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ABSTRACT 
     The current state of education focusing on standards and assessment, according to Wu (2004), 
reduces education to “technical problems and individual deficiencies, subject to surveillance and 
quality managerial procedures” (p. 308). This work uses Foucault’s discourses of discipline and 
power to understand standardization as a political utility of control that makes children docile 
subjects through “a set of practices by which one can acquire and assimilate” (Foucault, 1988, p. 
31). The process of standardization provides an ineffective grounding for achieving a worthwhile 
life as children are shaped as results-driven individuals (Shun & Wong, 2004). Baker (2008) 
believes that only through “a moral notion of reasoning” can a sense of responsibility be learnt 
(p. 191). 
     The Confucian cultivation of Ren represents a moral notion of reasoning. It understands the 
very foundation of human existence, not as an epistemology based on a dichotomous way of 
thinking, but as a moral responsibility. Not relying on an extensive accumulation of knowledge, 
the cultivation of Ren is based on a belief that all children are born with a moral goodness that 
can be led to a moral responsibility. Moreover, it emphasizes the carrying out of the benefit for 
others through respect, propriety, and relationship, rather than the seeking of rewards for one’s 
own. 
     Furthermore, I explain the Confucian notion of rights as embedded in the autonomy of the 
self. The more the self becomes morally responsible toward others, the more one’s rights are 
assured. I cite the United Sates law cases on higher education to support the claim that the 
political protection of rights may be necessary, but it is not the only condition to achieve 
autonomy and justice. In the case of Iowa Redistricting Policy, when a moral responsibility is 
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absent in the policymakers, an ideology of segregation continues to persist under the cover of 
diversity, which indirectly pushes the practice of discipline and assessment to its extreme. I 
conclude that the Confucian Ren celebrates a responsible living that cares children as lifetime 
achievers rather than results, rights-driven subjects. Moral responsibility can transform the 
existing power relations and make social, educational changes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Raise our head high and drop our head low, we will find the way. 
                                                                                       — Zisi , 中庸 (The Mean and Constancy)  1 2
     My first experience with a parent-teacher conference in Iowa was deeply disturbing. I was 
ready to hear about moments of my preschooler interacting with her friends at school. But I was 
not ready at all to talk through pages of evaluation prepared by the teacher. Assessments? Why? 
This is not why we send her to school, especially at the age of 4. Why is education so eager to 
hurry children (Hatch, 2002) to demonstrate skills like counting numbers? What is the point of 
assessment if children are reduced to numbers that do not reflect their capacity, especially for 
those who are beyond the maximum or below the minimum of the measurement scale? 
Throughout the conversation, the focus on curriculum objectives and dimensions, as well as 
meticulous behavioral instructions and expectations, was overwhelming. I worried, what would it 
mean that some children are “the dream kids for teachers?” What would it mean that some 
children are identified as low-achieving?   
     I learned that my 4-year-old was assigned to a letter spot on a carpet, an intended get-together 
space for group activities. As everyone was assigned to fixed letter spots, those who were unruly 
were placed nearest to the teacher to guarantee obedience. The opportunity for recess would be 
 Zisi (⼦思, c. 481–402 BCE), Chinese philosopher. The only grandson of Confucius, Zisi is 1
debatable the author of The Mean and Constancy (中庸).
 Texts in Chinese are translated by myself, including “中庸” (The Mean and Constancy), “论2
语” (Analects), “史记” (Records of the Grand Historian), “孟⼦”(Mencius), and “⼦道” (Zidao, 
or The Way of the Son). 
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taken away if one failed to be quiet and calm on the carpet. “Mom, Do I have to go school? Why 
do I go school?” my preschooler asked. So I asked myself, why do children think they are in 
school? What do we teach about why they are in school? Hatch (2002) explains,  
Systems set up on the premise that there are certain standards that everyone must attain. 
We teach students that meeting those standards is the reason they are in school. Children 
learn that doing the work that’s put in front of them at a level that will get them by is the 
stuff of schooling. In such a system, performance goals dominate learning goals. School 
tasks have no intrinsic value: they are only means to achieve the extrinsic rewards or 
avoid the punishments built into the system. (p. 460)         
     A year later, I walked down the hallway once again to my now 5-year-old kindergartener’s 
classroom for another parent-teacher conference. I heard a voice calling out, so stiff and cold, 
“Stop right there!” I immediately froze, worried and confused about whether the voice was 
directed at me or someone else. A student was picked out of the walking line, and the teacher 
pointed fingers at the student, demanding, “Is that how you walk in line? Go back to the end!” 
From the student’s appalled face, I knew the child was traumatized by the experience. What has 
driven education to such a disciplinary extreme? Do we remember that we are working with 
complex human beings? According to Foucault (1995), discipline works at the cost of greater 
intervention. It embodies a tight and more meticulous implementation of control that disrespects 
humanity. “It is no longer the body, but the soul” that is being punished (p. 101). Discipline, i.e., 
the meticulous control of the operations of the body and soul, becomes “the formula of 
domination” (p. 137). 
     I realize that the extreme discipline I happened to observe at school that day does not 
necessarily reflect the teacher’s belief. In fact, as Apple (2013) acknowledges, educational 
transformation is a social movement in which educators are not the real engines. Rather, the 
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incident was driven by a system of punishment and assessments that has overrun education for 
operational convenience and control. It is so forcefully implemented that any consideration of 
individual difference is eliminated. The fact that discipline and assessment start so early in 
children’s life shocked me, scared me, and shut me down at that moment in the school hallway.           
     With the “meticulousness of the regulations, fussiness of the inspections, and supervisions of 
the smallest fragment of life and the body” (Foucault, 1995, p. 140), young children’s impulses 
for learning are stressed; going to school becomes a dull experience. Schools and classrooms 
have become so tedious that my kindergartener starts to count in minutes and asks, “Teacher, 
when will school be over? When can I go home?” If I can’t help but feeling stressed by one 
incident, how do children face it day-by-day? My heart sinks at the fact that a “ history of 
utilitarian rationalization of detail” (p. 139) has led education astray. Education has become a 
continuation of politics. Disciplines have become “a political anatomy of detail” for control and 
domination (p. 139). Capitalism has transformed itself into a pursuit of standardized 
investigation. As educators, how do we work against the excessively disciplined and 
standardized curriculum that fuels children with a strong sense of individual entitlement for the 
rewards of one’s own? How do we work against the notion of children’s nature as “fickle and 
unreliable, and an inferior function to be controlled by transcendental reason” (Kim, 2014, p. 
87)? As children are trained to become result-driven subjects, how do we help them develop a 
sense of responsibility toward others that is essential for lifetime achievement? 
     As I feel my little girl’s frustration with the school, I recall my 20 years of experience in 
America trying to assimilate to the place. Over time, I tell myself: maybe the memories before 
my journey to America, the culture, or the place I grew up in, gets in the way. Maybe I need to 
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let it go. Yet the experience of raising a child for the past five years puts an end to my doubt. I 
know that the current state of education my child now encounters is problematic—without the 
elements of standards and assessments, I witness magic in her; with it, I see limitations. Having 
shared my personal motivation for writing this work, I move on to the theoretical outline.  
     The current state of education focusing on discipline, standards, and assessments, according 
to Wu (2004), reduces education to “technical problems and individual deficiencies, subject to 
surveillance and quality managerial procedures” (p. 308). In this work, I use Foucault’s 
discourses of discipline and power to understand standardization as a process to make children 
docile subjects through “a set of practices by which one can acquire and assimilate” (Foucault, 
1988, p. 31). Foucault (1995) writes, 
[D]iscipline produces subjected and practiced bodies, ‘docile’ bodies. Discipline 
increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same 
forces (in political terms of obedience). In short, it dissociates power from the body; one 
the one hand, it turns it into an ‘aptitude,’ a ‘capacity,’ which it seeks to increase; on the 
other hand, it reverses the course of the energy, the power that might result from it, and 
turns it into a relation of strict subjection.... [D]isciplinary coercion establishes in the 
body the constricting link between an increased aptitude and an increased domination. (p. 
138) 
     The process of standardization trains children to be docile bodies that conform to a political 
utility of control and domination. It provides an ineffective grounding for achieving a worthwhile 
life; children are shaped as results-driven individuals that lack the moral consideration for others 
(Shun and Wong, 2004). Baker (2008) believes that only through “a moral notion of 
reasoning” (p. 191), a notion that appreciates the difference of others, can one learn a sense of 
responsibility. Different from the current state of education focusing on the imposition and 
standardization of knowledge, in Confucian thought, the accumulation of knowledge is 
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considered secondary to the cultivation of moral responsibility. In addition, Confucius believes 
that all children are born with a moral goodness that can be cultivated toward a moral 
responsibility. However, the innate moral goodness does not automatically lead to a moral 
responsibility. It needs to be cultivated through respect, propriety, and relationship.  
     For the main body of this work, I use Confucian philosophy—a discourse that is profoundly 
different from the Western discourses of subjectivity and power—to understand the very 
foundation of human existence, not as an epistemology based on dichotomous thinking, but as a 
moral responsibility based on the cultivation of Ren (i.e., benevolence for others). More 
specifically, the Confucian cultivation of Ren understands the appreciation of differences, the 
working out of conflicting relations, or the “entitlement of others” (Chan, 2006, p. 245), as the 
precondition for individual autonomy, not the other way around. It emphasizes the carrying out 
of good intention for the benefit of others, rather than the seeking of rewards for one’s own.  
     In Confucian thought, human rights are approached differently from the Western way of 
claiming rights relying on legal and political forces. Rather, they are embedded in the autonomy 
of the self through the cultivation of moral goodness. The Ren self becomes autonomous and its 
rights are assured in carrying out the good intention for the benefit of others, rather than from the 
pursuit of one’s own rewards. Other scholars have also echoed on the value of bringing in a 
discourse that is profoundly different from the Western discourses of subjectivity and power 
(Apple, 2013, Smith, 2008). By embracing the complexity of relations, the Confucian cultivation 
of Ren demonstrates a creative resiliency not only in achieving autonomy, but also in carrying 
out the good intention for the benefit of others, which is fundamental in lifetime achievements, 
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Confucian Ren understands that feelings of achievements do not dwell in pursuing one’s own 
rewards, but in knowing that the benevolence for other people is delivered. 
Research Questions 
     Lifetime success in many ways is like the development of Chinese bamboo. In the beginning 
years, Chinese bamboo shows no visible signs of growth above the ground. Not until the fifth 
year do people observe miraculous growth. Real-life achievements take much longer than a few 
years and much more persistence than preparing for tests. This work concerns the following 
questions: first, how is moral and social responsibility understood in Foucault’s and Confucian 
thought? Second, what kind of subjectivity is constituted in the current state of education 
focusing on disciplines and standards? And thirdly, how does Confucian cultivation of Ren guide 
the self toward a moral responsibility that complements the results-driven subjectivity?  
     Zizek (2006), Wu (2004), etc., acknowledges the challenge for educational change under the 
political utility of control . Foucault also points out any effort, including resistance, produces 3
new modes of subjectivity and power, and eventually becomes a tool of oppression. Given the 
challenge of educational change, the Confucian Ren as a moral responsibility provides useful 
insights to not only understand the limitation of the results-driven subjectivity, but also to make 
social changes possible. Confucius  believes that social changes can be brought about if patience 4
and perseverance are cultivated toward a moral responsibility that carries out the good intention 
 Zizek (2006) writes, “It is better to do nothing than to engage in localized acts whose ultimate 3
function is to make the system run more smoothly… It [resistance] is a revolt which poses no 
effective threat, bombarding the power with impossible demands” (p. 334).
 Confucius (551 BC – 479 BC) was a Chinese teacher and philosopher in the Spring and 4
Autumn period in Chinese History.
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for the benefit of others. Not relying on discipline and standard to impose knowledge, the 
Confucian cultivation of Ren allows children to grow as lifetime achievers, rather than as 
rewards-driven subjects. It cultivates the patience and perseverance toward a moral responsibility 
that is critical in real-life achievements. It focuses on the carrying out of good intention for the 
benefit of others, rather than the pursuit of one’s own reward.  
     More specifically, the externally imposed standards have little to do with the seeking of Ren. 
To learn is to cultivate Ren, not to accumulate knowledge. Learning is not associated with the 
habit of getting rewards from external incentives. On the contrary, the absence of external 
incentives signifies the initiation of Ren. The self, especially the leader, must choose Ren 
voluntarily. For example, when asked how to keep thieves under control, Confucius replies, “If 
your highness is not greedy, people would not steal, even if you reward them for doing so” (12: 
18). Using this analogy, if educators allow education to be the pursuit of rewards, we only allow 
punishment and control to prevail. Just like the key to understanding thieves is to see the “greed” 
in rulers, the key to understanding standards is to see them as rooted in the technology of control 
and dominance. 
     Like Foucault, Confucius sees discipline as authority that trains children to conform to a 
political utility of control, rather than as a way to encourage them to grow as autonomous and 
morally responsible individuals. To Confucius, discipline does not bond people together, nor do 
they serve the purpose of working toward the common good. Zisi (2012) in The Mean and 
Constancy records, “It is frivolous and ineffective to transform people with the use of command 
or authority” (33). The rewards-driven subjectivity conforming to authority essentially takes 
away the self’s impulse to feel for others. Confucius sees no other way but to encourage the self-
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cultivation of Ren as a moral responsibility. Mencius (2012) adds to this point in Mencius, “We 
use moral principles to save a nation from drowning in a corruption. We use hands to pull a 
sister-in-law from drowning in water. Why, do you say we should rescue a corrupting nation with 
my hands” (4A:13)?  
     The art of archery is a good example to demonstrate the importance of moral cultivation in 
education. Zisi (2012) in The Mean and Constancy writes, “In archery we have something like 
the way of the superior man. When the archer misses the center of the target, he turns around and 
seeks the cause of his failure in himself” (9). In the instance of archery, we can’t blame the bow 
or the wind, nor the archer, for missing the target, just like we can’t blame the children, teachers, 
and schools for not getting the outcomes. The art of the archery lies in the archer’s calm aiming 
and releasing of the bow. Similarly, the art of education lies in helping children to become 
lifetime achievers, rather than to pressure, standardize, and punish them for the purpose of 
governance. As the Master indicates, we turn to the moral cultivation of the self.  
     In short, the cultivation of moral responsibility complements the results-driven subjectivity 
and allows children to grow as autonomous, responsible individuals capable of lifetime 
achievements. Confucius says, “One can subjugate the commander of a large army, yet, one can 
never bend the will of common people” (9: 26). If education continues to construct children as 
results-driven subjects, social change for the betterment of all would not be possible. However, if 
education sets the will of children as a moral responsibility toward others, children can do 
wonderful things, not only in their own lives, but also to others and society.  
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Chapters Overview 
     In Chapter One and Two, I introduce and review standardization and its effects on the self 
accordingly. In Chapter Three, I rely on Foucault’s discourses of discipline, technologies of the 
self, and governmentality, to understand how the self is disempowered as it engages with an 
education of standardization. In Chapter Four, I use Confucian thought to explain how the self is 
empowered through a lifelong cultivation of Ren as a moral responsibility, and becomes 
autonomous and capable of transforming the existing power relations. While both Foucault’s 
discourses and Confucian thoughts have a focus on the interchanging dynamics of order and 
chaos, Foucault emphasizes the discursive transgression of power relations, whereas Confucius 
embraces and cultivates the uniqueness of human nature as morally responsible.  
     In Chapter Five, I focus on the application of Confucian cultivation of Ren and its implication 
for education. I use legends in ancient China to show that the practice of Ren modeled by rulers 
has tremendous educational, social power beyond the typical idea of education associated with 
schools, classrooms, and knowledge. The practice of Ren modeled by rulers sets up a good 
example for people to learn and develop a moral responsibility. This model of Ren does not rely 
on external laws to reinforce conformity; instead it is based on a belief that people are the 
foundation of the states and that people by nature have the moral goodness to recognize Ren. In 
other words, although not all people are Ren, but by nature they can recognize Ren. Together the 
ruler’s practice of Ren and people’s recognition of Ren can transform the established social, 
political power. Furthermore, I use the case of Iowa Redistricting Policy to argue that, when a 
moral responsibility is absent in those leading and establishing policy for education, education 
does not deliver the equality of educational opportunity for all children. Lastly, I cite the United 
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States law cases on academic autonomy to support the claim that people’s moral responsibility 
plays a critical role in the protection of academic autonomy, which complements the legal 
enforcement.  
     I conclude that the Confucian cultivation of Ren as a moral responsibility provides helpful 
insight to understand the limitation of the current state of education focusing on standards. It 
reminds educators that children, not the governance of control, are the foundation of the states. 
To work toward the social, educational change oriented for the common good, education needs to 
care children as lifetime achievers, rather than to train them as results-, rights-driven agents. 
Education should encourage a moral responsibility in children, rather than to reinforce a 
subjectivity that seeks only reward for oneself. In children’s eyes, there is no binary of words and 
pictures, orders and chaos, reasons and instincts, or rights and responsibility. They exist only 
because people construct them.     
     To finish, Foucault’s deconstruction of discipline and punishment, technologies of the self, 
and governmentality, help to understand how power relations operate. Yet, without connecting to 
Confucian thought, I could not see a way that addresses the limitation of standardization. I’m 
able to connect with the consideration of people as the foundation of the states, which reveres the 
uniqueness of human nature as morally responsible. Confucius understands that, what truly 
bonds people together, is not the dominant economic or political power, but the moral 
responsibility practiced by both the leaders and people. Maybe invisible at times, people’s moral 
responsibility will rise above circumstances and transform the existing power relations. Zisi 
(2012) writes, “Nothing is more visible than when it is hidden” (The Mean and Constancy, 1).  
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     In summary, education should be a lifelong cultivation of moral and social responsibility. It is 
not simply the vocational preparation as Dewey opposes, nor a “technical mutation” of hierarchy 
and control as Foucault opposes (Foucault, 1995, p. 147). Most importantly, education should not 
be reduced to numbers that can be standardized, as Taubman (2009) and others oppose. 
Education should be a cultivation of Ren as moral, social responsibility: “help others whenever 
we wish to do the same to ourselves; enable others to express themselves and communicate 
whenever we wish to accomplish the same” (Analects, 12: 2). Without cultivating a moral 
responsibility in children, education is limited to the accumulation of knowledge that is results-, 
rights-driven; without it, children are trained and limited as agents that conform to a political 
utility of control, rather than as autonomous, responsible individuals. Moral responsibility as Ren 
can complement the political, legal enforcements in working toward the betterment for all. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
STANDARDS AND ASSESSMENTS—THE MAKING OF THE DOCILE SUBJECT 
      
     On February 27, 2017, columnist Hannah-Jones writes in The New York Times, “Have We 
Lost Sight of the Promise of Public Schools?” The author asks these questions: “Is public school 
a dead end? Is education oriented toward the proliferation of profit-driven and privately funded? 
Would public school still matter? Have we forgotten what ‘public’ really means?” These 
questions are not new, and yet still provoking and fundamental. If the trend of public education 
complying to capitalism has become inevitable, why do people’s voices like Hannah-Jones’ rail 
against the labeling of public school as an industry? How does the corporation of education work 
through standards and assessments on people? How does an education focusing on standards and 
assessments disempower people in the mask of fair competition and free market choice? This 
chapter reviews standards and assessments and their effects on students, teachers, and educators. 
I start with a brief historic overview of public school, and then move on to a more detailed 
literature review on standards and assessments presented as the following: self as subjectivity, 
self as hurried/stressed, self as undifferentiated/assimilated, self as entrepreneurs, self as 
digitized. I conclude with the self as a lifetime achiever. For the purpose of discussion, I include 
voices of both proponents and opponents.  
Overview 
     The word “public” derives from the Latin word publicus, meaning “of the people.” It used to 
stand for a communal ownership of institutions and society that supports common good over 
individual advancement. This is how public infrastructure such as public school came into place 
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in the United States. Becoming widespread in the 1800s, according to Hannah-Jones (2007), 
public school was not intended to provide advantages for any particular individuals, but instead 
sought to shuffle “the wealthy and working class” in a way that would create a common sense of 
citizenship and national identity. However, this was not the case in practice. Not until the Civil 
Rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s did African Americans start to have the same legal 
rights to access public schools. Nevertheless, according to Hannah-Jones, the limited sense of 
public good “was a unifying force because it meant that the rich and the poor, the powerful and 
the meek, shared the spoils— as well as burdens—of this messy democracy.”  
After the 1950s, just as African Americans started to gain access to public schools, the 
voucher movement offered and supported white Americans to pay for private schools that 
worked against school desegregation and toward privatization. From the beginning, privatization 
was a convenient and effective way to break the understanding of public schools and set people 
apart once again. By cutting costs and maximize competition among schools, privatization sets 
public schools in a competitive free-market-based system of school choice. By doing so, it 
eliminates the geographically based system of public education. According to Coffman (1993), 
modern democratic society has no absolute power like kings of ancient Egypt or China, but 
rather a lot of rulers with greater or lesser power, in Foucault’s term, the collective dimensions of 
governmental powers. Coffman writes, “It is not their control of the food supply or of the 
economy in general, but instead the educational system that concerns us” (p. 5). 
Starting in the 1950s, standards and assessment have been the instrument for educational 
reform driven by political rather than educational purposes. According to Gratz (2000), the 
primary purposes of standards and assessments are two-fold: to push students to learn faster and 
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prepare them for competitions in a global market, and to address the achievement disparity 
between high- and low-achieving students. Standards proponent Hauser (1999) argues that, 
without raising standards, American education will continue to be “a vast sorting system based 
largely on social class and racial background, with the outcome determined for many children 
before the game began” (p. 64). Following Hauser’s argument, standards and assessments can 
combat achievement gap, thus work against the system’s built-in failure destined for low-
achieving students. With all respect to the author’s good intention, do standards and assessments 
deliver their vision? Are they improving the low-achieving?  
Little evidence in the literature supports the claimed causal link between standards and 
achievements. Allen (1991) argues that in their empirical study, the adoption of higher standards 
in science class results in ninth graders’ achievement improvement. In the study, a proportion of 
ninth graders were placed in a more demanding science class whereas the rest remained in the 
less rigorous version. Students in the controlled group were required to work extra, either on 
their own or get tutoring from peer and teacher, before and or after school, until they scored 
100% on the test. Making a causal link between higher standards and achievements, the author 
also points out that students, when asked, attributed their three-week science success to their own 
effort and motivation rather than to the enforcement of higher standards. It is thus questionable 
whether the observed improvement in science should be attributed to extrinsic factors such as 
standards or to intrinsic factors, such as student motivation and effort. The enforced standards 
may have provoked a short-term boost of incentive for learning science, but their long-term 
effect is unknown. 
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On the other side, opponents of standards have questioned the assumed causality between 
standards and achievements, and are concerned about their negative impacts on students and 
teachers. Hatch (2002) asserts, “Using the threat of failure as a tool to motivate young children 
and their teachers is an absurd notion that characterizes a system designed to punish rather than 
improve” (p. 459). Gratz (2000) also points out that standards and assessments are designed 
primarily to identify and punish rather than to improve “poor-performing” schools and students 
(p. 683). The author reports, “If you look at the evidence about kids retained, they don’t get 
better over the long time. They fell further behind” (p. 686). It is necessary to point out here that 
standards designed to identify the poor-performing are not the same as competing in the world 
economy. The one-size-fit-for-all standard fails to address the complexity of achievement gap in 
which students’ social, cultural, and racial background play a role.  
     Many other researchers converge on this point. Nave (2000) et al. agree that the effectiveness 
of standards-based movement in raising student achievement is still an open question. The author 
also points out that the standards-based movement is a “reform on the cheap” (p. 129). Brady 
(2000) explains, capitalists in power seek inexpensive strategies and quick fixes to education 
giving the appearance of solutions. Eisner (2001) argues that standards and assessments reduce 
learning to a causality between standards and entitlements of the self (p. 370). They fail the 
“ethical commitment to do what is right” for children (Hatch, 2002, p. 461).   
     These researchers agree that in the process of standardization, all children, not just the poor-
performing, are prepared as docile subjects for the market of global competition. Eisner (2001) 
writes, “Education has evolved from a human development serving personal and civic needs into 
a product our nations produce to compete in a global economy” (p. 370). Standards and 
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assessments have become the enforced exercise, in Plato’s term, “the element of slavery,” for the 
executions of a purpose other than the development of children. They function to enslave people. 
This review focuses on how standards and assessments operate and shape the self as a docile 
subject, hurried/stressed, undifferentiated/assimilated, as entrepreneurs, digitalized, as well as 
how they limit the self as a lifetime achiever.  
The Self as a Docile Subject 
The most important and greatest puzzle which every man faces is himself.  
                                                                                                                     —  Boring, 1950 
     Based on Foucault’s theorization of governmentality, Raaper (2017) argues that the 
“neoliberal discourses of accountability have turned assessments into a complex technology of 
governmentality that manages educational processes as well as student subjectivities” (p. 322). 
Discipline as a specific technique of power “acts on individuals by approaching them both as 
objects and as instruments of its exercise” (p. 322). Comparing two universities that are impacted 
by neoliberalism to a various extent, Raaper’s study reports that, like any other disciplinary 
technology, assessments constrain and control not only academics but also people’s subjectivity. 
Standards act as engines for generating products. Taubman (2009) speaks specifically on the 
subjectivity of supervisors and student teachers. The author explains that, teaching, when aligned 
to a set of standards and driven by the need to grade them, ignores the complexity—“the 
autobiographical, situational, and temporal, relational, contingency–of the specific class on a 
particular day” (p. 123). Raaper adds that the imbalanced power relation between the assessor 
and assessed has been shifted to a “complex field of politics shaped by global, national, and 
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institutional contexts” (p. 335). Davies and Bansel (2010) argue that technologies of assessments 
“produce specific types of academic subjects that fit with the programmatic ambitions of 
government” (p. 9).  
     As mentioned above, Raaper and Taubman et al. consider standards and assessments as 
disciplinary power through Foucault’s governmentality through which children are trained as 
docile subjects. To differ a little, Olssen (2006) differentiates assessments from standards. To 
some extent, the differentiation of assessment and standards makes sense because children 
practice standards on a daily basis without necessarily feeling assessed all the time. Thus the 
impact of assessments may be more indirect than the impact of standards. In a way, standards 
work as disciplines that precondition children as docile subjects for the purpose of assessments 
that serves for governmentality of control. Olssen argues that understandings of standards and 
assessments must include discourses of both discipline and governmentality, for how subjectivity 
is “to be ruled, how strictly, by whom, to what end, by what method” (Foucault, 1997, p. 89) are 
all intertwined and inseparable.   
     In addition to Foucault’s concepts of discipline and governmentality, rationality is another 
pivotal lens the literature uses to discuss the effects of standards and assessments. Foucault 
(2001) theorizes power relations as demonstrating a history of rationality, always pursued 
differently from period to period and in various ways as the more effective means of governance 
(p. 325). Eisner (2001) argues that the use of standards and assessments is only necessary if 
people are to function rationally. “Measurement is one way to describe the world and 
quantification is not good for everything” (p. 368). Trained to become docile subjects, children 
are expected to function rationally and effectively. The management of children as rational 
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subjects secures the effectiveness of governance. “A superb formula: power exercised 
continuously and for what turns out to be a minimal cost” (Foucault, 1980, p. 155), or in 
Marshal’s (1995) term Busnopower, a particular form of bio-power that is “redirected at the 
subjectivity of the person, not through the body but though the mind” (p. 322). 
The Self as Hurried/Stressed 
     Hatch (2002) sees the proliferation of standards and assessments as threats to early childhood 
education. “It’s wrong to label a 7-year-old second-grader a failure; it is criminal to do it to a 4-
year-old preschooler” (p. 459). To Hatch, it is totally inappropriate to expect children at the age 
of 4 to perform on academic tasks and label some as failure. It does little benefit but to damage 
their future achievements. Boud and Falchikov (2007) also respond to the hurriedness of 
assessments on children that damages their future confidence. In The Hurried Child, Elkind 
(1994) argues that young children are put under debilitating stress in a curriculum dominated by 
standards and assessments. Homework has been increased, free play is curtailed and constructed 
toward academic learning, recess is shortened or eliminated, and so on. Children are stressed 
because their need to play and be physically active is overthrown for mandatory, seated exercises 
on worksheets. Recall Plato’s thoughts on learning as playing, “There should be no element of 
slavery in learning. Enforced exercise does no harm to the body, but enforced learning will not 
stay in the mind. So avoid compulsion, and let your children’s lessons take the form of 
play” (Cited in Eisner, 2001, p. 371). Elkind warns, “When young people’s developmental 
needs…are ignored, when their human differences in growth rates and behavior are deemed 
deviant, and when they are given little or no space to live and to grow, they are stressed” (p. 
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188). Instead of rushing children to achieve and perform, the author argues that waiting, until 
they are ready, shows no academic disadvantage in the long term.  
     Lynott and Logue (1993) argue against Elkind’s et al. perspectives on the hurriedness of 
children. First, the authors assert that claims of the hurried child authors fail to take into account 
the diverse experiences of contemporary American children from a historical perspective. In 
other words, harsh realities for many African American children in the past are overlooked. The 
authors argue that the “lower class children have always grown up faster than their middle and 
upper class counterparts” and “hurrying is more problematic for middle class children because 
the lower class children see the ‘need’ for early independence whereas hurried middle class 
children today do not” (p. 481). Note here that the authors limit the independence of African 
American children as the ability to earn a living rather than to achieve lifetime fulfillment. 
Educators know well that the need to survive cannot substitute for the need of lifetime 
achievements. Standards and assessments limits and trains children, particularly African 
American children, to a mere physical survival of living.  
     Lynott and Logue (1993) also criticize that families of the past have been romanticized by the 
“hurried child writers.” They argue that the way children are raised has always been deemed 
problematic in every historical era (p. 487). Again the authors ambiguously equate the challenge 
of feeding children in the past to the challenge of living at one’s full potential. The authors 
critique that the hurried child writers fail to acknowledge the decreased empirical evidences of 
behaviors in youth, such as drug use. However, one question remains: the evidence of decreased 
behaviors itself cannot simply be claimed as the outcome of standards and assessments. It is only 
wishful thinking that there’s a causal link between decreased behaviors and external standards 
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and assessments in evidence. As mentioned before, Allen’s (1991) study is an example of such 
empirical evidences. 
     Going back to the theme of this section, stress is contagious. It passes back and forth between 
teachers and children. Stressed teachers teach to the test and unfairly seek ways to eliminate the 
low-performing scores. Taubman (2009) refers to teachers’ stress as the seduction of a 
profession.  
The best way we educators can address serious social, political and economic problems is 
to comply with regulatory agencies and their mandated audit practices, subject ourselves 
to control from afar, render ourselves and our situations as quantifiable data, and 
surrender to normalizing discourses that drain our subjectivities. (p. 144)  
     Also speaking to the stress of being audited in a system of standards and assessments, Power 
(2003) describes depressed, exhausted, and nervous teachers. 
The auditee is undoubtedly a complex being simultaneously devious and depressed; she 
is skilled at games of compliance but exhausted and cynical about them too; she is 
nervous about the empty certificates of comfort that get produced… She fears the 
mediocrity of the auditors at the same time as she regrets their “powerlessness to 
discipline the “really bad guys;” she loathes the time wasted in rituals of inspections but 
accepts that this is probably what “we deserve;” she sees the excellent and competent 
suffer as they attempt to deal with the demands of quality assurance at the same time as 
the idle and incompetent escape its worst excesses… but wonders why, after all her years 
of training, she is not trusted as an expert anymore. (p. 125)   
     Taubman (2009) breaks down teachers’ stress into four reasons: the fear of dwindling 
resources, the shame of failing to meet up the heroic figure portrayed in media, the fantasy that 
teaching is responsible to everything, and the mourning for the “lost idea of racial integration and 
eradication of poverty” (p. 128). According to Taubman, standards and assessments are offered 
for teachers, in the name of empowerment, in order to make the stress more manageable. While 
the American public may not “have any idea about the seriousness of efforts to dismantle public 
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education, piece by piece,” teachers are seduced into “busily grading, assessing, evaluating, 
ranking, rating, and of course preparing for the next test” (p. 127). Yet at the same time, they feel 
lost, “Who am I or what am I? A prompter for the big screen?” The “hollowing of teacher 
identities and intellectual work” (p. 105) aggregates rather than alleviates the stress day-by-day. 
Herein lies the irony of stress management for teachers. 
     Beal and Hendry (2012) investigate another form of irony: parental stress of school choice. As 
standards and assessments market schools as products and data that are now available to be 
compared, parents are given the impression of empowerment hoping that their input and 
participation can lead to better match of a school for their children. The process is complicated 
and stressful. The stress lies in not only that the “parents’ school choice behavior does not always 
reflect rational choice theory” as presented in school data (p. 524), but also that school choice 
policies fail to consider “parents’ personal histories and class, racial, ethnic background, and/or 
the racial and socioeconomic divisions in school systems” (p. 527). Again, the stress lies in the 
irony of empowerment masked as empowerment. To explain, the disguised empowerment of 
choice casts parents as consumers but only with the condition of accepting education as 
standards and assessment. In addition, minority and low-income parents are disempowered 
because school choice policies “privilege middle-class, professional parents with the time and 
flexibility to navigate complex school choice systems.” The authors conclude, “The result is a 
segregated, homogeneous student population” (p. 525).  
     In short, the limiting standards and hurried assessments successfully clone the macro social, 
racial, and class stress in teachers and parents into the micro school and classroom settings. Cited 
by Beal and Hendry, “School-wide desegregation ‘may not be synonymous with desegregation at 
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the classroom level’” (p. 526). Standards and assessments serve as the “immutable mobiles” that 
“can move across context and cross local, state, and national borders, from one community of 
practice to another, and transforming these as they go, but not being themselves transformed in 
the process” (Taubman, 2009, p. 114). As contagious as it can be, stress consumes teachers, 
students, and parents.          
The Self as Undifferentiated/Assimilated  
     Eisner (2001) argues that, rested on rationalization and quantification, standards and 
assessments promote comparison in student performance without consideration of their 
differences. In addition, standards and assessments promote comparison in outcomes of schools 
without consideration of different curricula, approaches of teaching, and allocation of time for 
instruction. Taubman (2009) in Teaching by Numbers adds that comparison-based standards 
ignores the larger social, political, or economic complications but instead focuses on the 
mechanism of individual deficiencies. “Never sensitive to the specificity of context, history, or 
unique experiences, differences are cast as faults of students, teachers, schools, or families” (p. 
114-117). 
     To Taubman (2009), teaching to the comparison-based standards is reduced to enforcements 
of numbers. Losing the complexity and contingency, this form of teaching has less and less to do 
with the students. It becomes more and more a process of maximizing output and minimizing 
input, a game pertaining not to the differences and meanings in learning, but rather to the 
efficiency of products. As the teacher’s input and interaction with students in classrooms become 
silent, teaching by standards can easily be replaced by mechanics and machines. Ball (2015) 
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argues that the technology of governance requires educational practitioners to “set aside personal 
beliefs and commitments and live in an existence of calculation” (p. 213). 
     What should be the purpose of educational standards and assessments? Looking back, the 
recognition of standards and assessments as the understanding of differences is not new. Walsh 
(1985) argues that assessments are meaningful only if differences of children and their 
environment are taken into consideration, otherwise assessments will remain harmful, inaccurate, 
and inappropriate. Starting in the 1900s, assessments were mainly a means to understand rather 
than to normalize individual difference (as well as to identify specific abilities). On the one side, 
Walsh (1985) asserts that the “tests and assessments have had tremendous utility for individuals, 
for organizations, and for a society concerned with the development and nurturance of individual 
potential and the facilitation of productivity and high quality of life” (p. 370). On the other side, 
Walsh points out, the controversy of using standardized tests and to what extent, are not 
technical, statistical, or methodological, but an intended value choice.  
     More specifically, by design, assessments allow the systems to “select some and reject others” 
(Walsh, p. 392). In other words, standards and assessments disregard the pre-existing low 
achievements that are the results of previous conditions, such as the inequality of educational 
opportunities. Standards and assessments disregard the social, racial, and family background, and 
continue to reinforce and perpetuate the achievement gap in a meritocratic system of seemingly 
fair competition and free market. Thus “any discussion of race differences in test performance 
must account for the fact that blacks and whites develop in drastically different socioeconomic, 
cultural, and educational environments” (p. 379). Walsh points out, “Tests constructed by and for 
the cultural majority [i.e. the white middle-class] are simply inappropriate and unfair. Walsh cites 
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Jensen’s (1969) study of intelligence that attributes the observed difference of intelligence in 
white and African American children primarily to genetic factors. Jensen’s failure to take into 
account the differences of socioeconomic, cultural, and educational environment, has led to a 
widespread public outrage at the time. Taubman (2009) laments on the unchanged ideology of 
segregation behind the assimilation of differences.  
[O]ur schools are more segregated today than at any time since Brown vs. Board of 
Education [1954]… yet it is impossible to hear a discussion of this fact… We hear a good 
deal of talk about diversity…, but one would assume from reading the standard that we 
live in an integrated society, where diversity is really only about being sensitive to the 
Other’s cultural differences [original capitalization]. We also hear much about closing the 
achievement gap but not about closing the economic gap or closing the racial gap. (p. 
153-154)   
     In addition to examining the assimilation of differences as segregation, Shahjahan (2011) 
critiques that evidence-based education continues a colonial discourse that promotes “hierarchies 
of knowledge and monocultures of the mind” (p. 182). From an anticolonial perspective, 
Shahjahan argues that standards in evidence-based education shares a common ground with 
colonial schooling in that the “irrational, feminine, i.e., the differences, are considered as the 
colonized inferior to the rational, masculine, of the colonizers” (p. 184). Without the violence of 
conquest, standards represent a benevolent form of assimilation “by construing the superiority of 
rationality as symbol of civilization, a gift only the most civilized mind can render” (p. 186).     
     On the subject of what to teach to children, politics of standards and assessments assume that 
whatever is known by the dominant elites should be taught to the next generation. Eisner (2001) 
opposes the notion of teaching to a fixed curriculum. Brady (2000) adds that teaching should 
focus on the student’s “here and now” rather than the “preprocessed, canned information” (p. 
651). Teaching should be about discovering where children are, what their strengths are, and 
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where additional guidance is needed, i.e., to discover the uniqueness and differences, rather than 
to strip away any autobiographical characteristics. According to Eisner, educational evaluation 
“takes time, it is intensive and complex… subtle, particularly if used to provide information to 
improve the process of teaching and learning” (p. 369). The author suggests that educational 
assessments need to increase variances to better understand differences. The real measure of 
educational achievement should be “what students to with what they learn when they can do 
what they want to do” (p. 370). 
     Lastly, standards and assessments demand a fact-based curriculum that promotes a singular 
process of recalling rather than multiple ways of learning. According to Brady (2000), how 
children process information involves more than just recalling facts. Learning involves processes 
of categorizing, translating, hypothesizing, valuing, generalizing, or synthesizing, to name a few. 
Standards- and assessments-enforced curricula reduce learning to a process of recalling that lacks 
the genuine intellectual challenge. The intellectual dullness sets limitations in the curious mind 
and often turns students off. Cook (1951) writes about the consequences of the elimination of 
individual difference, particularly in students with higher ability. 
 As long as children of all the people remain in school, it will be impossible to reduce the  
 variability of instructional groups significantly through promotion policies. [If insisted],  
 the efficiency of the school is reduced through the accumulation of low-ability pupils and 
 the lessening of educational opportunities for the more able. (p. 21)  
In summary, standards and assessments ignore student uniqueness, reduce teaching to a fixed 
curriculum, and dwindle down intellectual challenge. They serve to assimilate differences and 
train children to become docile subjects that conforms to the political utility of control. I finish 
this section with Lipman’s (2004) summary. 
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Students are reduced to test scores, future slots in the labor market, prison numbers and 
possible cannon folder in military conquests. Teachers are reduced to technicians and 
supervisors in the education assembly line—“objects” rather than “subjects” of history. 
This system is fundamentally about the negation of human agency. (p. 179) 
The Self as an Entrepreneur 
     From a Foucauldian (2004) perspective, standards and assessments rest in diffuse power that 
optimizes outcome and favors minimum input as the ideal path of governance. Rationalization 
plays a central role in the process of optimization. Olssen (2006) argues, in neoliberalism, human 
individuals are to be shaped in terms of a classification of skills, knowledge, and ability—in 
other words, to become “entrepreneurial and competitive conduct of economic-rational 
individuals” (p. 219). A neoliberal education of standards and assessments actively creates 
conditions for an effective market order, extending economic criteria into educational spheres. 
Cited by Olssen, standards and assessments universalize the “entrepreneurial form through the 
promotion of an enterprise culture” (p. 218). Besley and Peter (2007) also argue that individuals 
learn to “refashion themselves as the ‘entrepreneurs’ who apply certain managerial, economic, 
and actuarial techniques to themselves” (p. 164).  
     Furthermore, according to Olssen (2006), preparations of entrepreneurial individuals require a 
“redefining of law and of juridical institutions so that they function to correct the market 
mechanism and discipline the non-entrepreneurial behavior” (p. 218). They require a flexible 
rationalism in which the concept of lifelong learning is often used as “the magic spell in the 
discourse of educational policymakers” (Lambeir, 2000, p. 350). Marshal (1996) points out that, 
what constitutes the neoliberal discourse of lifelong learning are skills and information. In this 
sense, learning as the entrepreneurial self is reduced to skills that must adapt over and over again 
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for external market demands. Yet the self is never fast enough to update skills in order to achieve 
job security. As the survival responsibility is shifted from the system to the self, this 
entrepreneurial self, although competent of updating skills demanded by the market of 
opportunity, and presumably rational as well, can never live its life independently from the 
market demand. 
     Trained to be rational and responsible for its autonomy under the conditions of updating skills 
and information demanded by the market, the entrepreneurial self in an entrepreneurial culture 
enables the “abolition of welfare obligations of states” (Olssen, p. 221). “Not only must 
individuals learn, but they must learn to recognize what to learn, and what and when to forget 
what to learn when circumstances demand it” (p. 224). In short, an entrepreneurial culture 
promoted by standards and assessments not only limits learning to an individual pursuit of 
information, it also avoids social responsibility under the cover of autonomy. 
The Self as Digitized  
     Friedman (2006) in The World is Flat presents a world of rapid technological competition in 
which the key for people’s thriving is to reorient learning as “digitized” (p. 278). According to 
the author, standards and assessments presented in the digital world make students work harder 
and get teachers motivated. Friedman writes, “The best way to make kids love learning is either 
to instill in them a sense of curiosity, by great teaching, or stimulate their own innate curiosity by 
making available to them all the technologies of the flat-world platform” (p. 304). This part of 
the review concerns the following questions: How would technologies of the flat-world stimulate 
innate curiosity? Why are corporations so invested in education testing? How does school-based 
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digital learning impact children? What are the consequences of learning experienced in the 
digital world?  
     The introduction of internet access in schools and its hidden effects on learning concern many 
researchers. To start with, Hope (2015) explores how e-safety policy documents serve to limit 
individual thought. The author construes the e-safety agenda “as a more subtle description of the 
governmentality strategy as it encourages certain forms of social actions while restricting the 
possibility of other types” (p. 345). Four themes arise in the research as the consequences of this 
agenda: the homogeneous construction of online children, the muting of children voices, the 
responsibility of children, and the diagnostic inflation of risks.  
     Hope (2015) reports that in the e-safety policy, ambiguity exists in the definition of child age 
and the social complexity of children. According to the author, the policy speaks of a child who 
may not exist or who exists merely as an artifact. The homogeneous representation of children 
creates a “crude simulacrum” that portrays them as potentially at-risk rather than as “one of 
being” (p. 345-346). Children are no longer considered the key social actors that are capable of 
affecting policy and practice. Furthermore, children’s views are dismissed as irrational rather 
than as providing insight. Adult perceptions dominate the policy, for example, “We need to keep 
listening to parents and those who work with children, [but not the children themselves]” (p. 
347). As children are positioned as both at-risk and irrational, the e-safety policy ignores the 
imbalanced power between children and adults, however, holds children responsible for 
appropriate online conduct. By shifting the responsibility away from the system, children are 
mobilized “as agents of social control” (p. 348) and trained into “self-policing behaviors” (p. 
350). Hope summarizes, notions of children becoming self-policing justify “the advocacy of 
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crude, generic controls” that serve “to cast a net of social control wider while encouraging 
students to accept dominant policy discourses” (p. 350). In short, school-based digital learning 
prescribes only the standards and judgements that are deemed acceptable by the system.  
     O’Brien et al. (2014) argue that e-learning technology, within a standardized framework, 
relentlessly sets limitations for the acceptable and unacceptable. It defines “not only what one 
should learn but also how one should learn” (p. 285). It is not just a technology, but a technology 
of disciplinary power. E-learning allows programmers to integrate standards, goals, and other 
descriptions into the design. It embeds the encoded standards deeper into the lives of its users. 
Obrien et al. writes, “With every iteration of the attempt to perfect the technology, we are—
whether our role is to be a spider or a fly—less and less able to live without the webs that we 
weave and that entrap us” (p. 293). In short, e-learning and e-safety policy limit learning to the 
promotion of standards for the purpose of dominance and control.   
Conclusion—The Self as a Lifetime Achiever 
     Thacher (1999) raises a critical question: “Why today’s children arrive at our privileged 
school doors with social skills… far less developed than those of prior generations” (p. 51)? 
Where does the “odd feeling of powerlessness” come from? (Taubman, p. 94). What has the 
current state of education focusing on standards and assessments been doing to children? In this 
review, I have so far focused on the limitation of standardization as a process to train children to 
become docile subjects that conforms to a political utility of control and domination. It provides 
an ineffective grounding for achieving a worthwhile life. Eisner (2001) believes that, “The 
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function of schooling is not to enable students to do better in school. The function of schooling is 
to enable students to do better in life” (p. 369).  
    First of all, standardization misses the purpose of education for challenging conversations. 
Students are trained to yield away from challenging conversations that are portrayed as difficult 
and confrontational, but instead seek comfort in instant rewards. They find ways to cut corners in 
studying for the test and plan their time accordingly. Eisner (2001) argues that the process of 
rational planning and learning just for the grade has very little to do with an intellectual 
disposition where “risk-taking, exploration, uncertainly, and speculation” can emerge. These 
dispositions are in fact essential for lifetime achievement.   
     Second, an education of standards and assessment train children into a belief of individual 
entitlement for rewards that is isolated from their responsibility for others and society. From a 
social perspective, Coffman (1993) argues that education should not be limited to “subject-matter 
specifics, but include… social sensitivity and personal adjustment, the attitudes and values 
necessary for functioning as members of democratic society” (p. 6). The author cites, 
[T]ests have thus far been developed only for the objective concerned with the students’ 
intellectual development, or with his purely rational behavior [original italics]. 
Objectives concerned with his non-rational behavior, or objectives concerned with his 
emotional behavior, or objectives concerned with such things as artistic and aesthetic 
values and tastes, moral values… etc. have been seriously neglected in educational 
measurement. (p. 7) 
     When education is set for individual reward, notions of inclusiveness, tolerance, and 
solidarity with others are excluded. Eisner points out that educators need to redirect education 
toward the “processes, conditions, and culture that are closer to the heart of education” (p. 372). 
Children need a fresh and humane vision of education instead of the current state of standards 
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that focuses on the production of an indifferent, docile subject. They need an education that can 
help them become responsible humans, who can shape the society, rather than being shaped as 
docile bodies.  
    This review adds to the growing body of literature on a critical perspective of standards and 
assessments. Observing my daughter’s experience with standards and assessments at school, I 
believe that rushing into the practice of standards and forcing out children’s impulse for playing 
bring little benefit to lifetime achievement; rather they serve the purposes of governance, 
rationalization, commodification, assimilation, segregation, and colonization. Standards and 
assessments de-humanize children, knowledge and learning. “Why do we continue on 
educational reforms that have already been tried and found ineffective in the past” (Coffman, p. 
6)? In summary, education should not be working toward individual entitlement or rewards at the 
expense of tolerance and consideration for others. “We don’t need a collection of standardized 
workers, but rather a vast variety of talents developed to the fullest” (p. 8). Education should be 
for the well-being of all. 
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FOUCAULT’S SUBJECTIVITY: POWER, CONTROL, AND LIMITATIONS 
  
 The space of freedom for the individual is love—it is the only space, the only   
 moment in life, where the various precautions, defenses, conservatism break down,  
 and one tries to go to the  limit of one’s being, so it is fundamental. 
                                                                                          Julia Kristeva: Interviews, p. 121 
 The turning of real lives into writing is no longer a procedure of heroization: it   
 functions as a procedure of objectification and subjection… the appearance of a   
 new modality of power in which each individual receives as his status his own   
 individuality, and in which he is linked by his status to the features, the    
 measurements, the gaps, the “mask” that characterize him and make him a “case.” 
                                                                                            Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 192  
     In this chapter, I use Foucault’s discourses of discipline and power to understand the current 
state of education, which focuses on standardization as a process to make children docile 
subjects. Foucault’s theory provides a powerful lens to see standardization as serving to a 
political utility of control. However, it is based on a utilization of power relations dominated by 
memories of opposition. Consequently, Foucault’s care of the self is limited to an exercise of 
centrality for people who are already in domination. Furthermore, it is a rational mastery of the 
self relying on reason (Wang, 2004, p. 28). I write this chapter with the following two questions 
in mind: first, how in particular do I connect with Foucault’s discourses on discipline and 
punishment as I struggle with my little girl in the current state of education? Second, given the 
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consideration that this work unarguably evolves life, particularly educational experience, why am 
I not comfortable writing it as an autobiographical work? What can be learned from the way I 
feel? The first question leads to the significance of Foucault’s work in understanding 
standardization and the second to its limitation. 
     Reading Foucault helps reveal how power relations operate, are imposed upon, and control 
children in education. However, Foucault’s discourses, including his thoughts on the care of the 
self, do not necessarily provide insight for social change. Knowing that the current state of 
education reinforces a results-driven and docile subjectivity does not automatically provide a 
way of change for education. What should educators do after having learned the fact that the 
current state of education is not aimed at preparing children for lifetime achievement, but rather 
at training them for the purpose of political control? As I read more on Foucault’s work, I felt 
stuck considering the dichotomy of liberation and oppression. Then I came across Hendry’s 
(1998) message: “I suspended the notions of agency as dependent on a unitary subject, resistance 
as oppositional and power as a possession” (p. 39). Simple yet illuminating, reading her message 
was a turning point for me. She reminded me of my original motivation in writing this chapter: 
opposition is just a method. It is not the end, but rather only a beginning of understanding. To go 
beyond opposition, I need to understand where opposition originates first. 
     To give an outline of the chapter, I begin with the notion of opposition from which Foucault’s 
technologies of power and the self originate. After having understood the development and 
constitution of subjectivity, I move on to the disciplined and punished subject. For the second 
half of the chapter, I use “writing as autobiography” as a transition from the significance of 
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Foucault’s work to its limitations. Without engaging in a conversation on morality, Foucault’s 
discussion of the care of the self remains problematic and thus impossible to achieve.  
Technologies of the Self: Opposition 
     Foucault’s technologies of the self can be traced back to Rousseau’s narratives on power and 
the self. According to Baker (2001), Rousseau’s “self” embodies three types of power: physical 
power, or bodily strength; metaphysical power of will, or the capacity to make choices; and 
social power that exists within a civil society (p. 272). To Rousseau, the pure physical power 
contains only a Newtonian inscription; neither good or bad, it is simply a function of the self’s 
survival instinct without any moral bindings. Unlike the physical power, Rousseau’s 
metaphysical power of will is the desire to cause things to happen to oneself, and consequently, 
to others in both positive and negative ways.  
     By separating the body from the mind, Rousseau accepts the opposition of feeling from 
reason. Although acknowledging that the self’s physical power and metaphysical power of will 
constitute the embryo from which social power grows, Rousseau separates social power from 
these two. Furthermore, knowing that feelings are inseparable from the constitution of social 
power, Rousseau accepts the opposition of the self from social power. Consequently, both the 
self and social power are conceptualized as fixed with boundaries, rather than as emerging and 
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lived . Rousseau does not acknowledge that it is precisely the mental, subjective nature of the 5
self that makes it possible to convert power relations into categories. According to Baker (2001), 
Rousseau’s conception of social power eventually becomes a unique commodity of human 
relations that can be possessed, converted, and exchanged. Thus inequality, enabling “the 
execution of one’s Will over and against or with others,” becomes an “uneven and unequal 
possession… redundantly relational and exchangeable” (p. 274). Baker explains, 
 [Social power and inequality], being almost null in the state of nature, draws its   
 growth from the development of the body, our faculties, the progress of the   
 human mind, and finally becomes stable and legitimated by the establishment of   
 language, property, and laws. Social inequality is hence originally predicated in   
 physical or natural differences… but society gives currency [categories,    
 standards, discipline and punish, and so on] to those differences in ways that convert  
 them into uneven social tools, such as richness and poorness, that make masters and  
 slaves out of people. (p. 275, added bracket)  
     Rousseau does not intend to justify inequality, nor enslavement, in his conceptions of power 
and the self. For Rousseau, it is the institutionalization of enslavement, rather than the 
disadvantage of the enslaved people themselves, that forces power to leave the body and 
eventually the mind. Rousseau foresees social power’s tendency for categorization and control, 
and warns against these tendencies as subjugations of the self. Rousseau (1992) opposes the un-
naturalness of servitude in enslaved people and is concerned about oppression of all people. He 
writes: 
!  Transitioning from Enlightenment to postmodern thought, Dewey’s six philosophical positions 5
on relations support the argument that, without subjective judgment, power relations are not 
possible. Dewey (1902) explains that relations “have no objective existence or counterpart” and 
are “purely mental product, stating something of emergence when facts have really nothing to do 
with one another” (p. 201). Moreover, relations are products of the processes of judgments, and 
these judgments can never be free of subjective choices. Once reduced to identities for the 
function of representations, relations are no longer the same as what Dewey refers as the 
relatively objective, namely the practical modifications of relations.
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 We must not, therefore, look to the degradation of enslaved peoples as a basis for judging 
 man’s natural disposition for or against servitude, but look rather to the prodigious  
 achievements of all free people who have strived to protect themselves from   
 oppression. (p. 85) 
   
     Foucault’s discourses on the technologies of power and the self provide a powerful lens for 
examining the prodigious achievements of modern civilization to which Rousseau refers to. 
Though both Rousseau and Foucault discuss the notion of resistance, Foucault does not see the 
self as fixed, but rather as a subject that changes from time to time and practice to practice. 
Specifically, the subject is constituted not only by the imposition of power relations, but also by 
the self’s conscious resistance and transgression. This is precisely what Foucault means by self-
constitution. I discuss more on Foucault’s subjectivity in the section on “subjectivity through 
technologies of the self.”  
     The purpose of this section is to bring awareness to the limitations of opposition as a way of 
thinking. As a method, opposition helps to clarify the problem being investigated, but it is not the 
goal of investigation. Rousseau’s sympathy for the enslaved and for the subjugations of all 
people in general are encouraging but limited. Although recognizing the commodification of 
social power and its tendency for domination and control, Rousseau fails to acknowledge the 
interchange of body and mind, feeling and reason, and self and society. Foucault, by contrast, 
sees the interchange of the self and society as the precondition for categorization, subjugation, 
and commodification. As a result, Rousseau’s self is fixed and isolated, while Foucault’s self 
actively transgresses power relations. I turn to Foucault’s technologies of power from which his 
technologies of the self derive. 
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A Transgressing Subject Through Power and Domination 
     Foucault does not specifically use the term “technologies of self” until very late in his works. 
His early works focus mainly on the technologies of power and domination from which the 
transgressing subject is constructed. In Foucault’s earlier works, such as The Order of Things 
(1994) and Discipline and Punish (1995), the concept of subjectivity is secondary to his 
preoccupation with power and domination. Foucault often refers to the subjugated subject in 
these earlier works, whereas the subjectivity correlates specifically to the technologies of the self 
in his later works. A critical characteristic of the subjugated subject (i.e., the embryonic version 
of subjectivity) is its urge to transgress through the continuity and discontinuity of power 
relations. On the one hand, Foucault’s transgressing subject is made possible by Rousseau’s 
conception of the self as fixed, superior to, and opposite from the world of nature and society. 
For, without opposition, there would be no boundaries necessary to transgress. On the other 
hand, Foucault’s transgressing subject moves beyond Rousseau’s predetermined and fixed 
identification of the self as the oppressed.  
     To begin with, Foucault’s transgressing subject investigates into conjunctures of ruptures, 
hidden rules, and justifications that underpin the continuity of power relations. Through a non-
linear and constant remaking of power relations, Foucault’s transgressing subject (1972) 
questions continuity. 
 These pre-existing forms of continuity, all these syntheses that are accepted   
 without questions, must remain in suspense. They must not be rejected of course,   
 but the tranquility with which they are accepted must be disturbed; we must show  
 that they do not come about of themselves, but are always the result of a construction the  
 rules of which must be known, and the justifications of which must be scrutinized. (p. 25)  
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     A couple of points help to understand Foucault’s transgressing subject. First, the transgressing 
subject is discursive. According to Olssen (2006), it investigates not only “the regulated and 
legitimate forms of power in central locations,” but also the “powers at extremities”—the 
regional and local forms and institutions; not just as one domination over another, but something 
that circulates; and lastly, not in a deductive manner, but ascending—“starting from its 
infinitesimal mechanisms each of which has its own history, its own trajectory, its own 
technologies and tactics” (p. 21). In other words, the transgressing subject must trace multiple 
entrances of power relations, the descent and emergence of power relations in the context of 
history, and particularly the “jolts and surprises,” rather than the origin of history (pp. 14-15). It 
must respond to the “haphazard conflicts,” rather than the regulative and mechanical power 
relations that are already established (p. 15). Zebrowski (2008) interprets the transgressing 
subject as an individual, active organism that rejects the universal conclusion and generalization. 
The author writes, “The organism is far from passive—the interaction is almost a spiral of 
continuing change and action. There is not a direct line from environment and organism, but 
instead a constant remaking of both the world and the individual” (p. 316). Olssen and 
Zebrowski concur that Foucault’s subject must actively and consciously transgress power 
relations in order to have a sense of existence.    
     Second, the transgressing subject refuses any predetermined identifications. It is multi-
dimensional, rather than fixed or physical. Olsen (2006) adds that the subject does not assume a 
“universal governing structure of self-realization” (p. 8). Popkewitz and Brennan (1998) 
summarize, “The Concept of Man is fraud, not that you and I are nothing” (p. 11), but that the 
constitution of the self is changing and not limited to fixed features of material bodies, such as 
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gender, age, or other physical characteristics. Furthermore, the transgressing self must investigate 
into specific techniques of control. Foucault (1988) summarizes, the transgressing subject is not 
to “accept knowledge at face value but to analyze the so-called sciences as very specific ‘truth 
games’ related to specific techniques that human beings use to understand themselves” (p. 18). It 
must see beyond certain forms of ethics as the universal model for freedom . 6
     In summary, Foucault’s technologies of power and domination determine “the conduct of 
individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, an objectivizing of the 
subject” (Foucault, 1988, p. 18). As a consequence, the subjugated subject must be an active 
agent in transgressing power relations. Foucault’s transgressing subject derives from the 
determination of individuals’ conduct, as well as the individuals’ submission to certain ends and 
domination. Next, I turn to Foucault’s technologies of the self from which the concept of 
subjectivity is fully developed.  
Subjectivity 
     In “The subject and power” (1982), written a few years before his death in 1984, Foucault had 
become increasingly and explicitly interested in the subjectivity, in how a “human being turns 
him-or herself into a subject” (p. 208), or, to put it differently, how models of self-knowledge are 
constituted through historical technologies of power and domination. According to Foucault 
(1997), subjectivity investigates the “problem of the relationship between subject and truth” (p. 
290). It concerns the following questions: 
 In an interview, “Truth, power, self,” Foucault (1988) confirms, “I think there are more secrets, 6
more possible freedoms, and more inventions in our future than we can imagine in humanism as 
it is dogmatically represented on every side of the political rainbow…” (p. 15).
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 How was the subject established, at different moments and in different institutional  
 contexts, as a possible, desirable, or even indispensable object of knowledge? How were  
 the experience that one may have of oneself and the knowledge that one forms of oneself  
 organized according to certain schemes? How were these schemes defined, valorized,  
 recommended, imposed? (p. 87)   
     It is these schemes, techniques, or procedures that Foucault calls the “technologies of the 
self.” Foucault (1997) explains the concept. First, “neither the recourse to an original experience 
nor the study of the philosophical theories of the soul, the passions, or the body, can serve as the 
main axis in such an investigation” (p. 87). To Foucault, the specific conditions, by which the 
subjectivity is constituted, are created “through certain practices that were also games of truth, 
practices of power” (Foucault, 1982, p. 290). These conditions are externally imposed, rather 
than internally initiated by the subjects themselves. Thus, the original experience of the subject 
itself does not automatically lead to the questioning of its conditions. Second, the investigations 
of subjectivity “could not be properly accounted for simply by talking about ideology” (p. 290), 
for two reasons: first, the techniques and procedures used for the constitution of subjectivity 
“exist and vary in every civilization.” Second, they are “suggested or prescribed to individuals in 
order to determine their identity, maintain it, or transform it in terms of a certain number of ends” 
(Foucault, 1997, p. 87). In short, the constitution of subjectivity is “a matter of placing the 
imperative to ‘know oneself’” through relations of self-mastery or self-knowledge (p. 87).  
     Foucault’s (1988) notion of subjectivity raises questions about the world and people in a way 
very different from the Western tradition of philosophical inquiry. These questions—“what are 
we in our actuality?” “What are we today?”—constitute “a field of historical reflection” on the 
self (p. 145). Gutman (1988) agrees: 
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 If there has indeed been an immense labor to turn man into a subject (an individuated self 
 and a defined personage in the social order) in order to subject him more completely and  
 inescapably to the transversals and furrowing of power—and I think Foucault has   
 conclusively shown that this is indeed the case. (p. 103)  
     Foucault (1988) explains the technologies of the self as an effort to not only “show the 
arbitrariness of institutions,” but also to find “which space of freedom we can still enjoy and how 
many changes can still be made” (p. 11). In “Technologies of the self,” Foucault defines, 
 [T]echnologies of the self… permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the  
 help of others a certain number of operation on their own bodies and souls, thoughts,  
 conduct, and ways of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state 
 of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality. (p. 18) 
     A few points help to clarify understanding on the concept of subjectivity. First, subjectivity is 
historically constituted. It has no universal content and varies from in one specific form to 
another, wether mad or sane, delinquent or not delinquent; second, subjectivity is constituted by 
the subject itself, it is self-mastery; and thirdly, it is ontological, always distinguishing itself from 
the physical body. On the one hand, Foucault follows Descartes’s dualism of mind and body. 
While the Cartesian subject is invariant and transcendental—dwelling in the conscious and 
existing without the reality of objects—Foucault claims that subjectivity is constituted not 
through the physical body that engages in practices, but rather through the ontological nature of 
the subject. On the other hand, Foucault does not provide a clear base for what the ontological 
nature of subject is. Foucault seems to suggest two contradictory meanings here: first, 
subjectivity is both socially and ontologically constructed, and second, subjectivity would simply 
not exist without the ontological nature of the subject. However, it is not clear whether the 
ontological nature of the subject to which Foucault refers exists without the reality of objects, 
like the Cartesian subject does. Foucault (1997) strives to explain subjectivity.  
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 It is not a substance. It is a form, and this form is not primarily or always identical to  
 itself. You do not have the same type of relationship to yourself when you constitute  
 yourself as political subject who goes to vote or speaks at a meeting and when you are  
 seeking to fulfill your desire in a sexual relationship. Undoubtedly there are relationships  
 and interferences between these different forms of the subject; but we are not dealing  
 with the same type of subject. In each case, one plays, one establishes, a different type of  
 relationship to oneself. It is precisely the historical constitution of these various forms of  
 subject in relation to the games of truth which interests me. (p. 290) 
     Again, this explanation goes back to the historical dimension of subjectivity mentioned 
before. It does not address the question of whether the ontological nature of the subject exists 
with or without the reality of objects. Foucault does not provide clarification on the relation 
between the subject’s ontological nature and its social reality; rather he always refers to the 
historical dimension of the constitution of subjectivity concerning the history of how the subjects 
act upon themselves in both theory and practice. In addition to the historical dimension, 
Foucault’s subject is also disciplined and punished. 
The Disciplined and Punished Subject in Education     
     Foucault (1988) asserts that subjectivity is constructed and shaped in a system of penalty and 
prohibition. A constant feature of the Western culture, according to Foucault (1995), punishments 
had disappeared as a public spectacle by the beginning of nineteenth century. When more hidden,  
 [Punishment] leaves the domain of more or less everyday perception and enters that of  
 abstract consciousness; its effectiveness is seen as resulting from its inevitability, not  
 from its visible intensity; it is through the certainty of being punished and not the   
 horrifying spectacle of public punishment that mechanics of punishment works. (p. 9) 
     No longer the constituent element of penalty, punishments lose its intensity of physical pain, 
but “at the cost of greater intervention” (Foucault, 1995, p. 75). The punitive power, a certain 
technology of power, is “produced permanently around, on, within the body” (p. 29). It is linked 
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to the fact that individuals are under the control of authority, of governmentality. Foucault (1988) 
refers to governmentality as “the contact between the technologies of domination of others and 
those of the self” (p. 19). Its sole interest is in the “principle of rationality” (Foucault, 1991, p. 
89); its objective “is to reinforce, strengthen and protect the principle of rationality” (p. 90). 
Governmentality is a science of ruling the state’s economics and politics. It means “to apply 
economy, to set up an economy at the level of the entire state, which means exercising toward its 
inhabitants, and the wealth and behavior of each and all, a form of surveillance and control” (p. 
92). Since to govern means to govern things, people are to be disposed of certain tactics so that 
they can be arranged for the convenience of governing “at the level of consciousness…regardless 
of what the particular interests and aspirations may be of the individuals” (p. 100).    
     Rooted in a history of discipline and punishment, the institutionalized standards of education 
seek docility in the individuals, however, not through “the form of the ethical community… but 
certain specific technique called… the police” (Foucault, 1991, p. 153). According to Foucault 
(1988), the modern society “did not initiate it [the police]; rather it accelerated it, changed its 
scale, [and] gave it precise instruments” (p. 139). Educational standards are one manifestation of 
these political techniques. Citing Turquet’s analysis on the technique of government , Foucault 7
argues that policing breaches out to people’s conditions. Life as a whole, starting from education, 
is the object of policing. 
 Turquet proposes four specializations of executive police powers. The first is to look after the 7
positive, active, productive aspects of life, especially those concerned with education. The 
second is to look after the poor, widows, orphans, and the aged, who require help. Policing 
should not only be concerned with people who are reluctant to go to work, but also take care of 
public health, diseases, and so on. The third is to specialize in commodities and the fourth, 
territory and space. In short, the task of police branches out into all of people’s living conditions. 
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     One effect of policing is biopolitics, or biopower. Foucault (2004) refers to biopolitics as the 
endeavor to rationalize problems (e.g., problems of health and race) that are presented to the 
governmental practice. Its internal rule—maximum economy—is to maximize the effect and 
minimize the cost. Recognizing its regressive and possessive nature, Foucault argues that 
exercises of biopolitics cannot be limited to a test of optimization, but instead should concern for 
“the lawfulness of its scheme for achieving effects” (p. 74). To Foucault, standards work as the 
extension of biopolitics, and hence, are justified by rationality and the state’s competition in 
global market. However, the scheme is implemented without considering the lawfulness.     
     To Foucault, both the police and biopolitics disguise their repressive and possessive nature in 
the promise of individual success. Limited primarily to the maintenance and reproduction of 
economic relations, they shift the responsibility of care from the state to the individuals 
themselves. Foucault (1988) points out that it is no coincidence that the great public welfare 
movement emerged in the period of World War II. To Foucault, the political technologies of the 
self are the “instrument for the reproduction of economic relations” (p. 152). Their exclusive aim 
is the conversion, reinforcement, and development of the state’s strength, rather than the care of 
the individuals. Foucault uses the term “political utility” to explain the coexistence of political 
structure and the promise of individual success.  
 It is clear that the governments don’t have to worry about individuals; or government has  
 to worry about them only insofar as they are somehow relevant for the enforcement of the 
 state’s strength… But there is in this perspective something which we call a kind of  
 political marginalism, since what is in question here is only political utility. From the  
 state’s view, the individual exists insofar as what he does is able to introduce even a  
 minimal change in the strength of the state, either in a positive or in a negative direction.  
 It is only insofar as an individual is able to introduce this change that the state has to do  
 with him. And sometime what he has to do for the state is to live, to work, to produce, to  
 consume, and sometimes what he has to do is to die. (p. 152)    
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     Educational standards work as a form of cultural prohibition and control working for the 
political utility. According to Foucault (1995), disciplines work as a “coercive, corporal, solitary 
model of power” to assimilate and transform individuals into subjects obedient to rules, habits, 
orders, and authorities (p. 131). Disciplines imply an interrupted, constant coercion and 
supervision. Children are supervised, manipulated, corrected, and trained to obey and become 
skillful in ways that fulfill the reproduction of economic relations; children become subjects “out 
of the methods of punishment, supervision, and constraint” (p. 29). Foucault (1988) asserts, “The 
meticulousness of regulations, the fussiness of the inspection, the supervision of the smallest 
fragment of life and of the body…provide, in the context of school… an economic or technical 
rationality…” (p. 140). In short, political utility assures “a relation of docility-utility” (Foucault, 
1995, p. 137).  
     Conforming to political utility, schools become the machines that seek to “implement the 
mechanism or the perfect army,” of the disciplined, docile mass in civil society (Foucault, 1995, 
p. 168). Foucault writes,  
 It was an effort to adjust the mechanism of power that frame the everyday lives of  
 individuals; an adaptation and a refinement of the machinery that assumes responsibility  
 for and places under surveillance their everyday behavior, their identity, their activity…  
 another policy for that multiplicity of bodies and forces that constitutes a population.  
 What was emerging no doubt was not so much a new respect for the humanity…[but  
 that] controls become more thorough. (pp. 77-78)      
     In practice, educational standards produce subjected, practiced, and docile bodies by dividing 
education space into “as many sections as there are bodies so that each body is supervised, 
assessed, and judged, at each moment” (p. 141). With the disappearing of punishment as a public 
spectacle, however, the idea of imprisonment is transferred into disciplinary cells in school 
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practice. Children are assigned disciplinary places that correspond to particular functions. Unruly 
children would be placed between others who are well behaved. The cell-like spaces not only 
make it convenient and efficient to supervise, but also break down communications among 
children. Disciplines work as an art of rank, hierarchy, and reward, which “carves out individual 
segments and establishes operational links” (p. 148).  
     Within the divided disciplinary space, no time is wasted but spent on establishing operational 
links. Children are accustomed to “executing well and quickly the same operation” (Foucault, 
1995, p. 154). School time is divided into successive segments, one after another, each of which 
has a strictly enforced start and end time. My daughter often expresses her struggle with the 
rigidly divided, cell-like structure of time at school. The following conversation provides a 
glimpse of school experience. 
 “Mom, I’m so tired!” 
 “What did you do at school?” 
  “Nothing!”  
 “What classes did you have? What happened in Music today?”  
 “We were busy. We didn’t have time.”  
 “But what were you busy for?”  
 “They made us do this and do that. We were busy. I didn’t have time for anything.”  
 So I try to be specific, “What about math? Are you still working on numbers 5-10?”  
 “No. But Jon didn’t want to do it. The teacher said, ‘Jon, what do you choose, go to the  
 principle’s office, or work on your sheet?’ Then Jon started to make a funny noise and we 
 all started to laugh.” 
     This “busy-for-nothing” is a constant theme in our conversations, which always end up with 
someone being punished, either by being sent to the principal’s office or not getting to attend 
recess. These conversations give an idea of how school experiences are for children. I can’t help 
but think that discipline at school really functions as a tool to obtain efficiency. For example, 
when we as parents have a conversation at home, sometimes a disagreement, we are often 
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stopped by our daughter: “Mom, that is a ‘level three voice,’ thumbs down, not allowed.” What 
worries us is not that she imitates the teacher’s way of enforcing the voice level; instead, what 
worries us is that school disciplines are training her to shun away from conflictual, 
confrontational conversations on a daily basis. 
     Within the disciplinary spaces, children are accustomed to follow what are told, when to start, 
and when to end. The opportunity for finding the solution within their own time frame is taken 
away. When discipline works exclusively for efficiency, order, and function, there is no time 
available for playing and exploring. Within the disciplinary spaces, it is forbidden to waste time 
on figuring things out. There’s no time within, nor in between, the time blocks. As my daughter 
is getting more and more used to the clear-cut instruction given by her teachers, it is more and 
more challenging for us to explain to her at home that people do not always agree with each 
other. She often stops us by eliminating the disagreement: “I don’t care who started it. It does not 
matter who started it.” 
     So as parents, we realize that discipline and standards control children not only on the scale of 
constraints, prohibition, and obligation for the efficiency of movement, but also on the “working 
of individuality” (Foucault, 1995, p. 137), the internal organization, “their morals, their 
occupational capabilities, their honesty” (p. 159). They demand a transformation of behaviors in 
the development of knowledge children have about themselves. They misleadingly promote a 
belief that behaving and performing well on the given instruction at school leads to rewards and 
a lifetime happiness. Doing something right is exclusively linked to a reward, be it a sticker, a 
hallway ticket, or a choice of being able to sit with a friend at lunch time. Everything is used as a 
reward and linked to disciplines. Only the assimilated and docile ones can fit in and survive. 
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Foucault (1995) writes, “Since the population is nothing more than what the state takes care of 
for its own sake, of course, the state is entitled to slaughter it, if necessary” (p. 160).  
     Foucault (1988) contrasts the disciplinary space with the art of listening. If children have the 
option of just listening or being silent, they are not under the pressure to respond to the teacher’s 
questions. This type of listening allows children to listen to the voice within themselves as they 
listen to the teacher’s. Foucault explains, “You keep silent at the lecture. You think about it 
afterward” (p. 32). The art of listening is linked to a realization that children are not under the 
constant supervision of the teacher. Allowed time and space, children are not under the urgency 
to know. Foucault points out that the Western tradition of inquiry has always overemphasized the 
“knowing yourself” but forgotten the caring of the self (p. 19). Particularly, when the knowing is 
limited to the knowing of discipline and standards, education reinforces only the observation and 
internalization of the rules established by external authorities. In short, discipline and standards 
seek to fulfill primarily an economic agenda. They promote a rewards-driven subjectivity as 
children are divided, isolated, and trained to become docile bodies.   
Writing as Autobiography 
                                                       The pleasure a writer knows 
                                                        is the pleasure of sages. 
                                                        Out of non-being, being is born; 
                                                        out of silence, 
                                                        a writer produces a song. 
                                                        In one year of silk, there is infinite space; 
                                                        language is a deluge 
                                                        from one small corner of the heart. 
                                           Wen Chu: The Art of Writing, Third Century A.D. 
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     Rousseau’s advocacy for the importance of emotion over reason was a great contribution to 
the early Romantic movement in the 1700s. In Rousseau’s age, rationalism was so privileged that 
it problematically devalued the spontaneity of feelings. According to Baird and Kaufman (2008), 
“The more sophisticated and learned society became, the less happy, less virtuous, and more 
corrupt the people became” (p. 765).    
     Rousseau’s Romantic self labors on the abundance of the self’s feelings in confession through 
which the self is liberated from rationality. Insisting upon the self’s singularity, Rousseau (1953) 
writes, “My mind needs to go forward in its own time, it cannot submit itself to anyone 
else’s” (p. 118). Rousseau approaches the self’s emotional significance not as rooted in similarity 
to others, but in “exaggerated sensibility” (Gutman, 1988, p. 235). The self’s emotive life, the 
primacy of feeling, is the basis of Rousseau’s individuality. Life for Rousseau is meaningless 
without feelings; life is driven by the urge to confess unreservedly. Rousseau (1953) writes,  
 I have only one faithful guide on which I can count: the succession of feelings which  
 marks the development of my being, and thereby recall the events that have acted upon it  
 as cause and effect… The memory of them is too dear ever to be effaced from my heart. I 
 may omit or transpose facts, or make mistakes in dates; but I cannot go wrong about what 
 I have felt, or about what my feelings have led me to do; and these are the chief subjects  
 of my story. The true object of my confusion is to reveal my inner thoughts exactly in all  
 the situations of my life. It is the history of my soul. (p. 262)  
     Rousseau’s confession in recounting the detailed episode of life demonstrates a “signal 
importance of Western tradition,” i.e., to commit actions and feelings in writing (Gutman, 1988, 
p. 103). As the emergence of feelings becomes dependent on the activity of writing, the writing 
itself becomes a relief and pleasure. It serves multiple purposes in the Western traditions of 
power and self.  
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     First, the inclusion of individual experience, as well as the exposure of personal shame in 
writing, not only serves to unburden the self, but also reveals the self’s weakness. Rousseau 
makes a cause-effect connection between the social order and the self: by making the social order 
hostile, the self retreats to the confession of feelings. Without investigating deeper into the 
questions of what makes the social order hostile or what makes the self weak, Rousseau 
reinforces the opposition of the self and society. Although Rousseau intends to rebel against the 
overvaluation of reason by asserting the claims of emotions, his commitment of feelings to 
writings reinforces the opposition of the self and society. In other words, the primacy of feelings 
in writing creates a sense of superiority and control in the self. As the self retreats to confession 
and thus becomes more isolated from society, its sense of superiority reinforces a fixity, rather 
than an interchanging of boundaries. Rousseau’s confession in writing continues the Western 
tradition of opposition, simultaneously making the self weak and the social order hostile. It 
justifies for the superiority of the self based on an acceptance of the opposition between the self 
and society, reason and emotion.   
     Second, Rousseau’s openness of feelings makes the self subjected to the pubic gaze. Gutman 
(1988) explains, Rousseau’s commitment of feelings to writing makes subjectivity segmented: “a 
subject to be discussed” in the public gaze, “a subject in the political sense of being in an inferior 
relation to power,” and “a subject that the self recognizes as its own subjectivity” (p. 108). This 
segmentation of the self relies substantially on the primacy of feeling and makes the solicitation 
of subjectivity possible. In becoming an object available for examination under the public gaze, 
the segmented self ultimately makes the world alien and inhospitable. Rousseau (1953) writes, “I 
now led, so to speak, a double life” (p. 252). The internal division of reason and feeling, and well 
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as of self and society, sets Rousseau in permanent conflict with himself. Rousseau admits, “I 
found myself isolated and alone” (p. 252).  
     The temporary comfort and the sense of centrality found in the self’s commitment of 
emotions to writing have given way to isolation and loneliness. Becoming subjected and 
segmented, Rousseau’s romantic self recognizes that the exaggerated sensibility has contributed 
powerfully to its dilemma. The comforting sense of centrality found in writing is only an 
exaggerated, false notion of self-reference in which the self portrays itself as the arbiter of order, 
value, and meaning within the space of writing, which has little to do with how the reality 
operates. Rousseau (1953) describes this notion. 
 The impossibility of attaining the real persons precipitated me into the land of chimeras;  
 and seeing nothing that existed worthy of my exalted feelings, I fostered them in an ideal  
 world which my creative imagination soon peopled with beings after my own heart… 
 altogether ignoring the human race, I created for myself a society of perfect creatures. (p.  
 398)  
     Trapped in isolation and delusion, Rousseau realizes the limitation of autobiographical 
writing as a way to attain happiness. In his last work, The Reveries of a Solitary Walker, 
Rousseau (1982) profoundly remarks, “True happiness is indescribable; it can only be felt, and 
the stronger the feeling the less it can be described, because it is not the result of a collection of 
facts but a permanent state” (p. 224). Here I similarly relate my unease with writing 
autobiography: why do I not feel relief or pleasure in writing things down? For me, writing 
autobiographically does not necessarily lead to a critical understanding of power and the self, nor 
did it for Foucault. Instead, it is the making of dominance and control, as well as of objectivity 
and subjectivity, with which Foucault himself concerns. Moreover, the elaborations of individual 
experience committed in writing serve as the immense labor that makes subjectivity possible. 
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Foucault (1988) points out that writing is “one of the most ancient Western traditions” through 
which “the self becomes somethings to write about, a theme or object” (p. 27). Although I agree 
with Foucault on this point, what differs between us, I suspect, is that the Chinese part of my 
identity does not possess a central agency as much as Foucault does as a Western philosopher.  
     Confucius, for example, did not write any books in his lifetime. He believed that teaching is 
not an embodiment of a set of standards, but rather is an intimate, changing relationship between 
the teacher and student—one that cannot be simply recorded or replicated in writing. I do not 
claim that I am in any way Confucian, but the urgency to write in general is not a characteristic 
of Confucian thought, particularly when the writing involves how the self relates itself to nature 
and society. Whereas the Western self opposes itself and inevitably constructs itself as superior to 
nature, the Confucian self immerses itself within and reveres nature. In Chapter Four I discuss 
Confucian thought and elaborate on this point. For now, I continue with the Western tradition of 
committing actions and feelings to writing that serves as a precondition to the constitution of 
subjectivity.  
     Rousseau in the end realizes that feelings committed in writing alone cannot transcend 
categories and divisions. Not only does writing lose the uniqueness and significance of human 
existence, it also solicits a public gaze of subjectivity. Can one write autobiography in a way that 
resists the fixity, division, and categorization while, at the same time, reserving the ineffability of 
feeling and experience? This is surely a challenge to many. Rousseau’s (1982) writing in the 
“Fifth Walk” of the Reveries already stunningly resembles the style of novel: “There, the noise of 
the waves and the tossing of the water, captivating my senses and chasing all other disturbance 
from my soul, plunged it into a delightful reverie in which night would often surprise me without 
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my having noticed it” (p. 67). As the detailed recounting of life episodes is no longer sufficient to 
convey the self’s feelings, notions of centrality and division finally start to dissolve away in 
Rousseau’s writing, and instead, notions of the undifferentiated other start to emerge. In 
Rousseau’s journey, the division of the self from the world has been proven to be incapable of 
engendering lifetime happiness for him. In the attempts to regain the self’s deprived sense of 
power, the abundance of details creates a segmented subject available for the public gaze, 
making this self powerless.  
    Foucault (1978) comments on the strong inclination to speak as a constant feature of Western 
culture rooted in centrality and opposition. 
 Western man has become a confessing animal. Whence a metamorphosis in literature: we  
 have passed from a pleasure to be recounted and heard, centering on the heroic or   
 marvelous narration of “trial” of bravery or sainthood, to a literature ordered according to 
 the infinite task of extracting from the depth of oneself, in between the words, a truth  
 which the very form of the confession holds out like a shimmering mirage… The   
 confession is a ritual of discourse in which the speaking subject is also the subject of the  
 statement. (pp. 59-61)      
     To Foucault (1994), writing, as a way of gathering and collecting thoughts, is a personal 
exercise of reasoning that conforms to the tradition of authority. He writes, 
 The essential requirement is that he be able to consider the selected sentence as a maxim  
 that is true in what it asserts, suitable in what it prescribes, and useful in terms of one’s  
 circumstances. Writing as a personal exercise done by and for oneself is an art of   
 disparate truth—or, more exactly, a purposeful way of combining the traditional authority 
 of the already said with the singularity of the truth that is affirmed therein and the   
 particularity of the circumstances that determine its use. (pp. 208-212) 
  
     Foucault (1994) explains further by differentiating reading from writing. As a “mental 
agitation, distraction, change of opinions and wishes, and consequently weakness in the face of 
all the events,” reading “turns the mind toward the future, makes it interested in novel ideas, and 
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prevents it from providing a fixed point for itself in the possession of an acquired truth” (p. 211). 
Writing, however, resists reading’s scattering effect “by fixing acquired elements, and by 
constituting a share of the past” to which the self can always withdraw (pp. 211-212). Writing is 
a process of appropriation of the collected and making it the truth of one’s own mind. It is a 
rational action in the writer that concerns more with the authority of the past, but less with the 
uncertainty of the future. To Foucault, the deliberate recounting of details in writing 
autobiography does not guard against the commitment of foul thoughts or actions, but rather 
conforms to a tradition of reasoning that is already established. 
    Sword (2017) asks successful scholars to describe their feelings about a piece of writing that 
they are proud of. One of the responses is, “It was written from the heart” (p. 109). Sword argues 
that feelings of achievement, pleasure, and pride associated with writing dwell in “knowing that 
their work has made a difference to other people” (p. 109). This type of writing that makes a 
difference for other people, rather than reinforces one’s own centrality and superiority, reaches 
out to the “public life of the time” (p. 114). The writing resembles more like a letter than a diary. 
It speaks to the public, not read only by the writer. It concerns the feelings of others, rather than 
being obsessed with one’s own feelings, as in Rousseau’s confession. To write for others means 
to be a “vulnerable observer” (p. 115), rather than someone who speaks as the voice of a white, 
middle-class male, like Foucault. Rousseau’s self is willing to expose its own vulnerability, yet 
not very observant of others’ feelings; Foucault’s subject is observant of its surroundings, yet 
itself is very secure. How does the self care for itself in a way that is simultaneously vulnerable 
and observant of others?       
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The Care of the Self 
     Foucault only uses the term “care of the self” very late in his work. Developing from the 
technologies of power to the technologies of the self, Foucault’s care of the self investigates acts 
and practices (both permitted and forbidden), as well as feelings, thoughts and desires, especially 
those that are hidden. Foucault (1988) refers to the care of the self as the self’s efforts to 
“transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, 
and immortality” (p.18).   
     By reading the Greek’s notion of the “art of life” as “taking care of the self,” or “concern with 
the self,” Foucault (1988) explains the care of the self as involving three relations: the self with 
political life, defective education, and knowing the self. To explain, the care of the self does not 
exclusively involve a preparation for political life, but operates independently from it. In 
addition, it is not obligatorily educational, but rather a way of living that does not stop at the 
moment of death. In other words, the care of the self concerns the knowledge of oneself 
involving both education and relationships.  
     For Foucault (1988), limiting the care of the self to “a set of practices by which one can 
acquire, assimilate, and transform into a permanent principle of action” is a process of making 
the self more subjective (p. 31). The current state of education focusing on standards assimilates 
children in ways that are fundamentally against Foucault’s notion of caring for the self, a notion 
in which the self does not accept any knowledge deemed important by external authorities. 
Relating to the third relation mentioned above, according to Foucault (1988), philosophical 
tradition has overemphasized the knowing of the self but forgotten the care of the self. Whereas 
knowledge of oneself in Greek culture is only the consequence of taking care of the self, in 
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modern society it is limited to the principle of knowing the self through discipline and standards. 
The current state of education limits the self to a set of standards, emphasizing a knowing for a  
purpose of acquirement, assimilation, and transformation that sacrifice care for children. 
     According to Foucault (1988), the care of the self inherits neither “the tradition of Christian 
morality that makes self-renunciation the condition for salvation,” nor “the secular tradition 
which respects external laws as the basis for morality” (p. 22). To Foucault, to care is to escape 
from all possible rules, including morality. It is thus difficult “to see the concern for oneself as 
compatible with morality” (p. 22). In an interview, Foucault (1997) responds, 
 Recent liberation movements suffer from the fact that they cannot find any principle on  
 which to base the elaboration of a new ethics. They need an ethics, but they cannot find  
 any other ethics than an ethics founded on so-called scientific knowledge of what the self  
 is, what desire is, what the unconscious is, and so on. I am stuck by this similarity of  
 problems. (p. 256)   
     Seeing the care of the self and ethics as incompatible, Foucault (1997) insists that he does not 
believe in finding alternatives. He responds, “You can’t find the solution of a problem in the 
solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people” (p. 256). To Foucault, the 
problems of scientific knowledge, power relations, and human society cannot be solved by 
engaging ethics. On the one hand, Foucault acknowledges the simultaneous fluidity and stability 
of power relations from which subjectivity is constructed. He writes about the relation between 
ethics and social structures.  
 For centuries, we have been convinced that between our ethics, our personal ethics, our  
 everyday life, and the great and social and economic structures, there were analytical  
 relations, and that we couldn’t change anything… I think we have to get rid of this idea  
 of an analytical or necessary link between ethics and other social or economic or political 
 structures. (p. 261) 
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     On the other hand, Foucault (1997) offers little insight beyond the statement“not everything is 
bad, but that everything is dangerous.” He writes, “My position leads not to apathy but to a 
hyper- and pessimistic activism” (p. 256). On the topic of ethics, Foucault responds, “ethics can 
be a very strong structure of existence, without any relations with the juridical per se, without an 
authoritarian system, without a disciplinary structure.” Yet his investigation stops with a 
comment that “all that is very interesting” (p. 260). In the end, Foucault sees subjectivity 
constituted though power relations as limiting the care of the self, however, he is unwilling to 
question the very base of scientific knowledge on which subjectivity, power relations, and human 
society are built. In other words, Foucault observes others and investigates power relations from 
a secure standpoint where “it’s not at all necessary to relate ethical problems to scientific 
knowledge” (p. 261). However, the fact that standards limit the self to a set of practices, as 
Foucault has deconstructed, is precisely an ethical problem. Isolating the problem of 
standardization within the realm of scientific discussion does not change anything, just as the 
care of the self Foucault advocates is not possible without the consideration of morality. 
    Furthermore, Foucault also relates the care of the self to writing. As much as feelings, 
thoughts, and desires are concerned, Foucault presents these elements in a way different from 
Rousseau. While Rousseau’s self is willing to expose its vulnerability and indulge itself with its 
romantic sensibility and imagination in writing, Foucault relies on the abstract representations of 
feelings. Although Foucault (1988) accepts that each of his works is part of his own biography
—“for one or another reason I had the occasion to feel and live those things” (p. 11)—his writing 
is not obsessed with the feelings themselves, but focuses on the abstract representation of 
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feelings. As both ways are attempts to reclaim power, Rousseau’s works appear autobiographical 
while Foucault’s do not.  
     Foucault expresses his reservation on writing a confession of feelings. Seeing the limitation of 
writing autobiographically as the reinforcement of the past, rather than as the betterment of the 
future for the purpose of the care of the self, Foucault (1994) asserts that writing involves a 
culture that is strongly stamped “by traditionality, by the recognized value of the already-said, by 
the recurrence of discourse, by ‘citational’ practice under the seal of antiquity and authority” (p. 
211). However, Foucault considers his own writing as emerging, rather than solely the 
reinforcement of the past. In an interview, Foucault responds, “If you knew when you began a 
book what you would say at the end, do you think that you would have the courage to write it? 
What is true for writing and for a love relationship is also true for life. The game is worthwhile 
insofar as we don’t know what will be the end” (p. 9).  
     For Foucault, the process of writing resembles the essence of life, which is not to be 
conclusive but explorative. Writing could be a way of caring for the self, of getting in touch with 
oneself, of living with oneself only when it is not conclusive. On the one hand, Foucault’s care of 
the self hints at the notion of unification in which the self is encouraged to get in touch with 
itself, which could be a way of caring for the self; but on the other hand, Foucault’s self remains 
trapped in its dominant status accepting the tradition of opposition, just as he perceives writing as 
trapped in a culture of traditionality. Foucault’s notion of the care of the self seems to contradict 
itself, for he sees no way of getting in touch with oneself, but to submit to a tradition of 
opposition. Toward the end of his work, the care of the self becomes more and more urgent to 
Foucault, for he increasingly realizes that living would become impossible or suffocating without 
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breaking from a culture of traditionality. When asked whether Foucault sees himself and his 
work as upsetting “the established laws and somehow anticipating the coming freedom,” his 
response is “No.” As a powerful lens to understand how power relations operate, However, 
Foucault’s works do not shed light on social change, for he simply does not believe in change. 
According to Martin (1988), any effort, for Foucault, is “a tool, an instrument of oppression” (p. 
10).  
     Foucault (1994) in The Order of Things argues that once words, discourses, characters, 
classifications, equivalences, exchanges, representations, identities, and orders are all abolished 
completely, “it is difficult to rediscover how that [the same] structure was able to function” (p. 
304). Foucault sees no other way to “express the order of things so completely and openly” (p. 
303), but to accept rationality and opposition that have been made so “directly accessible to 
us” (p. 304). Foucault (1994) writes about the opposition of nature and human nature as he 
considers the care of the self. 
 It is essential to observe that the functions of ‘nature’ and ‘human nature’ are in   
 opposition to one another… But both cannot succeed… without each other, and it is in  
 there that the communication between them occurs… This establishment of   
 communication between nature and human nature, on the basis of two opposite but  
 complementary function — since neither can take place without the other — carries with  
 it broad theoretical consequences. (pp. 309-310) 
     For Foucault (1994), nature is “not merely the unwinding of the fundamental chain of being, 
but offers jumbled fragments of it, repeated and discontinuous” (p. 310). However, the “series of 
representations in the mind is not obliged to follow [nature’s] continuous path of imperceptible 
differences.” (p. 310). Thus nature’s great, endless, continuous surface must be reprinted with 
“distinct characters, in more or less general features, in marks of identification — and, 
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consequently, in words” (p. 310). In the process of making representations of nature, or “chains 
of being,” discourse and subjectivity emerge. Foucault argues that the relation human has with 
nature is “definite and predictable to functional moments” (p. 310). It is limited to “the 
mechanisms of knowledge and by their functioning” (p. 310). For Foucault, the self has no place 
in the communications of nature and human nature. To communicate with nature, and similarly, 
to care for the self, requires abandoning everything that is associated with human sciences. 
Foucault writes,   
 As long as the [same] language [of human science] was spoken in Western culture, it was  
 not possible for human existence to be called in question on its own account, since it  
 contained the nexus of representation and being… It cannot, therefore, be objected… Or  
 rather, these objections may well arise and command respect, but only on the basis of a  
 discourse which is profoundly other. (pp. 311-312) 
  
     To summarize, Foucault conceptualizes the care of the self as the following: first, it is a way 
of living throughout one’s life, not limited to politics or a set of practices by which the self is 
assimilated and transformed; to care is not to make the self more subjective. This raises a 
question: how is the care of the self possible if there is no self but constituted subjectivity? In 
other words, how could one care for itself without making itself more and more subjective? 
These questions inevitably involve both ethics and scientific knowledge. Foucault does not see 
the two as compatible, nor does he believe in finding alternatives. Moreover, he does not believe 
that it is possible to question the very base of scientific knowledge from which subjectivity is 
constituted. 
     For Foucault, the care of the self is not a matter of knowing what good and evil lies within 
oneself, but “of who was being designated, or rather who was speaking…” (p. 305, original 
italics). Following Foucault’s definition, the care of the self suggests a notion of embracing the 
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evilness within the self, and of questioning and stepping away from its center. When asked why 
he often selects marginal thinkers and madmen instead of the mainstream figures to build his 
theoretical arguments, Foucault responses, “My reason will be snobbish: It’s impossible to see 
figures like Bopp and Ricardo as obscure” (Martin, 1988, p. 10). Foucault’s choice of the word 
“snobbish” may be a personal matter, but his choice of a dominant voice weakens his theoretical 
argument.  
     Foucault’s subjectivity speaks as a dominant voice. This voice’s urge to care for itself 
demands a breaking from all rules, making the care incompatible with either traditions or ethics. 
To Foucault, to care is to reject everything from which his subjectivity is constituted. Thus 
Foucault’s notion of the care of the self creates a dilemma: on the one hand, the self has the urge 
to care for itself and to break all rules; on the other hand, everything is a tool for oppression and 
nothing can be changed. According to Gutman (1988), “The great architect of the modern self 
ends up discovering that the building he has constructed is, when it comes right down to it, 
uninhabitable’ (p. 116). Rousseau, abandoning his ego entirely in the end, retreats to a reverie in 
which “the self and nature, me and not-me, are merged into an undifferentiated and undivided 
unity” (p. 115). Foucault’s subjectivity relentlessly seeks to reclaim its humanity in effort to care 
for itself, however, the effort is futile.  
Conclusion 
     According to Stallman (2002), power in the West is considered “a measure of an entity’s 
ability to control the environment around itself, including the behavior of other entities” (p. 98). 
To prove its worth, the transgressing subject analytically questions the historical condition from 
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which the subject is constituted. Wang (2004) writes, “Even Foucault, a rebel against modern 
Western tradition, does not directly challenge the duality… the priority of self over other” (p. 
74). Wang asserts that Foucault’s care of the self is not possible without the constant 
“transgression and endless critique” (p. 119). How does the transgressing subject challenge the 
epistemological foundation of reason and opposition? How does the subject counter the privilege 
of its own centrality? 
     Tamboukou (2008) argues that the “undoing of opposition” is possible only through narrative 
(p. 105). The author explains that narratives and counter-narratives allow the transgressing 
subject to embrace effects of power relations without retreating back to the subjective allusion of 
absolute freedom or objectivity. By focusing on the contingency, rupture, and refusal of any 
transversal, universal principles, the self can create spaces in which memories can unite with 
historical knowledge. Endres (2007) adds that generalizations about “where” and “when” the 
events occur become less significant or relevant in the making of social shifts, for the 
generalizations disconnect from people’s feelings, and only make new forms of control possible 
(pp. 173-174).  
     Foucault’s care of the self is based on an utilization of power relations dominated by 
memories of opposition, rather than the intimate, intense, interpersonal relationships that are 
caring, reciprocal, and emotionally charged. Not only is the care of the self an exercise of 
centrality for people who are already in domination, it is also “a rational mastery of the self,” a 
“constant return to oneself and care for oneself for which Foucault advocates, so that one’s soul 
can be perfected by reason” (Wang, 2004, p. 28). Tobias (2005) argues that the care of the self 
advocated by Foucault is agent-centered and oriented toward individualism more than 
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collectivism (p. 67). It represents the “rationalist ways of knowing” rather than other ways 
oriented toward caring for others (p. 216). 
     For Wang (2004), the care of the self requires de-centering the self from its own centrality 
through “calls for the simultaneous recognition and transcendence of historical, social, and 
cultural limitations” (p. 26). By traveling back and forth within the self’s own history, the self 
“can free thought from what it silently thinks” and, consequently “think differently” (p. 9). The 
discursive process questions “the implicit universality of the present through tracing the 
differences of the past and opening up a space for thinking differently, thereby transforming the 
given” (p. 28). In short, the creation and re-creation of a space in which the self thinks outside its 
own history of centrality, as well as the tradition of opposition, is critical for the care of the self. 
Without disrupting centrality and opposition, the care of the self that Foucault advocates is not 
possible.  
     Foucault (1988) foresees the controlling tendency of discipline and punishment. His 
discourses offer a powerful lens to see the limitation of educational standards. Children are 
assimilated and transformed into self-centered agents of knowing, rather than caring individuals 
who are not only observant of others’ condition, but also compassionate in working toward the 
betterment of others’ condition. Popkewitz (1997) et al. agree that Foucault’s technologies of 
power and self allow the subject to transgress multiple power relations by giving attention to the 
productive dimensions of power relations, rather than focusing solely on the negative dimension 
of power. By doing so, Foucault’s technologies of power and self offer a continuing 
problematization of the categorization, standardization, and control practiced in the current state 
of education. However, Foucault’s subject remains a rational self that leaves centrality and 
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opposition intact, even while Foucault tries to deconstruct domination and subjectivity. Without 
questioning centrality and opposition from which subjectivity derives, domination cannot be 
deconstructed by Foucault’s genealogical discourses themselves. In short, Foucault’s discourses 
offer one way but not the only way to understand knowledge, power, and especially social 
change. Foucault does not believe in change, nor does he engage with ethics, for he thinks that 
everything becomes a tool for oppression. Valverde (1999) explains,  
 Foucault’s work contributes to ethical reflection insofar as it definitively shows that there  
 are no positions beyond power. There is no such thing as morally pure resistance; there is  
 no such project as liberation from power as such. All political and personal practices of  
 freedom are necessarily intertwined with the micropower that have been disavowed by  
 traditional radicalism… And all political and personal practices of freedom involve  
 constituting their subjects. There is no such thing as liberation, not only because power is  
 always implicated in liberation as in domination, but also because there is no preexisting  
 human essence to be liberated. (p. 667) 
     Related to the contingency of memory, Valverde (1999) agrees that Foucault’s care of the self 
“underestimates the continuing role of memory work in constituting ethical practice” (p. 668). 
Foucault’s care of the self ignores the complex, adaptive aspect of human nature in which life, 
death, and memory together constitute the self’s existence. The constructed subjectivity turns the 
violence of opposition back onto itself and, hence, becomes unable to care for itself. Foucault’s 
care of the self demands a breaking from all rules, including laws, traditions, as well as ethics. To 
care means to void everything on which the constitution of subjectivity is built. How would the 
care of the self be possible if it relies on the same base it demands to break from? Since 
centrality and opposition, from which the entire framework is built, are not called into question, 
the care of the self to Foucault is not possible.     
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     Feminist critiques argue that Foucault’s technologies of power and the self focus on how 
power happens in particular ways, but not on who exercises the power. Ramazanoğlu (1993) 
asserts that people do not disappear from their theories. It does matter “who is speaking in 
creating the truths” (p. 15). Foucault’s discourses are not responsive to women’s subordinated 
experiences, memories, and myths. Fleener (2004) interprets her book title Curriculum 
Dynamics: Recreating the Heart as “Recreating He-Art” to critique and reject the “male-oriented 
logic of domination inherent in modernist thinking” (p. 4).   
     Drawing on Jantzen’s spirituality, Hendry (2008) points out the limitation of Foucault’s care 
of the self as it relates to women mystics. The author interprets Jantzen’s spirituality as a notion 
of caring for women, a notion that “brings about at political and structural levels conditions 
which will foster the dignity of each individual and the welfare of the community” (p. 207). In 
particular, Hendry studies women mystics and how their embodied knowledge brings forth 
previously inconceivable conversations. The author explains that, in this mystical tradition, the 
symbolic embodiment of women’s sacrifice internalizes pain in exchange for “personal and 
social transformation” (p. 207). Representing not only rebellion, but also compassion, women 
mystics enact a moral caring “based on choice” that goes beyond “caring as instinctual” (p. 208). 
This moral caring is simultaneously a private and public act that seeks social justice. Hendry 
writes, “There is an interdependent relationship between the self and society that contrasts with 
poststructural, especially Foucauldian, understandings of self against society. The mode of with 
versus against implies a different civilization orientation toward subjectivity and society” (p. 
215). Through “a state of egolessness,” women achieve a harmony between the inner, subjective 
soul and the external world (p. 217).  
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     Popkewitz (1997) adds that, “How people feel and tell the truth about the world is part of and 
expressive of social transformations by which relationships with the world and our selves are 
established” (p. 150). In other words, what contributes to social transformation is not just a 
rational way of thinking, but also the way people feel. Moving away from the tradition of 
opposition, Solé and Goodwin (2000) focus on understanding and building of dynamic 
relationships between human systems (namely the heart) and their biological contexts. They 
argue that mechanical model of opposition fails to embrace the dynamic nature of the heart, on 
which the human’s living systems adapt and thrive. Solé and Goodwin write that over the history 
of science,   
 We have had the organism as the expression of a vital principle, as a machine, as a  
 complex chemical network, as a result of natural selection. None of these attempts to  
 characterize life is wrong. Each gives a distinctive insight into the nature of organisms,  
 but each also is limited…. Information has meaning only within a context, and the living  
 context still evades us. (ix) 
     Investigating the cardiac output of a living heart, Solé and Goodwin (2000) found that the 
normal heart has a noticeable irregularity in the pattern of beats and the degree to which this 
pattern varies from the young to the old and from the healthy to the unhealthy. They discover that 
too much order in the pattern of a heartbeat is dangerous. People who experience cardiac arrest 
often have the most predictable and regular patterns of heartbeat. An irregular heartbeat is not 
only normal, but also desirable – it is a natural yet deliberate strategy of the heart to respond 
appropriately to the unpredictability of both external and internal conditions. Not only is a 
healthy heartbeat irregular, a healthy heartbeat avoids locking into any particular frequency in 
order to prepare and respond constantly to environmental stimuli, such as seasonal and emotional 
changes. The authors also find that the healthy pattern of cardiac output differs from one 
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individual to another. To maintain a balance, the heart does not always respond to changes by 
beating faster; instead, it tempers, holds, or stops. Healthy and natural are only meaningful in 
terms of individual context and the uniqueness of the heart.  8
     Fleener (2004) uses the heart as the metaphor for curriculum, school, and education. She 
argues that schools can become the heart of the society only when people recreate “the heart of 
schools” (p. 190). Fleener explains, “Our way, the Western way, has been the way of the beast, 
rejecting and denying wholeness, relationship, creativity, meaning, purpose, and value” (p. 182). 
The “Western way” has in large ignored the living systems, particularly humans, with a life of 
their own, a “heart” of their own. Recreating the heart of curriculum, school, and society requires 
“letting go” of the desire for control; it requires a “caring way of interacting” (p. 186). The caring 
of the self is ultimately caring of others. This is where Foucault falls short: his care of the self 
does not focus on caring for others, but rather tied to a subjectivity that conforms to the tradition 
of rationality and opposition. To finish, I quote William Hazlitt, “The love of liberty is the love 
of others; the love of power is the love of ourselves.”    
 Solé and Goodwin (2000) write, “The characteristic dynamics of health are the result of 8
nonlinear influences that describe the dynamic coherence of the whole organism as a single 
unified system, an emergent entity with distinctive properties of subtle dynamic order. The state 
of health is a normal biological attractor that combines both order and chaos. (pp. 116-117) 
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CONFUCIAN CULTIVATION OF REN AS A MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
      
     The current state of education focusing on standards and assessments, according to Wu 
(2004), reduces education to “technical problems and individual deficiencies, subject to 
surveillance and quality managerial procedures” (p. 308). In the previous chapter, I used 
Foucault’s discourses of discipline and power to understand standardization as a process to make 
children docile subjects through “a set of practices by which one can acquire and 
assimilate” (Foucault, 1988, p. 31). The process of standardization trains children to be docile 
bodies that conform to a political utility of control and domination. I argued that standardization 
provides an ineffective grounding for achieving a worthwhile life; children are shaped as results-
driven individuals that lack the moral consideration for others (Shun and Wong, 2004). Baker 
(2001) believes that only through “a moral notion of reasoning” (p. 191), a notion that 
appreciates the difference of others, can one learn a sense of responsibility. However, Foucault 
(1997) argues that “between our ethics, our personal ethics, our everyday life, and the great 
political and social and economic structures…, we couldn’t change anything” (p. 261). In 
addition, questions of human existence are not possible “as long as the [same] language [of 
human science] was spoken in Western culture” (Foucault, 1994, p. 310), except “on the basis of 
a discourse which is profoundly other” (p. 312). 
     In this chapter, I use Confucian philosophy—a discourse that is profoundly different from the 
Western discourses of subjectivity and power—to understand the very foundation of human 
existence, not as an epistemology based on dichotomous thinking, but as a moral responsibility 
based on the cultivation of Ren. By not reducing the conception of the world into dichotomy, 
!68
Confucian cultivation of Ren focuses on interrelations to develop a moral understanding that 
addresses the problem of subjectivity (Baker, 2001) and the “violence ingrained in logo-centrism 
(Wang, 2004, p. 319). 
     Other scholars have also echoed on the value of bringing in a discourse that is profoundly 
different from the Western discourses of subjectivity and power. Apple (2013) writes, “I have 
come to an immense amount of respect for the creative resiliency and political and educational 
courage of people in what we in the North somewhat arrogantly call the ‘Third World’” (p. 13). 
Smith (2008) adds that conversations between East and West are urgent. The author writes, 
“When these conversations work, both East and West can understand their character, their power, 
and their foibles in ways that each could have never experienced through simple self-
reflection” (xi). These scholars, according to Apple (2013), share a collective acceptance in 
which dichotomy is seen as “impossible and delusional” to the understanding of emergence, 
complexity, and relations (p. 22). Embracing the complexity of relations, the Confucian 
cultivation of Ren represents a “constant effort, constant struggle and constant organized and 
personal action” oriented toward the benefit of others. It demonstrates a process of creative 
resiliency in carrying out moral responsibility (p. 22).  
     To explain, the cultivation of moral goodness constitutes the very foundation of human 
existence, whereas the accumulation of knowledge is considered secondary. In fact, the 
cultivation of moral goodness does not necessarily rely on an extensive amount of knowledge. 
This notion is different from the implementation of educational standards which considers 
accumulation of knowledge most important and ignores the learning of responsibility. 
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      More specifically, the Confucian notion of learning responsibility is based on a belief that all 
children are born with a moral goodness that can be cultivated toward a moral responsibility. 
However, the innate moral goodness does not automatically lead to a moral responsibility. It 
needs to be cultivated through embracement of others, differences, tensions, and ambiguities. 
Confucian cultivation is a self-initiated learning that does not rely on external enforcements; it 
eventually becomes part of the self that cannot be taken away. Just like water finding its way as it 
adapts to and shapes around mountains and villages, the self realizes its moral goodness as it 
works through conflictive relations. Moral cultivation integrates the self as participating, 
responsible members who are capable of making social changes, just like the moving water 
never lacks but gains transformative power as it shapes around its environments. In short, the 
Confucian effort to work through conflictive relations and to go beyond the linear perfection of 
subjective reasoning differ fundamentally from the results-driven subjectivity. Most importantly, 
the Confucian cultivation of Ren emphasizes the carrying out of good intention through respect, 
propriety, and relationship, for the benefit of others, rather than for the rewards of one’s own. 
    One complication of Confucian Ren involves the concept of human rights. Specifically, the 
Confucian focus on interrelations is often critiqued for compromising individual rights. In the 
West, human rights, such as social and educational rights, are defined as how free the self can be 
from governmental interference or constraints. However, the fact that rights have been made 
more and more political rather than social and cultural (i.e., the politicization of rights) does not 
necessarily protect rights equally under the laws for all people. Political, legal intervention 
assumes that rights can be protected equally whereas in reality only the privileged few are 
granted justice. 
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     Confucian thought approaches rights differently from Western concept of human rights as 
relying on legal and political forces. Rather, Confucian notion of rights is embedded in the 
autonomy of the self through a cultivation of moral goodness. The more the self becomes 
morally responsible toward others, the more one’s rights are assured. The Confucian cultivation 
of moral responsibility understands the appreciation of differences, the working out of conflictive 
relations, or the “entitlement of others” (Chan, 2006, p. 245) as the precondition for individual 
autonomy, not the other way around. The Ren self becomes autonomous and its rights are assured 
in carrying out good intentions for the benefit of others, rather than from the pursuit of one’s own 
rewards. Political and legal protection is not the only condition required to achieve autonomy 
and justice of rights.  
     This chapter is an effort to understand the limitation of the current state of education in which 
disciplines and standards are implemented to an extreme at the expense of moral responsibility. It 
aims not to provide a comprehensive study of individualism or human rights, but instead focuses 
on Confucian notion of moral responsibility as a complement to the results-, rights-driven 
subjectivity. My intention is not to oppose Confucian thought to modern ethics, but rather to 
learn from Confucian Ren as a moral responsibility. To Confucian, the innate moral goodness of 
human nature is the core of genetic inheritance that can be brought into realization through 
cultivation. Nuyen (2007) writes about the Confucian choice of cultivation as a moral 
responsibility, rather than as a chance of genetic inheritance: “What I am given by chance is my 
tradition, and what I manage to do with it is entirely my choice and hence entirely my 
responsibility” (p. 94). Confucian Ren celebrates a responsible living, an art of life, toward social 
changes, because it believes that “what is decreed for me changes with how I behave” (p. 93).  
!71
    I start with limitations of rights-centered individualism in understanding responsibility. I 
explain that Cartesian separation of mind from the body produces a highly inflated, dominant, 
selective form of consciousness that fails to appreciate the complexity of nature and others, 
making the value of responsibility unrecognized and incompatible with rights. I then introduce 
some key concepts in Confucian thought. I explain that Confucian thought embraces the moral 
goodness of human nature and encourages the body to learn from and mirror the complexity of 
nature, resembling the way water adapts and shapes its environment. Not attempting to avoid the 
hierarchy of power relations that may be inevitable in civilization and beyond human control, 
Confucian focuses on relations of mutual respect, such as family piety, rather than external 
disinclines and laws, as a way to cultivate the innate moral goodness toward social responsibility. 
     I then move onto the complication of Confucian thought concerning the concept of human 
rights. I explain that Confucian thought approaches rights fundamentally different from the way 
rights are approached today. The Confucian notion of rights is embedded in the autonomy of the 
self through a cultivation of moral goodness. I conclude that in carrying out the good intention 
for the benefit of others, rather than from the pursuit of one’s own rewards, the Ren self 
celebrates the cultivation of moral responsibility by which social changes can be brought about. 
Limitations of Cartesian Rights-Centered Individualism in Understanding Responsibility 
     The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) recognizes the interdependence of 
rights  and a working society: “without civil and political rights, the public cannot assert their 9
 At the International Institute of Human Rights, Vasak (1979) for the first time talks about three 9
generations of human rights: first-generation civil/political rights, second generation economic/
social/cultural rights, and third generation solidarity rights. With the exception of solidarity 
rights, both civil/political rights and economic/social/cultural rights are protected by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as the human rights.
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economic, social, and cultural rights; similarly, without livelihoods of a working society, the 
public cannot assert or make use of civil or political rights” (http://www.un.org/en/universal-
declaration-human-rights/). The question remains: how do we to work toward the livelihood of a 
working society? How can one claim one’s own rights without considering other people’s rights? 
In short, how can one claim one’s own rights without a moral responsibility for others?  
     The dichotomy between rights and responsibility can be traced back to Descartes’ cogito, I 
think, therefore I am. To Descartes (1924), “the nature of intelligence is distinct from that of the 
body” and any dependence on the body is “manifestly an imperfection” (p. 23). Following 
Descartes’ theory of the independence of human intelligence, political and social rights in 
modernity are synonymous with the achievement and freedom of the mind. By separating the 
body from mind, the innate moral goodness that dwells in the body is altogether ignored. 
Descartes explains the dichotomy of body and mind. 
I was a substance the whole essence or nature of which is to think, and that for its    
existence there is no need of any place, nor does it depend on any material thing; so that  
 this ‘me,’ that is to say, the soul by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from body,  
 and is even more easy to know than is the latter; and even if body were not, the soul  
 would not cease to be what it is. (pp. 21-22) 
   
     To Descartes, a human’s capacity to think can transcend everything, including the innate 
feelings toward others. The supremacy of thinking isolates the self from its natural tendency of 
feelings for others in social relations. As Smith (2008) observes, the dichotomy of subject and 
object, of mind and body, “get in the way of a more complex, organic, fluid, and interwoven 
understanding of the universe” (p. 15). Referring to the problems of dichotomy as the subject’s 
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“uncoupling from nature, world, or environment,”  Baker (2001) asserts that “the problem of the 10
subject cannot be simply reduced to a problem of freedom,” for “the subject/environment schema 
dissolves the compactness of the conception of the world” (p. 21). This is not to say that 
Descartes (1924) does not value the learning from nature and others. In fact, Descartes writes, “It 
is good to know something of the customs of different people in order to judge more sanely of 
our own, and not to think that everything of a fashion not ours is absurd and contrary to 
reason” (p. 6). However, the Cartesian subject’s relation with nature and others is based on a 
desire to control and conquer, rather than its feelings for others as the embryo of moral 
responsibility that is fundamental in the Confucian cultivation of Ren.    
     Using Dussel’s  “two-sided myth,” Smith (2008) explains the Cartesian desire of conquest 11
implied by the logic of dichotomy (p. 23). The author explains the surface side of the myth 
—“Through our construction of Reason, we are the ‘carriers and defenders of liberty for the 
world’” (p. 23); and the underside of the myth —“all those who do not comply with our myth of 
liberty, underwritten by reason, we have the right to destroy, either directly through military and 
 “Binary schematisms are the precondition for the emergence of the figure that in modern 10
philosophy has gone by the name of the subject. Its indispensable precondition is the possibility 
of having true and false opinions (what’s more, being able to have them indisputably), as well as 
the possibility of acting correctly and incorrectly or morally right and wrong. When one takes 
knowledge into consideration, it becomes clear that the problem of the subject cannot be simply 
reduced to a problem of freedom. Instead, the subject individuates itself only in a life history of 
true and false opinions, of correct and incorrect actions… – as the mirror of the world, it could be 
nothing more than merely right. Thus the subject is “subject” (if one still seriously accepts this 
quality of ultimate substratum as part of the concept’s meaning) only for… realizations that 
binary schematisms have held upon” (pp. 20-21).
 Enrique Domingo Dussel (1934-), Argentine philosopher and writer, one of the primary figures 11
in the philosophical movement referred to as the Philosophy of Liberation that seeks to critique 
structures of colonialism, imperialism, racism, and so on, posing direct challenge to discourses of 
Euro-American philosophy, and emphasizing socio-political responsibilities.
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colonial conquest or through strategies of exclusion, silencing and denial” (p. 24). Smith argues 
that rights-centered individuals are not at all free but entrapped in the two-sided myth of reason 
and conquest. They conform to a politics of exclusion, a logic of denial that is indeed “a denial of 
the West’s own history”  (p. 24). Jardine (2008) adds that the singular logic of dichotomy and 12
this logic’s subsequent politics of exclusion are indeed “the logic of war” (xi). These authors 
concur that conversations between East and West can bring out voices of responsibility that 
deconstruct this myth, particularly, the myth of conquest and exclusion.    
    Adding the element of biological control to the already problematic logic of dichotomy, 
Dworkin (2002) elaborates on the idea of responsibility, namely, an individual’s creative 
relations with nature, culture, and others. The author refers to the notion of responsibility in two 
parts: an individual’s responsibility for their actions and society’s responsibility for helping each 
and every human succeed. From the perspective of biological control, Dworkin’s notion of 
responsibility involves the consolidation of choices and chances: choices made by individuals 
and societies, and chances controlled by biological nature. Dworkin argues that the availability of 
biological alteration has fundamentally challenged the individual’s responsibility in making 
choices. How can one be responsible for something that is out of one’s control? The author 
explains, “Our physical being…has long been the absolute paradigm of what is both 
devastatingly importantly to us, and in its initial condition, beyond our power to alter and 
therefore beyond the scope of our responsibility” (pp. 444-445).  
 “If globalization means anything beyond the parochial Euro-American vision of economic  12
integration, it has something to do… with an emerging sense of globalized community no  longer 
binarized by those policies of .inclusion/exclusion that continue to control the  minds of those 
controlling the systems of global power” (p. 26)
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     Dworkin (2002) seems to suggest that the individual’s creative and emerging relations to 
themselves, as well as to others and nature—in other words, their responsibility—are limited 
because of the alteration of biological control. Either way: without biological control, humans 
have nothing to do with the biologically-given, and with it, however, an in-depth understanding 
of its medical terms is not easy and thus made obsolete to the individual. Caught in the midst of 
biological chance and responsibility, Dworkin calls for an ethical individualism in which neither 
individual nor social responsibility should be compromised by the developed alteration of 
biological control. Dworkin believes that the idea of ethical responsibility can prevent humans 
from falling into an oblivion where scientific developments, such as biological control, take over 
humans’ creative relations to themselves, others, and nature.  
     Dworkin’s ethical individualism shares common ground with the Confucian cultivation of 
Ren. Like individualism, the Confucian cultivation of Ren is foremost a caring of the self. Rather 
than isolating the self’s rights from its responsibility, the Confucian Ren aims to cultivate a moral 
responsibility toward others that eventually opens up a possibility, or creates a condition, for 
maximizing the care of the self. Moral responsibility should not be abandoned because science 
has expanded the scope of chances and complicated the consideration of choices. The challenge 
is how to work toward a moral responsibility with regard to science, nature, and others.  
     Science will continue to advance as it already has, from biological control to artificial 
intelligence to, eventually, discoveries beyond human anticipation. In the game of Go , humans 13
now stand little—if any—chance in winning against programmed computers; for thirty years, 
 The game Go (围棋) was invented in ancient China more than 2,500 years ago. Despite its 13
relatively simple rules Go is very complex, even more so than chess.
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programmed computers have dominated humans in the game of Chess. Yet the fact that machines 
have absolute dominance over humans in winning certain games does not in any way diminish 
the value, challenge, and fun of these games. People play games not just to win, but to learn in 
the process. Machines cannot substitute what people can learn from and reflect in while playing. 
The reflection of learning is a unique human capacity that machines don’t possess. Confucius 
lived in a period when constant war, rather than scientific development, has complicated the 
consideration of responsibility. Yet he did not negate the moral responsibility, just as humans do 
not simply quit playing Chess or Go because they cannot beat machines.  
     Shun and Wong (2004) agree with Dworkin and others that the “Western morality provides 
ineffective grounding for duties to others because it cannot show the individual how the 
performance of these duties is related to achieving a specific conception of the good and 
worthwhile life” (p. 2). The ineffectiveness can be argued in a way as it relates to the privileged 
way of claiming rights. In modernity, the more one’s rights are spoken out, the more one’s rights 
can be claimed. The embodiment of voice as the essential vehicle of individual rights is 
challenged by post-structural discourses. Derrida (1973) questions the privilege of speech-as-
presence in which the excellence of the voice becomes a sign of the transcendental 
consciousness. In trying not to be recognized as the subjects of incompetence, Cartesian 
individuals must speak out in defense of their rights. Shun and Wong agree that “being able to 
make individual claims against others is not an essential feature of all philosophical acceptable 
moral systems, Confucian in particular” (p. 16). Moreover, the isolated emphasis on rights 
without adequate understandings of responsibility tend to convert all general conflicts into 
complications of rights. By doing so, society as a whole can easily become dysfunctional. 
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According to Bluhm (1996), the Cartesian model “contains no concept of natural community, no 
concept of human sharing” (p. 313), and it continues to limit the way individuals think and relate 
to others. 
     In summary, the Cartesian separation of mind from the body produces a highly inflated, 
dominant, selective form of consciousness that fails to appreciate the complexity of nature and 
others, making the value of responsibility unrecognized and incompatible with rights. Roets 
(2004) expresses that the “mentality of self, autonomy, and freedom have run its course… We 
should abandon the myth of objective knowledge and adopt a thinking that avoids the disjunction 
of normative and spontaneous thought” (p. 31). In Wang’s (2004) words, we should “see and 
value the interdependence of rights and responsibilities” (p. 32). This, however, requires a 
different way of relating to nature and others that is not designed for conquest and control. 
Nature, Moral Goodness, and Cultivation in Confucian Thought 
     Though preoccupied by power and subjectivity rather than ethics, Foucault (1988) 
nevertheless denies “a certain form of our ethics as a universal model for any kind of 
freedom” (p. 15). Specifically, the author comments, the “history of science does not develop in 
the same way as social sensibility” (p. 14). However, Foucault does not address how the 
development of social sensibility, by which people “react in very different ways to the same 
situation” differs from the development of science (p. 14). Realizing that the difference between 
development of science and social sensibility involves people and ethics, Foucault does not 
engage in discussions of moral responsibility, which plays a critical role in the development of 
social sensibility. Unlike Foucauldian theory, Confucian thought embraces the innate moral 
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tendency for contingency and focuses on cultivating the patience, tolerance, and responsibility 
towards others, rather than on constituting subjectivity built on rationality. 
     A few words on the historical background of Confucianism. Before the end of eighteenth 
century, Guangxu (光绪), the last emperor of the Qing (清) dynasty in Chinese history, 
discontinued the civil service examination system in which Confucian classic-reading was the 
main practice. By the 1970s, when I was growing up in China, Confucian classic-reading was 
long gone and replaced by vernacular Chinese literature that focuses on learning for utility. The 
May 4th Movement in 1919, along with Dewey’s visit to China, marks a radical break from the 
Chinese tradition of Confucianism. The introduction of pragmatism brought a shift in Chinese 
culture and education, from its history of Confucianism to a new era of modernity adopting 
Western values, especially democracy and science. According to Wu (2004), Confucianism at the 
time was attacked as an obstacle to modernization, and Chinese language was deemed an object 
of knowledge “detached from the inner landscape of moral identity” (p. 67). In spite of the 
tremendous socio-economic changes that China underwent at the time and continues to undergo, 
Confucian values have remained remarkably stable within the culture and among the people, 
although it is not necessarily emphasized in public schools. Aware that the essence of Confucian 
thought is not easily understood by simply knowing the texts or studying the culture from the 
outside, I read the Analects hoping that my experience of living in the culture for over twenty 
years would illuminate my understanding of the texts.  
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     Only recently have I started to read Analects , one of the Four Books  of Confucianism. I 14 15
was eager to bring a balance into my daughter’s education, which focuses so much on outcomes 
at the expense of tolerance and consideration for others. Children are forced and disciplined to go 
in a way that impedes their impulses for playing and exploration. So, without the Chinese 
language and culture background, I introduced to her the original Analects. 
     For someone like me who lived in China for over twenty years, reading Analects is not easy, 
for the writing itself is condensed, concise, and concrete, but at the same time symbolic. The 
meaning of the texts is interwoven within the language and should not be taken as absolute. For 
my daughter, who is just beginning to speak but does not read the language, the challenge was 
beyond her anticipation. But I wanted to engage her in an activity where understanding is 
completely irrelevant at the beginning. I wanted to cultivate her ability to live with ambiguity, to 
enjoy and appreciate doing something that is completely alien or maybe nonsense, and most of 
all, to try something that brings absolutely no reward at the beginning. I wanted her to tolerate 
the ambiguity of not understanding the texts, and to allow meaning to emerge, rather than to have 
me to impose or associate meaning to the texts right away. 
     The essence of Confucian reading is to take time in understanding by indulging in the format 
of repetition, just like children’s play and exploration. The seemingly “going nowhere” repetition 
of the texts cultivates a habit of persistence and patience. The practical aspect—the mastery of 
 The most important book of Confucianism, Analects (Lun Yu) is a collection of short dialogues 14
between the Master Kung Tzi and his students and rulers.
 The Four Books of Confucianism are: 中庸 (The Mean and Constancy), The Great Learning, 15
Analects, and Mencius. The Five Classics of Confucianism are: 易经 (Books of Changes), 尚书 
(Books of Document), 诗经 (Books of Poetry), 礼记 (Books of Rites), 春秋 (Books of Spring and 
Autumn). Together the Four Books and Five Classics are the core Confucian texts.
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language—comes along with the unraveling of meanings, just as outcomes of learning come 
through children’s repetitive play. Different from the modernist view , reading Analects aims 16
not at the practical aspect of learning the language, but the cultivation of perseverance for 
lifetime achievements. To Confucian, the practical aspect of learning is the byproduct of the 
cultivation. Confucius says, “Seek Ren, gain Ren” (7: 15). Likewise, seek utility, gain utility. In 
reading Analects with my daughter, I plant a seed of perseverance, a tolerance for the ambiguity 
of meanings, which is the seed for moral responsibility toward others. Without the perseverance 
and capacity to live through ambiguous, conflictive relations, moral responsibility would not be 
possible. If we seek only the utility of mastering the language itself, we will get only the utility. 
But in the cultivation of perseverance, the mastery of the languages will come along. 
     Unlike the ontology of the modern self that resides in a mind of rationality, the Confucian self 
dwells in the body. The body is all there is. The body reserves and represents everything. 
Furthermore, the body is not subordinate to the mind; feeling is not subordinate to knowing. In 
the body dwells the consciousness; in the body dwells meaning. When Confucius says, 
“Cultivating the self,” he means, “Caring for the body.” When Master Zeng, one of the 
Confucian thinkers, was ill, he summoned his students around and said, “Look at my feet! Look 
at my hands” (8: 3). When death was imminent, Master Zeng was not entangled with his afterlife 
 To clarify, my use of “modernist view” instead of  “Western view” is not limited to the United 16
States, but also applies to modern China, for the utility emphasis of learning has been adopted by 
and is also practiced in modern China. Since my focus for this dissertation is on the education in 
the United States, for the urgency of my daughter’s education that could be applied to the 
education of others, I don’t discuss in details the challenges of education that modern China now 
faces. The truth is, I don’t live in China any more, and I don’t really know what is going on. I use 
“modernist view” because on some aspects, the challenges of education I do discuss here may 
not be uniquely Western.     
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but observed his failure in preserving the body given by his parents. Confucius sees taking care 
of the body as the foremost responsibility of sons and daughters. Chaibong (2001) affirms, “In 
Confucianism, what determines and confirms my being is not the metaphysical, the 
transcendental, or the rational, but my physical body” (p. 317).  
     Confucian thought turns to nature as a way to take care of the body. When students are 
gathered around, Confucius asks each to speak of the activity that inspires him . Zi Lu (⼦路), a 17
senior student, responds that he would make the state’s army stronger within three years. Ran 
Qiu (冉求) expresses interest in making people abundant, and Gongxi Chi (宫西⾚) in managing 
rituals of propriety. Zeng Dian (曾点), the most junior says, “In late spring, after the spring 
garments have been sewn, I would go out with five or six capped youth , and six or seven boys 18
and girls. We would bathe in the River of Yi, and dance in the wind on the altar of Wuyu , then 19
chant to return.” Having listened to students’ response, Confucius sighs deeply, “I’m with you.” 
Zeng Dian is puzzled with Confucius’ reactions and lingers after the other three have left. He 
asks, “What about the others’ words? Why did you smile?” Confucius replies, “There is no 
deference in their words” (11: 26). This conversation carries multiple messages. One meaning is 
the Confucian openness and deference to nature that encourages the body to mirror and learn 
from the nature’s complexity. 
 At the time, Confucius’ students are all males.17
 The “capped youths” to which Zeng Dian refers to, are those who have reached the age of 20. 18
The “capping ceremony,” a ritual in Zhou dynasty, marks their entrance into public life. For girls, 
age and ritual vary. 
 The altar of Wuyu is used for a ritual during which people pray for rain or health.19
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     The Confucian self dwells not only in the body, but also in the belief in moral power. 
Confucius believes that all humans are born with the moral goodness necessary to cultivate a 
moral responsibility. Confucian thought departs from Rousseau’s concept of nature,  which is 20
based on a mechanical notion of form and matter. To Rousseau, not only does the innate 
goodness depart from the body as individuals grow from the original state of nature into 
participants in civilization, the innate goodness is also limited to instincts and feelings, 
resembling the “natural state of merely animal goodness” (p. 234), that “contains no moral 
content” (p. 241).  
     To Confucius, however, it is precisely this innate moral capacity that can be brought into a 
social responsibility. In Confucian thought, education is secondary to the active cultivation of 
moral goodness, whereas, for Rousseau (1952), education is the passive giving up of one’s innate 
goodness. Confucius does not believe in a learning that is not initiated by students themselves, 
nor does he consider accumulation of knowledge as important as the cultivation of moral 
goodness. In regard to self-initiated learning, Confucius remarks, “No guidance from the master 
until one ponders and raises questions; no prompt from the master until one stammers at 
expression of thoughts. Teach no further if one cannot derive from one to another three” (7: 8). In 
regard to knowledge, Confucius says, “If one can treat people with respect, exert efforts in 
dealing with parents and states, be trustworthy in keeping one’s words with friends, although one 
may not have accumulated knowledge, I call the one learned” (1: 7). To Confucius, acquiring 
 According to Baker (2001), Rousseau’s concept of nature has six elements: original state, 20
untamed animal appetites without religious or moral reasonings, matter and force, uniform laws 
of motion, and that which is not made by humans, and those potentials or dispositions revealed 
by institutions that humans later establish.
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knowledge does not automatically lead to the cultivation of moral goodness. As a moral 
philosophy, Confucianism does not focus on acquiring knowledge as modern education does. 
Rather it focuses on cultivating the moral goodness of human nature through relations, just like 
water finds its way around mountains and village. 
     As clean as it can be, water can do harm in many ways. It may cause severe damage and 
danger, but still be clean. The inability to be responsible for oneself and others is considered a 
loss of moral power in compassion and empathy, a failure to ensure the prominent of the self’ 
innate moral goodness. Yet the morally lost are not deprived of chances to change in the future 
and can still do wonder through cultivation. The Confucian cultivation is a conscious and bodily 
choice that is never too late to make. According to Baker (2001), the Confucian notion of human 
nature as morally responsible “marks the uniqueness of human beings rather than subjugating 
humanity to matter as the final reality” (p. 238). 
     To say that Confucian thought focuses on the cultivation of moral responsibility is not to say 
that Confucian thought is free of hierarchy. In other words, the Ren self thrives through (rather 
than avoids) the hierarchy of power relations and thus becomes autonomous. Rousseau wants to 
see children as free of the hierarchy of power relations because they by nature lack the moral 
capacity to participate in civilization. But the exclusion of morality from human nature  itself 21
does not prevent hierarchy. Baker (2001) agrees that hierarchy is indeed assumed in Rousseau’s 
 “Nature, as an original state, as untampered with, as a unified state, as regular laws of motion, 21
as untamed appetites, as potentials and dispositions that civil Man’s institutions brought into 
view, could not only be considered objective in all of its Rousseauean forms, but its objectivity 
announced quite loudly the origins of the foundations of inequality, of subjectivity, among Men 
in civil society…. It is precisely because the young were thought to lack morality, reason, and 
religiosity—progress of the mind—that they could not be considered real citizens” (pp. 
242-247).
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original state of human nature. The tensions between abundance and hungers, beautiful and 
deficient, noble and weak, natural and savage, reside in Rousseau’s notion of human nature. 
However, these tensions constitute the “paradox of modernity that is more stated rather than 
resolved” (Baker, 2001, p. 248). 
     Just as nature proceeds with or without human intervention, social hierarchy may be 
something beyond human control. Rousseau avoids morality in attempt to avoid hierarchy, 
whereas Confucius accepts morality. However, the Confucian acceptance of morality does not 
mean Confucius accepts hierarchy as it is. Rather Confucian Ren lives and thrives through the 
hierarchy of power relations. In carrying out of Ren, social hierarchy is destabilized and 
transformed (I explain this point more in Chapter 5). In short, the Confucian acceptance of 
morality does not conflict with the transformation of social hierarchy. It embraces the notion that 
humans cannot have absolute control over nature or the very civilization built upon reason. The 
Confucian tenderness and liberality toward human nature is woven into the interdependence of 
self, nature, and others through which rights and responsibility are brought to a balance. 
Chaibong (2001) affirms that the Confucian self lives and thrives in “the intricate intersubjective 
social network within which it [the body] is placed” (p. 317).  
     Having explained the Confucian choice of body and moral power in relation to nature, I move 
onto the Confucian choice of family piety over the external enforcement, such as disciplines and 
laws. Confucianism does not rely on legal enforcements to cultivate moral responsibility , nor 22
 The Lord of Ye says to Confucius, “There is a righteous man in my village. His father steals a 22
sheep, and he testifies against him.” Confucius says, “The righteous men in my village are 
different. Fathers cover up for sons and sons cover up for fathers. Righteousness lies within 
relations” (13: 18).
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attempt to avoid social hierarchy. Rather it embraces social hierarchy through its value of family 
piety based on mutual respect. Within the family, children rely on their parents’ guidance rather 
than the socially founded, external authoritative system of penalties associated with laws.  The 23
Confucian choice of family piety emphasizes the relations children have with others, not only 
parents, but also with sages and seniors in general, from which children learn and get ready for 
responsible, social participation. Not at all limited to the family, the father-son relationship, for 
example, symbolizes extra-familial relationships. When asked whether or not to act upon 
learning, Confucius recommends consulting with different familial and extra-familial relations 
for each student . For those who are reckless, Confucius suggests consulting with father and 24
brother; for those who habitually hold back from actions, he suggests moving forward without. 
Thus whether or not to consult with father and brother depends on the specific character of the 
students. To Confucius, taking into consideration other’s insights, be they a father, brother, 
teacher, farmer, or sage, is an essential way of learning to work out conflictive relations. The 
father-son relation is intended only as an example of such relations in which mutual listening is 
essential. 
 Rousseau (1992) writes, “It is manifestly contrary to the law of nature, however defined, that a 23
child should govern an old man, an imbecile should lead a wise man, and that a handful 
multitude goes in want of necessities” (p. 137). 
 Zilu asked, “May one immediately put into practice what one has learned?” The Master said, 24
“When father and brothers are alive, how could one immediately act upon what one has 
learned?” Ran You asked, “May one immediately put into practice what one has learned?” The 
Master said, “Yes, one may.”  
Gongxi Hua said, “When You are asked, ‘May one immediately put into practice what one has 
learned?’ you said, ‘Your father and brothers are still alive.’ When Qiu asked ‘May one 
immediately put into practice what one has learned?’ you said, ‘Yes, one may.’ I am confused, 
and presume to ask about this.” The Master said, “Qiu often holds back, and so I encourage him 
forward; Ran You often encroaches upon others, and so I draw him back” (11: 22).
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     Family piety is not a relationship of blind conformity, but mutual respect. To Confucius, 
respect does not come automatically with age or correspond to social status; it is not imposed, 
but earned. Just as responsible parents love their children by taking their thoughts and opinions 
into consideration, children learn to make responsible choices by learning from the models of 
their parents. It is a process of mutual respect. Confucius emphasizes the importance of not just 
the father-son relationship, but all family relationships and any other relations where mutual 
listening must apply. Critiques of Confucianism often misunderstand the father-son relationship 
as blind rather than mutual conformity. From the mutual conformity emerges a mutual respect; 
from the mutual respect, changes are possible. Not only emphasizing mutual respect in family 
relations and other relations in general, Confucius particularly stresses how those ruling in power 
should cultivate Ren in themselves in order to become better at working with conflictive 
relations.  
     The mutual respect of relations is often overlooked. This is why some scholars critique the 
Confucian emphasis on interrelationship as compromising individual human rights. Rosemont 
(2004) argues that Confucian individuals are unable to discover good life independently or claim 
individual rights without attaching themselves to authorities. The author fails to understand 
family piety as mutual respect and conformity which makes destabilization of social hierarchy 
possible. In addition, the author’s account reveals some mistakes commonly made in Western 
commentaries on Confucianism: first, Chinese people are assumed to be followers of 
Confucianism, while, in reality, most are not. Second, the author mistakenly considers certain 
behavior patterns or habits associated with Chinese people as Confucian. Living in a society 
where Confucianism is the main moral philosophy does not automatically make one a follower 
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of Confucianism. Likewise, Confucius uses certain behaviors as demonstrations and examples, 
like the father-son relationship, to discuss his philosophy. They are not meant to be taken 
literally. Rosemont’s critique of Confucianism as serving and perpetuating the hierarchy of 
power relations takes the father-son relation literally. It fails to understand the relation as a 
mutual respect and conformity. 
     Together the Confucian choice of human nature as bodily and moral, as well as its value of 
family piety over legality, lays the foundation for the cultivation  that mirrors the complexity of 25
nature and culture. Cultivation takes place in the self’s bodily movement, just like water gains 
momentum and power in moving. Similarly, the self becomes aware of its moral power through 
working out conflictive relations, just like water can do wonderful things as it adapts and shapes 
around nature. The moving water takes the shape of its environments but never lacks 
transformative power; the cultivated self interacts with others but never loses a sense of 
responsibility embodying the power to change society. In being responsible for others and in 
destabilizing the established social relations, the self becomes autonomous. Nuyen (2007) writes, 
“We can take comfort in the fact that it is our nature, our Xing (性), to follow the Way as 
exemplified by ancient wisdom and values, [and] that it is not in our nature, not in our Xing (性), 
to choose against that nature, just as water by its nature does not run upward” (p. 95). The 
Confucian cultivation, according to Smith (2008), follows “the way of developing the mind so 
that it may be a base for the arising of wisdom…, not to produce yet more knowledge…, but 
precisely to produce the capacity to discern and judge the true nature of… the economy of actual 
 On the point of cultivation, Descartes’ (1924) concurs that all good things pertaining to birth 25
require “long exercise and meditation, often repeated” (p. 18).
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human requirements” (p. 28). Just like water can change nature in following the natural way of 
running downward, Confucian cultivation can transform society in following and working out 
conflictive relations. Ren is the celebration of living — it changes people and society. I explain 
Ren further in a later section. 
     In summary, Confucian thought embraces the moral goodness of human nature and 
encourages the body to learn from and mirror the complexity of nature, resembling the way 
water adapts and shapes its environment. Not attempting to avoid the hierarchy of power 
relations that may be beyond human control and inevitable in civilization, Confucian thought 
focuses on relations of mutual respect, for example, family piety, rather than external disciplines 
and laws, as a way to cultivate the innate moral goodness oriented toward a social, moral 
responsibility.       
Rights and Moral Responsibility in Confucian Thought 
     The Confucian emphasis on cultivation and interrelation is often critiqued as impeding the 
practice of individual autonomy and compromising individual human rights. In ancient China 
and Confucian thought as well, rights are perceived fundamentally different from the way rights 
are understood in modern societies. Not a political but mainly a social and cultural value, rights 
in Confucian thoughts are embedded in the autonomy of the self. In fact, human rights in the 
United States, before the American Bill of Rights in 1791, have also been mainly a cultural and 
social value, although often manipulated for political reasons. Moreover, educational rights are 
not considered equal to all in the United States until the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Yet the 
politicization of human rights in general, and educational rights more specifically, still do not 
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necessarily protect rights equally for all people. Hintzen (2002) asserts that “rights constitute 
deceitful instruments to keep the bourgeoisie in power at the expense of the rest of the 
population” (p. 71). Whether or not the politicization of rights is an ideal way to promote 
equality and democracy, however, is not the focus here. Given the explanation that rights are 
mainly a social and cultural value in Confucian through, it is not appropriate to critique the 
Confucian emphasis on morality cultivation for not addressing the complication of human rights 
that is uniquely modern and political.  
     Concepts of human rights vary between Confucian and modern ethics, and, subsequently, the 
cultivations of people’s moral responsibility differ from culture to culture. In particular, modern 
ethics focuses more on claiming individual rights, defined as freedom from governmental 
interference, and centering on how free of constraints the self can be. Confucian thought focuses 
on cultivating a moral responsibility through which autonomy and freedom can be achieved. The 
more the self becomes morally responsible toward others, the more one’s rights are assured. 
Most importantly, Confucian thought believes that moral responsibility is the vehicle of rights 
and can lead to a humane, harmonious society, whereas in modernity, individual freedom is 
believed to lead to a democratic society; in practice, however, rights are not equal for all. In 
Confucian thought, a humane, harmonious society is not synonymous with the modern, 
democratic society. Recognition and protection of human rights may be necessary, but legal 
protection is not the only condition required to achieve autonomy, freedom, and democracy. 
Political, legal intervention alone cannot protect rights for all. They cannot substitute the moral, 
social values of rights and responsibility that serve as the essence of Confucian thought. 
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     Wang (2004) challenges the rights-centered individualism that is dominant in modern ethics. 
The author asks, “How can we espouse the freedoms and rights of individuals under a rational 
governing structure without reducing them to egoistic and atomistic entities and subjecting them 
to the growing danger of alienation under modernity” (p. 319)? Rooted in rationality, reason, or, 
as Wang puts it, “the law of contradiction” (p. 319), the political enforcement of rights assumes 
that people’s rights can be protected equally by laws, whereas, in reality, only the privileged few 
are granted justice. Human rights are not simply political phenomena; they have been made more 
and more political in modern societies. Political protection of rights is not only problematic but 
fundamentally impossible. Wang cites Derrida: “there is no possibility of justice without 
shattering the illusory authority of laws and norms and overcoming the violence ingrained in the 
‘logo-centrism’ of Western metaphysics” (p. 319). The discourse of human rights is a product of 
modernity, not applicable in ancient China. It makes little sense to critique an ancient philosophy 
like Chinese Confucianism for not addressing or anticipating the political complications on the 
concept of human rights. To clarify, my focus is on the social, cultural values of rights and 
responsibility as captured in Confucian thought, not the political, legal complication on the 
concept of human rights as perceived today, although it is the latter that motivates this writing.  
     To begin with, the concept of rights is not so much of a concern in ancient China. As a moral 
philosophy, Confucian thought approaches rights in a way fundamentally different than most 
societies do today. Rights, in Confucian thought, come about as the self learns from the 
complexity of nature and thus cultivates the moral goodness. Li (1992) asserts that the rights 
dimension of Confucian thought is an element of human nature, Renxing (⼈性). In Confucian 
thought, caring for oneself can be developed naturally from the innate instinct for survival, but 
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this act is not exclusively human. The Confucian notion of rights is embedded within the 
elements of human nature, elements other than self-care, that are distinctively human. Hintzen 
(2002) acknowledges that humans are moral beings rather than beings of rights relying on legal 
enforcement. What makes one human is not how well one can speak out and defend their rights 
through political, legal enforcement, but rather how well one fulfills social roles. The greater the 
individual’s ability in fulfilling social roles, the more respect one will receive, and the more 
rights one’s rights will be granted by others. It is the moral responsibility, a person’s ability to 
carry out good intentions, rather than the desire to care for oneself, that sets humans apart from 
other species.   
     Second, Confucian thought does not turn to legal protection as a way to cultivate moral 
responsibility, for Confucian thought does not see people as entities of the hierarchy built upon 
reason within which legality operates. People, according to Chaibong (2001), “are considered 
both the means and the end of human flourishing, not something to be limited, abolished, or 
otherwise overcome” (p. 315). China is a people’s republic; it stands in the service of the people. 
Whether or not the modern Chinese government should increase legal enforcements on human 
rights (i.e., to make it legal and political, or otherwise let them remain ethical and ideological) is 
another topic. At least in naming the country, the Chinese government has been persistent in 
preserving the very essence of Confucian thought. 
     Thirdly, the Confucian notion of rights is not fixed with social status, but the result of being 
respected and responsible. People’s rights are assured based on their respectfulness, regardless of 
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social roles and status. In Analects (16:12) , Confucius praises Bo Yi (伯夷) and Shu Qi’s (叔26
齐)  moral virtues because they refuse to go along with the ruler’s violence and cruelty in 27
governing the states. They are respected, remembered, and praised by people whereas the Duke, 
who has wealth and high social status, is not. To Confucius, the assurance of rights depends on 
people’s recognition of one’s Ren rather than one’s wealth and social status. Legends of Ren, like 
Bo Yi (伯夷) and Shu Qi, chose not to conform to the ruling power but to live with dignity. It is 
their rights to live with dignity, not their responsibility to follow a ruler who is not Ren. If Bo Yi 
(伯夷) and Shu Qi (叔齐) did not choose to die with dignity, they would have been granted all 
rights because they were respected and their Ren had been approved by people. In Confucian 
thought, the self’s rights depend on how much the self is respected. Rather than constantly 
defending or claiming one’s own rights, the Ren self focuses on the cultivation, the carrying out 
of good intension, for the benefit of others. The more the self is respected by others, the more 
one’s rights are granted by others. Contrary of the Confucian notion of rights that is not linked to 
wealth and social status, human rights in modern societies are. According to Hantzen (2002), 
“hierarchically, the more rights one is to enjoy, the higher status one may be deemed to be” (p. 
55). 
 Confucius remarks, “Duke Jing of Qi had a thousand of horses [symbolic of his wealth and 26
social status], but on the day he died, the people could find no virtue to praise him. Bo Yi (伯夷) 
and Shu Qi (叔齐) starved beneath the Mountain Shouyang (⾸阳), but the people praise them 
till this day. It is not the wealth that matters, but only having the difference in people’s respect.”
 Bo Yi (伯夷) and Shu Qi (叔齐) are two brothers who lived in China at the time of transition 27
between the Shang and Zhou dynasties. It was a time when their country was misruled with high 
taxes, mass hunger, violence, and cruelty. They refused to follow the minister’s way and starrved 
to death underneath the Mountain of Shouyang. They are remembered in Chinese literary culture 
for moral virtue.
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     Maybe what makes people respect Bo Yi and Shu Qi so much is that they did not choose to 
live at the expense of their Ren. To Confucius, “The ones that are Ren do not seek to live on at 
the expense of Ren [wealth, social status, and so on], but at times sacrifice their life to complete 
Ren” (15: 8). To summarize, the Confucian notion of rights is embedded in the belief that the 
innate desire to care for oneself can be carried out in human’s moral cultivation of Ren toward a 
humane society where rights correspond with mutual respect, rather than with a hierarchy fixed 
with wealth and social status. It is when rights are disassociated from the compensation of 
seeking that the self becomes autonomous. 
     Furthermore, the Confucian notion of rights is based on an autonomous self, capable of 
reflective engagement and consideration of others. People must be able to act upon their 
independent will before they practice being responsible to others. This notion of autonomy and 
freedom is supported and consistent throughout the detailed textual evidence in Analects. 
Confucius says to his students, “One can seize the general in charge of the three army divisions, 
but one cannot deprive the will (or heart’s intent) of common people” (9.26). Mencius  also 28
says, “One cannot be perplexed when wealthy and honored, or deflected from one’s will when 
poor and obscure, nor can one be made to bow before superior force” (3B. 2). The two messages 
converge on the Confucian notion of autonomy: a notion of being able to persist and reflect on 
the intent of the heart. Confucian autonomy, or the intent of the heart, cannot be taken away by 
elements of hierarchy, such as wealth and social status.     
 Mencius (Meng Tzi, 孟⼦, 372 – 289 B.C.E), Chinese philosopher, the most famous 28
Confucian thinker after Confucius.
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     Not only capable of acting upon one’s independent will, the Confucian autonomous self must 
furthermore question authorities before they can make choices accordingly and live with 
dignity.  The mutual respect of father-son, of mother-daughter, of teacher-student, and so on — 29
symbolic of the creative practice of ritual — provides a way to claim dignity different from that 
of claiming rights. Rituality is a mutual repeating, following, and conforming based on 
examination and choice. Xunzi (荀⼦ ) says in Zidao (⼦道, The Way of the Son): 30
If a father has a son who’s able to give honest suggestions, he would not choose to do 
things contradicting propriety. If a scholar has a friend who’s able to give an honest 
suggestion, he would not make irresponsible choices. How could a son be called filial for 
simply following the order of his father? And how could one be called loyal for simply 
following the order of the ruler? One can only speak of filial respect and loyalty after one 
has examined the reasons. (29) 
     In short, Confucian conformity does not always line up with the way power relations operate, 
as in the case of Bo Yi and Shu Qi, who deny the compensations promised by the ruling power 
and choose to die with dignity. According to Smith (2008), the Confucian notion of rights and 
responsibility as interdependent and emerging leads to a belief that “everything in life is self-
organizing and co-constructive–that is, everything is constructed through every other thing, and 
 “Zigong said, “If a son follows the order of the father, that is filial respect; if one follows  the 29
order to the ruler, that is loyalty. But what is the answer of my teacher?” Confucius said, “How 
ignorant that is! You do not know filial respect and loyalty. In antiquity, a state of ten thousand 
war-chariots was never diminished if there were four ministers giving honest suggestions; a state 
of one thousand war-chariots was never endangered if there were three ministers giving honest 
suggestions; and a family with one hundred war-chariots would not bring harm to its ancestral 
temple if there were two family ministers giving honest suggestions. If a father has a son who’s 
able to give honest suggestions, he would not choose to do things contradicting propriety. If a 
scholar has a friend who’s able to give honest suggestion, he would not make irresponsible 
choices. How could a son be called filial respect for simply following the order of his father? 
And how could one be called loyal for simply following the order of the ruler? One can only 
speak of filial respect and loyalty after one has examined the reasons.”
 Xunzi, 荀⼦(312–230 B. C. E), a Chinese philosopher and one of the major Confucian 30
thinkers after Confucius and Mencius.
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what happens to one somehow influences what happens to everything else in a movement of 
constant adaptation and change” (p. 22). Smith’s notion of everything existing in every other 
thing is similar to Confucian way of “obtain by yielding.” As Zigong (⼦贡) describes, “Our 
master is modest, friendly, reverential, and frugal; he obtains by yielding. The way our master 
seeks things is different from the way others do” (1: 14). To apply the notion of “obtain by 
yielding” in the interchangeability of rights and responsibility, the Confucian way of claiming 
rights does not seek what benefits oneself, but instead what benefits others.  
    The understanding of responsibility and rights as interchanging and transformative, has made 
headway in postmodern theories. Derrida’s conception of identity as both presence and absence  31
can be applied to the transferability of rights and responsibility in which two seemingly opposites 
interchange with and transform into one another. Egéa-Kuehne (1997) writes about Derrida’s 
conception of “double duty,”—“This double duty [for example, traditions and differences, 
integration and alterity] calls for responsibility, the responsibility to think, speak, and act within 
aporetic situations, under double contradictory imperatives” (p. 160).  
     Applying Derrida’s concept of “double duty” in teaching and learning, Egéa-Kuehne (1997) 
asks: “isn’t it [teacher’s responsibility] to encourage them [students] to take risks in learning and 
discovering the other, the unknown, while building up a greater sense of responsibility toward 
self-directed learning, and therefore truly unique identity building?” (p. 161). This notion of 
learning responsibility differs fundamentally from the dominant, educational practice of 
 For example, Derrida sees identity not as fixed but fluid. Egéa-Kuehne (1997) explains 31
Derrida’s concept of identity: “every form of presence contains an absence, and every absence a 
presence” (p. 158). To Derrida, “whether or not it [the absence or presence of certain 
characteristics of identity] is in evidence is only a matter of mind and perception” (p. 157).
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standards and assessment. Rather than reinforcing the rationale of results-driven, the process of 
learning responsibility focuses on building a moral flexibility and perseverance that emerge from 
appreciation of differences in others.  
     The perseverance to struggle, to put in effort without outcomes, and to work through 
conflicts, differ fundamentally from the rights-centered, results-driven individualism. Baker 
(2001) believes that only through “a moral notion of reasoning” (p. 191), one that appreciates the 
differences of others, can a deep sense of responsibility be learnt. Baker’s moral notion of 
reasoning and Derrida’s concept of “double duty” share the understanding that a sense of 
responsibility can emerge only through the appreciation of others’ differences and the recognition 
of relations as mutually transformative.      
     Derrida’s understanding of responsibility as the appreciation of differences and others aligns 
nicely with the Confucian cultivation of Ren, in which the appreciation of others is not set 
against, but rather fundamental to the prosperity of states. Confucian thought emphasizes 
working through interpersonal relations as the essential component of a humane and prosperous 
society. Moral responsibility is considered a contribution rather than a hindrance to recognition 
and protection of individual rights. It sees the working through conflictive relations as the 
precondition for individual freedom, not the other way around. Confucian rights are embedded in 
the fulfillment of responsibility. Entitlements to one’s own rights would not be possible if not 
carried out with responsibility to others. Chan (2006) asserts that responsibility, or “the 
entitlement of others,” has a “firm basis in Confucian ethics” (p. 245). Contrary to frequent 
misinterpretations, the cultivation of moral responsibility is considered a privilege, rather than a 
constraint to the autonomy of the self. It is convenient yet futile to reject Confucian thought 
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based on patterns of behaviors observed from the outside of the culture that do not represent the 
very essence of moral responsibility. I turn to an explanation of how Confucian Ren works 
toward the destabilization of social hierarchy.     
Cultivation of Ren (仁) as Responsibility: Working toward Changes 
     Unlike Foucault’s concern about how subjectivities are constructed through power relations 
by themselves (i.e. technologies of the self or tekhnie of the self), the Confucian cultivation of 
Ren does not focus on the technologies of the self, but the art of life. It cultivates a responsible 
living that embraces the constant struggling of others in relation to the self, not vice versa . 32
Foucault (1988) is right in pointing out that the truth in the Confucian art of living is related not 
to “an absolute law of the permitted and the forbidden, nor by reference to a criterion of 
utility” (p. 57) . However, Foucault is not right that the Confucian art of living is “first and 33
foremost in relation to itself” (p. 57). Rather, it is first and foremost a cultivation of the self, a 
“reverberation in the body” in relation to others, in its intensity, quality, and duration (p. 57). It is 
in the benefit of others that the self is respected and honored, and thus celebrated as Ren (仁). 
     Understanding rights and responsibility as interchanging and organic, the Confucian 
cultivation of Ren promotes a moral responsibility that cherishes other people. People of Ren are 
not only independent, autonomous beings capable of moral feelings, but also responsible beings 
of human-relatedness. The Cultivation of Ren does not celebrate the loving of oneself due to the 
 Constitution of subjectivity embraces the practice, the constant struggling, reminding of the 32
self in relation to others.
 Constitutions of subjectivity, according to Foucault (1978), is strictly geared to a form of 33
knowledge-power in Western civilization. 
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achievement of one’s own rewards, such as wealth or social status; rather it celebrates the loving 
of others in action. When Fan Chi (樊迟) asks about Ren, Confucius responds, “Loving 
people” (12: 22); when Zhong Gong (仲恭) asks about Ren, Confucius responds, “Do not do to 
others what you would not wish to have done to yourself” (12: 2). The essence of Ren as loving 
people, as carrying out actions for the benefit of other, is fundamental and consistent throughout 
Analects. Confucius remarks, “People need Ren more than water or fire. I have seen people die 
in treading through water and fire; I have not seen anyone die in treading through Ren” (15: 34).  
     Confucian Ren is confirmed in the “look of others.” People learn about other’s Ren through 
observing their action and intention. Confucius says, “See their actions, observe their past 
experiences, examine their intentions and habits, how can anyone hide? How can you not know 
what kind of persons they are” (2: 10)? To Confucius, everything about the self, both feelings 
and intentions, are manifested, reflected, and revealed in the self’s actions through the body. 
People’s intersubjective vision of the self constitutes and eventually develops as a social 
sensibility. The intersubjective vision does not always follow the dominant way of knowing and 
reasoning. When social sensibility converges with respect, it becomes powerful. People follow 
Ren when they recognize it. This is how rulings of Ren and people’s recognition of Ren gain the 
power to make changes.  
     This is also why claiming oneself as Ren by the self is one thing and being recognized as Ren 
by others is another. Confucian cultivation of Ren as responsibility toward others has an 
intersubjective or social dimension. What people say about their good intentions is not 
meaningful until these intentions are faithfully carried out in actions and observed by others. 
When Sima Niu (司马⽜) asks about Ren, Confucius responds, “The ones who speak with 
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reluctance” (12: 3). To Confucius, the easily said cannot be Ren. How could something hard to 
carry out be easily said? For example, it’s easy to say that “I treat everyone with kindness,” but it 
is hard to carry it out. Because it is hard to carry out, Confucius chooses not the say it, for saying 
“I treat everyone with kindness” means little. If one cannot explain “how” to treat everyone with 
kindness, Confucius believes that it is better not to say it. This is why the Ren self speaks with 
reluctance, for saying without knowing how, and knowing how without actually carrying out the 
good intentions, are not meaningful. In Confucian thought, the ones who say one thing but do 
another are referred as “Xiaoren” (⼩⼈), and the ones who are ethical and capable are referred 
as “Junzi" (君⼦). In achieving transparency and consistency in the body, thoughts, and actions, 
those of Ren earn people’s respect and become capable of making changes. Certainly saying that 
the self’s character is dependent on “the look of others” is not to say that the Confucian self 
relies solely on the look of others to maintain an understanding of oneself. Instead, Confucian 
thought emphasizes the intersubjective relations in carrying out good intentions through which 
people develop social sensibility.      
     Confucian thought suggests Li (礼, rituals of propriety) to be the vehicle for Ren (仁). When 
asked about Ren, Confucius responds, “Conquer yourself… Don’t look if it is not Li, don’t listen 
if it is not Li, don’t say if it is not Li, don’t do if it is not Li” (12: 1). The Confucian notion of Li 
permeates everyday life in the acts of seeing, listening, talking, and doing that simultaneously 
cultivates the relations and bond people together. Li (2007), using the analogy of “language,” 
explains Li as the “cultural grammar” and Ren (仁) as the culture itself (p. 311). Starting with the 
simple imitation in the bodily movements, rituals of Li can emerge with ease and transform from 
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Li’s public dimension to a creativity that is more private and free. As the carrier of Ren, Li’s 
pubic dimension allows the self to connect with community and Li’s private dimension allows 
the self to connect with oneself. Just as the style of writing varies from person to person, Li can 
be changed or suspended over time depending on the circumstances. In the case of getting 
married, for example, Li represents a particular set of ceremonial motions that may differ greatly 
from one community to another. At the same time, because Li “is embedded in people’s everyday 
behavior as grammar is embedded in everyday expressions” (p. 318), it has an “outwardness” 
that involves “social objectivity” (p. 322). Thus, Li builds on creative efforts rather than an 
isolated set of rules and actions. Confucius explains the role of Li in bringing out the holistic 
personhood of Ren. 
The Master said; [If one]  is intelligent to acquire, but not Ren to keep, [one] will lose it 34
even if [one] acquires. [If one] is intelligent to acquire and Ren to keep, but not solemn in 
dealing with people , then people will not respect. [If one] is intelligent to acquire, Ren 35
to keep, and solemn in dealing with people, but does not act according to Li, it is still not 
good. (15: 32) 
     To Confucius, Li is simultaneously private and public—Li is always a private event subject to 
change according to particular needs, as well as a public phenomenon that welcomes the 
concepts of community and relationship—just as grammar by nature is public and yet flexible in 
 Notice that Chinese as a language does not start each sentence with the subject of “I” even 34
when expressing one’s own ideas. This implies the notion that everyone is capable of practices of 
ren [benevolence, 仁] and that everyone can become a master of loving oneself and others. In 
addition, the implied “I” suggests a humble appreciation of the self and nature in Chinese 
culture.      
 Interpretations of the original text vary. Some translate it as “solemn in presenting to people” 35
and others as “solemn in dealing with people.” Both capture the manner in presenting but not the 
essence of what is presented. Confucius seems to suggest both the seriousness and diligence in 
ruling and the solemnness in presenting to people.
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personal use. Both the private and public dimensions of Li are preserved and transferred into the 
cultivation of Ren (仁); the two support each other.     
     The Confucian rituals of Li can be confused with the enforcement of standards, for, in both 
systems, the self is expected to follow certain routines. There are two crucial differences: first, in 
who initiates the practice, and second, in whether there is a choice of how, when, and where. 
Practices of standards are assessed externally, whereas practices of rituals are not. Ritual 
practices have nothing to do with putting up a good character artificially in order to acquire a 
respectful look of others, but rather aim to cultivate the body as a private event that is not under 
the public gaze. The purpose of following Li’s public dimension at the beginning is only to 
initiate something that the self has not acquired on its own. In other words, the learning of Li, 
which at first involves imitation, preconditions the self-initiated learning that eventually becomes 
part of the self and cannot be forgotten.  
     For example, during the Chinese New Year celebration, children are gathered around senior 
members of the family to convey their best wishes with the gesture of a bow. In response, senior 
members would give a red pack with some money in it to wish for a year-long health. This is a 
good example of rituals in family bonding. Confucius never prescribes any ritual but only 
emphasizes the value of it. When to do it (before or after the meal); where to do it (in the family 
room or at the dinner table); and how to do it (verbally with or without the gesture of a bow) all 
depend on the specific families.  
     Even young children who may not understand the value of rituals, including babies who are 
still carried in their parents’ arms, are nevertheless included in the family circle. For members 
who are not able to be physically present—whether traveling or having passed away—their 
!102
absence are felt by those who remain. Yet the inability to be present at the time of family 
gathering does not disqualify them from future reunion. This is different from enforcing 
standards which, if not met, will result in future disqualification, and will therefore delimit the 
self’s chances for lifetime achievement. To Confucius, rituals represent the symbolic 
opportunities for people to express mutual respect and love. They are events that people look 
forward to. Just like the July 4th fireworks in the United States, these rituals are a celebration of 
independence and a commemoration of those who fight for it. It is these rituals that everyone 
looks forward to. 
     As years pass by, feelings about family rituals may change, yet the hope to stay connected 
overcomes other circumstances. The Confucian practice of rituals brings people together. 
Feelings, thoughts, and actions converge toward a sense of responsibility — to be there in a 
family circle, to be there in a social circle, and to be there in a life circle. Confucian thought 
persists on challenging the self to remain responsible throughout the life circle.  
 From fifteen, my heart is set upon learning; from thirty, I support myself; from forty, I’m  
 no longer doubtful; from fifty, I realize the propensity of my Tianming (天命) [i.e., my  
 responsibility or the purpose of my existence]; from sixty, my ears are attuned to the  
 advice set against; from seventy, I can be as free as my heart desires, and yet without  
 overstepping the acceptable boundaries. (2: 4) 
     To Confucius, the practice of ritual carries the symbolic meaning of learning for lifetime. The 
essence of rituality lies in the effort to keep challenging oneself, opening up for more and more 
possibility rather than closing down on a fixed, secure standpoint. People apply different rituals 
of working and learning. Writers in particular enjoy their private modes of ritual to enhance the 
way they are connected to the works. Rituals bring people a sense of joy and satisfaction. Again, 
Confucius never prescribes how one should learn at the age of fifteen or seventy. He only 
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emphasizes the symbolic ritual of learning in a life circle. In short, rituals do not impose 
constraints but instead aim at integrating the self as participating, responsible members of the 
family and society, i.e., cultivating Ren.  
     Relating Li to the modern practice of science, Nuyen (2007) argues that Li serves to guide 
individuals to connect with “settled convictions” and to create new relations. The author writes, 
“There is no need to think that these ‘settled convictions’ are unsettled in the age of biological 
control, as they are convictions formed in the process of building up social relationship, a 
process that remains to be accomplished after the biology has done its work” (p. 89). The author 
agrees that as long as individuals cultivate a sense of responsibility toward Ren, their choices 
made through practices of Li cannot be genetically engineered. The Cultivations of Ren based on 
Li reinforces the notion that human relations cannot be manufactured or substituted by biological 
control. Machines may do lots of things better than humans, but they do not possess the ability to 
make responsible choices like humans do. Education should prepare children for what machines 
cannot do, rather than prepare them to compete with what machines do best, i.e., following 
orders and performing standards. Why train humans to become something that cannot survive in 
the future? Future generations do not need more machines, but instead need people who can 
make responsible choices. How science advances, how genetic science alters the biological 
chance, should not alleviate people’s responsibility for making choices oriented toward the 
benefit of others. Nuyen (2007) writes, “What I am given by chance, is my tradition, and what I 
manage to do with it is entirely my choice and hence entirely my responsibility” (p. 94). 
     Confucius believes that the innate moral goodness of human nature is the core of genetic 
inheritance that can be brought into fuller realization through the creative practice of Li. Unlike 
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Dworkin’s notion of cultural background and genetic inheritance as an absolute given, Confucius 
sees both cultural background and genetic inheritance as relevant elements—cultural background 
as emerging from creative practice of Li and genetic inheritance as the realization of innate moral 
goodness. Nuyen (2007) explains, “The chance inheritance of traditional wisdom and values will 
continue to guide us in making responsible choices, in marking out responsible behavior from 
irresponsible behavior…” (p. 94). Confucius and Nuyen concur that culture and biology are not 
transcendental and fixed, but rather changing factors interdependent with the choices humans 
made, make, and continue to make in the future. Nuyen writes, “What is decreed for me changes 
with how I behave” (p. 93). The Confucian life is about choices, not chances.  
     In addition to the cultivation of Ren through Li, the Confucian responsibility also resides in 
the concept of respect or reverence for others, namely Jing (敬, respect). Without Jing, Li is 
limited to mechanical repetitions. Chan (2006) explains two notions of Jing relevant in practices 
of Li: Jing as a state of mind when supported by a strong sense of responsibility, and Jing as an 
intentional state pertaining more directly to people’s behaviors. To explain, Jing as an intentional 
state is often directed toward and associated with social ranks, laws, authority, or age; it also 
tends to appraise these factors themselves as having values. On the contrary, Jing as a state of 
mind requires a “self-reflection and self-awareness in scrutinizing whether one has consciously 
identified, understood, and carried out one’s duties” (p. 242), especially when external objects or 
rewards are absent.  
     Chan (2006) points out that modern notions of respect (as, for example, sympathy, 
recognition, and appraisal) are all limited to intentional attitudes toward specific external objects, 
thus making respect something to be evaluated. These notions are limited to a fulfillment of duty 
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that can be monitored by external instruments. The part that cannot be monitored—the part that 
cultivates a state of mind—is overlooked. The Confucian notion of Li cultivates Jing as a state of 
mind by which the self, not the external instrument, makes the judgment. This state of mind is 
manifested the presence of the body, for without Jing, it’s better to have no rituals at all. 
Confucius remarks, “Be present in ceremony as if the spirit of Tian (天) is there, or otherwise it’s 
better not to do it” (3: 12). 
     Together, Confucian notions of Ren, Li, and Jing imbue the self with the complexity of nature. 
To be creative, to be free, is to immerse oneself in and unite with nature. To be free is not to 
escape into nature, but rather to gain inspiration from nature’s complexity. Wang (2004) writes 
that “love and freedom can be pulled in opposite directions if we see love as merely a relation 
with and freedom as only freeing from” (p. 136). Autonomy and freedom come from an ability to 
care and be involved with others. Autonomy and harmony can only be brought about through 
complex interactions. Wang (2009) supports the notion that moral responsibility must be brought 
into consideration of harmonious society. Wang writes, 
 The ultimate ground of a peaceful and harmonious community is not the sacred power of  
 some divine or societal authority, but the genuine care and reverence among individual  
 persons within the community. The root of justice lies in the sensus communis [common  
 sense] of the human heart…, in the judgments we make in our heart and our conscience,  
 in the contest of a humane concern for the people in our community. The roots of justice  
 are not in divine or political power or in the authority of reason, but in the heart of the  
 people. (pp. 327-332)   
     To finish, Nelson (2009) points out that Confucian notions of Ren, Jing, and Li may not be 
directly relevant for or contribute to scientific research, political policies, or activist initiatives. 
However, these concepts provide invaluable insights in considering cultural background and 
responsibility as fluid and transformative. Without reducing culture and nature to a “teleological 
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realization of potentiality with a fixed trajectory and end” (p. 298), Confucian notions of Ren, 
Jing, and Li cultivate a moral responsibility that helps to exam into the political, racial, 
educational tensions that Foucault’s genealogical discourse is not able to address. Nelson writes, 
“The dominant Western conception of ‘nature,’ as an inherently extrinsic and derivative realm 
dependent on divine and human production, construction, and calculation, is fundamentally 
inadequate to the holism” (p. 298). Confucian notions of Ren, Li, and Jing together nurture “the 
conditions of all things from which responsibilities emerge without anticipation or 
calculation” (p. 306). Not implying a “coercive obedience to a mysterious external substance or 
law,” the responsiveness or receptivity of Ren, Li, and Jing transform “the socially defined and 
limited responsibilities of the convention defined by customary common life” (p. 306). The 
Confucian Ren, Li, and Jing require breaking down various precautions, defenses, conservatisms. 
These notions create a sense of freedom and love through which social sensibility emerge.   
     Confucius reveres people’s collective, social sensibility, a sensibility beyond individual 
subjectivity. When social sensibility converges with respect, the two together becomes powerful. 
In the next chapter, I focus on the application of Ren and its implications for modern education 
by using ancient Chinese legacy, the Iowa Redistricting Policy, as well as the United States law 
cases. I argue that people’s collective responsibility can transform legal, political powers. As my 
writing about Confucian Ren comes to a pause here, I realize that what I have done in my life so 
far is nowhere near Ren, with the exception of my willingness to read Analects. I did it not for 
any tangible reward. I am willing to slow down and wait for results to emerge. I am willing to 
take on the responsibility to make changes, first in myself, and then for others.  
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EDUCATION AS A MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
      
     Education is to prepare children for their lifetime achievement and to bring the equality of 
educational opportunity for all. It should bear a potential to change society for the common good, 
rather than to conform unquestionably to a political utility of control. If the current state of 
education focusing on standards continues to reinforce the construction of an individual, results-, 
rights-driven subjectivity at the expense of moral responsibility, education would lose its purpose 
and social change for the benefit of all would not be possible. In the previous chapter, I 
introduced the Confucian Ren as a moral responsibility that cultivates people as responsible 
individuals capable of carrying out benevolence for others. I explained that the Confucian Ren 
self does not seek the rewards of one’s own, nor do they rely on legal forces to claim rights.  
     Having laid out the difference between the Confucian Ren self and the individual, results-, 
rights-driven subjectivity, my focus in this chapter is on the implications of Ren for modern 
education. I draw on two examples: the Iowa Redistricting Policy implemented in public schools 
and the United States law case on academic autonomy in higher education, namely Burt v. 
Rumsfeld (2005). I use the Iowa Redistricting Policy to argue that political manipulation of the 
Redistricting Policy cannot deliver the equality of educational opportunity for all. In the case of 
Burt v. Rumsfeld (2005), I maintain that the legal enforcement alone does not protect the 
academic autonomy and people’s moral responsibility can complement the legal enforcement.   
These two examples suggest that when moral responsibility is present, it can lead to social 
change. However, when moral responsibility is absent, particularly in those establishing 
educational policy, remnants of segregation will continue to exist in public, educational spaces. 
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How then do children learn about moral responsibility when it is not encouraged or modeled in 
education?    
     In Confucian thought, learning moral responsibility is not limited to education or schools. The 
practice of Ren modeled by ancient Chinese rulers has tremendous educational and social power 
beyond the typical idea of education associated with schools, classrooms, and knowledge. The 
practice of Ren modeled by rulers sets up a good example for people to learn and develop a 
moral responsibility. This model of Ren does not rely on external laws to reinforce conformity; 
instead it is based on a belief that people are the foundation of the states and that people by 
nature have the moral goodness to recognize Ren. In other words, although not all people are 
Ren, they can by nature recognize Ren. Together the ruler’s practice of Ren and people’s 
recognition of Ren can transform the established social, political power.  
     In the case of the Iowa Redistricting Policy, the existing power relations are not at all 
changed, but rather perpetuated. Under the cover of diversity and closing achievement gap, 
remnants of segregation continue to persist. Without addressing the pre-existing social, racial, 
and economic background of African American students, the Iowa Redistricting Policy, as it has 
been practiced so far, does not deliver on its alleged commitment of diversity. In addition, 
people’s empathy toward marginalized others, as well as their good intentions for public schools, 
is not reflected in the policy. The practice of Ren modeled by ancient Chinese rulers helps 
educators to see the limitation of the Iowa redistricting Policy: when moral responsibility is 
absent in those establishing educational policy, not only is diversity an empty concept, the 
equality of educational opportunity is also not possible. Instead, remnants of the “racially 
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exclusive past” (Mitchell et al., 2010, p. 294) continues to exist in the name of diversity and 
closing achievement gap. 
     The so-called “achievement gap” between African American and white students in Iowa is in 
fact an opportunity gap (Ravitch, 2013). Based on the student population published in the Iowa 
School Report Card, some predominantly white schools continue to exclude African American 
students. Those public schools do not share the responsibility in providing the educational 
opportunity for African American students. Other schools that share the responsibility, however, 
are not provided with additional support in developing the educational environment needed by 
African American students. As a whole, the public education space continues to be a “reified 
racialized space” (Mitchell et al., 2010, p. 294), a space where the opportunity gap persists. I 
conclude that a moral responsibility committed for the equality of educational opportunity must 
address the social, racial, and economic background. Only by understanding “the ‘raced’ nature 
of space” (p. 296) and by working out these tensions that exist both in and outside of the school 
context, can educators work toward the closing of achievement gap.  
     Contrary to the absence of moral responsibility practiced in the Iowa Redistricting Policy, I 
cite the United States legal cases on academic autonomy to support my claim that moral 
responsibility not only exists in ancient China, but also in the modern United States. In the case 
of Burt v. Rumsfeld (2005), people’s collective effort plays a critical role in the protection of 
academic autonomy. To give an outline of this chapter, I begin with the practice of Ren modeled 
by ancient Chinese rulers to explain its educational power in leading people toward a recognition 
of Ren. I then use the Iowa Redistricting Policy as an example opposite of the practice of Ren. I 
maintain that the absence of moral responsibility in those establishing educational policy allows 
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segregation to continue in public education spaces. Lastly, I cite the United States legal cases to 
support my claim that people’s moral responsibility can complement the legal enforcement of 
academic autonomy in higher education. 
The Power of Ren in Ancient Chinese Rulings 
     The Confucian cultivation of Ren as moral responsibility delivered educational opportunity 
for common people. Before Confucius, education was a privilege for nobility and royalty alone. 
However, Confucius believed that education should be for all people. He remarks, “There’s 
teaching; there’s no division of class in teaching” (15: 38). Confucius makes education possible 
for common people based on his belief that people, not political power relations, are the 
foundation of states. Furthermore, Confucius’ democratic inclination for education is reflected in 
a broad love for people. Confucius remarks, “All people within the four seas are my brothers and 
sisters”(12: 5). The Ren of Confucius supports him to deliver education for common people. As 
equal brothers and sisters, people have the opportunity to realize their moral goodness and learn 
to be responsible for each other through the cultivation of benevolence, compassion, respect, 
propriety, and relationship. 
     In Confucian thought, people seeing, recognizing, and following Ren do not rely on an 
extensive amount of knowledge but a moral willingness to follow its innate goodness, which can 
be encouraged and led by the practice of Ren modeled by leaders. The legendary emperors  in 36
 The deeds of five legendary emperors — the Yellow Emperor (皇帝), Zhuanxu (颛顼), Yao 36
(尧), Shun (舜), Yu (禹), are recorded in Sima Qian’s Records of the Grand Historian, Chapter 1, 
“Five Emperors.” Although considered the legend, archaeological findings, such as excavations 
of underground artifacts, some are also words, have provided clues and information for the 
existence of ancient China in the development of human history.
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ancient China (2699–2101 BC) are the models of Ren that have been long celebrated, 
particularly by common people. At the time, the lives of Emperor Yao (尧, 2333-2234 BC), Shun 
(舜, 2233-2184 BC), Yu’s (禹, 2283-2101 BC) were tied closely to the people’s when dealing 
with frequent tribal wars, opening fertile lands, and facing natural catastrophes. Their practice of 
Ren, especially Yu’s, reached and touched people’s hearts, because they shared a common 
responsibility with people as they found ways to live in peace with nature. Sima Qian  (2007) in 37
Records of the Grand Historian writes about Emperor Yao: “He is benevolent and wise as the 
Sky. Close to him, people’s heart feels the warmth of the sun; look up to him, people see clouds 
generously covering the earth. He is rich but humble, noble but not indulgent” (p. 2).  
     Yao is the first Emperor in Chinese history who gave his ruling to someone outside of the 
family line, a decision historically called the “demise,” based on that person’s ability in carrying 
out Ren. According to Sima, Yao asked, “Who can continue the responsibility in my position?” 
When people recommended his son, the Emperor replied: “Ah! Foolish, ferocious, he cannot be 
used to continue my responsibility” (p. 2). When another person outside of the family line was 
recommended, the Emperor replied, “Crafty in words and ingratiating in actions , he cannot be 38
used” (p. 2). Yao kept on searching, “Let’s find someone in the people far and hidden” (p. 2). So 
finally Shun (舜) was recommended. Shun had a blind and ignorant father, a stubborn mother, 
and an arrogant brother, yet he was able to live with his family in harmony. Emperor Yao sent 
 Sima Qian (135 – 86 BC), Chinese historian, the father of Chinese historiography, author of 37
the first comprehensive and systematic book, Shiji (史记, Records of the Grand Historian) on the 
Chinese history.
 Confucius in Analects remarks the same, “Crafty in words and ingratiating in actions are rarely 38
Ren (1.3). 
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Shun on various missions to see Shun’s ability and most importantly, to see how people 
perceived Shun. Years later, Shun’s Ren was recognized by both Yao and people. Yao passed 
away twenty-eight years after he demised his ruling to Shun. Sima records, 
 People are sad and grieve as if their own parents had passed away. For three years, no  
 music is played. Yao knows his own son, unworthy to rule. If he lets Shun rule, no one  
 but his  son will benefit; If his son rules, people will suffer and only his son benefits. Yao  
 says, “I can’t make the people suffer and only let one person benefit.” So he passes his  
 ruling to Shun. (p. 2)    
     When three years of mourning came to an end, Shun intended to return the ruling back to 
Yao’s son. Yet the political power inherited by Yao’s son had disconnected him from the people 
and deteriorated. People came from all around to show respect to Shun. As the time came again 
to pass on the ruling, Shun asked the same question that Emperor Yao asked: “Who can continue 
Emperor Yao’s responsibility in my position?” So Yu (禹) was recommended. Sima writes, “Yu 
is diligent: his earnestness does not deviate from virtue, his Ren is kind and loving, his words can 
be depended on, his voice musical, his body balanced and his movement solemn and in 
propriety” (p. 5).  
     Emperors Yao, Shun, and Yu lived through a period when floods assailed villages, overran 
hills, and fast expanded to encompass mountains. People’s lives were deeply troubled. It was 
mutually understood by both the ruling power and by the people that whoever succeeded in 
governing the water would establish the political power as the next emperor. Yu’s father, Gun, 
was a brother of Emperor Yao. A very influential leader among tribes, Gun was considered 
Emperor Yao’s strongest political competitor. Opponents of Emperor Yao’s Ren argue that, 
sending Gun to govern the water, a mission very hard to accomplish, is more political, and even 
cruel, not Ren. Yao expected Gun’s failure so that he had a legitimate reason to eradicate Gun 
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politically. As expected, after nine years, Gun failed to govern the water and was imprisoned to 
death. The reason why Emperor Yao may not have personally favored his brother Gun as the next 
ruler, and instead wanted to pass on his ruling to someone outside of the family line, is unknown. 
Political as it may have been, Yao’s Ren in choosing Shun instead of his unworthy son is 
undeniable.  
     Aware of the difficulty and political implication of water control, Emperor Shun appointed 
Gun’s son, Yu, to the same task. Again, opponents of Shun’s Ren argue that Shun wanted to 
eradicate Yu, just as Yao wanted to eradicate Gun. The questions remains, however: if Emperor 
Shun so deliberately wanted to kill Yu, why and how dis his ruling eventually pass onto Yu? The 
choice was beyond Emperor Shun himself and his political power because the people chose Yu to 
be the next ruler. For thirteen years, Yu lived and worked with the people and successfully 
managed the rampant water. Sima records,  
 He travels all over the land to learn about rivers and mountains. He marks divisions of  
 the high land and rivers based on the characteristics of the soil using lines of stakes. Yu  
 grieves that his father was punished for not being able to govern the water. Tired in the  
 body and distressed in the mind, he lives away from his home for thirteen years, not  
 daring to enter when passing by his house a few times. With ragged clothes, a simple diet, 
 and poor living conditions, he saves and devotes his budget to work. When traveling  
 along the dry land, he uses a carriage, on the water he uses a boat, in swamps a sledge,  
 over the hills he wears shoes with spikes. On the one hand he holds a measure, and on the 
 other, a compass. Yu envisions opening up nine provinces, diverging nine rivers lines,  
 managing nine lakes, and measuring nine mountains. He distributes seeds for people to  
 plant in low lands. In making roads commutable so food can be sent from areas of surplus 
 to that of scarcity, Yu works for the distribution of wealth and resources in the land.  
 Journeying over nine mountains, following the course of nine rivers, Yu unites the nine  
 provinces by clearing hills of wood, banking swamps, and dredging and leading streams  
 to join rivers. In order to drain the nine streams into the four seas, he deepens channels  
 and canals and connects them with the rivers. So everywhere within the four seas is  
 habitable, and everywhere has a road that leads to the capital. (p. 5) 
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     Knowing that his father died in a conjuncture of civic matters and political battles, Yu had 
reasons to choose revenge against Shun’s political power, rather than to take the given 
responsibility fully. Politically, Yu may not have had a choice but to continue the work 
unfinished by his father. But he chose to do what benefitted the people. He lived through the 
burden knowing that his father was imprisoned to death and that he too may face the same 
destiny. Under all circumstances, the Great Yu completed water control so people could live on 
and prosper.  
     Opponents of Yu’s Ren argue that Yu cultivated and established political forces by dealing 
with water and people. But governing water was a risky task no one was willing to take. Yu 
could have lived and commanded on dry land. Why risking his life to govern water for the 
benefit of others that is so hard to accomplish? Yu may have been forced into the risk, but he 
chose to work with people and for the maximum benefit of people. Yu’s Ren was driven by the 
benefit of other people rather than his own. Confucius remarks, “Seek Ren, gain Ren, what 
complaint could there be?” (7:13). Yu sought Ren, so people responded to and followed his Ren. 
As Yu’s Ren was recognized, Yu accumulated a reputation that laid the foundation for the growth 
of his political power.  
     Confucius remarks, “If names are not set correctly, speaking cannot be fluent ; if speaking is 39
not fluent, things cannot be done successfully” (13: 3). Yu governed water and people finally 
lived on to prosper. This is the reason that Emperor Shun could not deny, no matter how crafty 
his political argument could be. Yu’ Ren as responsibility in governing water convinced the 
 Confucius means that, if the names are used correctly, the language could be fluent in a way 39
that makes sense or be convincing to people. Here Confucius does not refer to the reason that 
constructs argument in modern language, but rather the culture that is accepted by people. 
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people and the people responded to it. This was a power that no emperor, not even the Sky  40
could ignore. In Confucian thought, “the intent of people’s hearts” is the converged, 
consolidated, collective, social, moral responsibility (or, to use Foucault’s words, social 
sensibility), which lays the foundation for all civilization and power relations.  
     Yu sets his mind to follow rather than to conquer  the complexity of nature (namely, the 41
nature of water), by diverting and converging the water to the low lands and then to the sea. He 
taught people to grow crops that were suitable for various types of soil, so more and more lands 
became fertile and habitable. The famous episode of his legend—“pass by home but do not 
enter”—sets an example for people: Yu could leave aside the tangible comfort and personal 
benefits of home, and instead devote his life wholeheartedly for the benefit of other people. The 
Ren Yu seeks was not driven by any results or rewards that could be measured or foreseen in 
advance. It is based on the loving of others that is carried out in action with an uncertain future. 
Yu’s willingness to take on the risk in seeking Ren conveys a powerful message: “if Yu can do 
that for people, why can’t people do the same?” So, the Great Yu received the power of the Sky 
from Shun’s hand because he was approved by people. Years later, Yu followed the footstep of 
Emperor Yao and intended to pass the ruling back to Shun’s son, but the people all came to 
respect Yu. He said, “Ah! With the assistance of virtue, your people will grandly respond to your 
pure intention. With a serene heart, Heaven will manifest the blessing in you” (p. 5). So, Yu went 
on to lead an era of abundance.  
 Sky (天) is the symbolic representation of Heaven in Chinese culture. Its power lies in its own 40
course of balancing the nature and human world in which the converged intention of people’s 
hearts is observed by the Sky.
 Yu’s father failed because he sets his mind in governing, changing, or setting limits for the 41
water. When the flood is so bad that no river banks can contain it.
!116
     To summarize, the ancient rulers who sought Ren, particularly Yu’s governance of water, set a 
powerful educational model. These rulers’ moral responsibility was rooted in a belief that people, 
not power relations, were the foundation of the states. I will now apply this message to modern 
education, where the Ren model is absent, particularly in those establishing educational policy. 
Children are not seen or cared for as the core of education, which is contrary to the Confucian 
way of seeing people as the foundation of the states. In the following section, I discuss the 
implications of Confucian Ren in the Iowa Redistricting Policy.  
Iowa Redistricting—Diversity the Political Way       
     In recent years, the Iowa City Community School District (ICCSD) has been working on a 
redistricting policy that aims to achieve better socioeconomic balance and close the achievement 
gap (I discuss more on achievement gap later). In the policy, school district boundaries are 
changed as an effort to achieve a more balanced distribution of the number of students qualified 
to receive free or reduced-price lunch (FRL) at each school. Starting in the fall of 2014, two-
thirds of K-6 students were faced with the challenge of changing schools. However, the schools’ 
statistics shown for the years of 2014-2016 do not necessarily reflect the alleged commitment. 
While the ICCSD overall has an average of 35% qualified for FRL, Kirkwood Elementary, for 
example, continues to have 69% of enrollment in FRL. Other schools like Wickham and Lincoln, 
however, have a lower than 5% (See Table 1) . In addition, with an average of 19.8% in African 42
American students population, Kirkwood continues to have a high percentage of 43%, while 
schools like Wickham and Lincoln are only at 4% (See Table 2).  
 All data are drawn from http://reports.educateiowa.gov/schoolreportcard.42
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Table 1. Percentage of FRL (ICCSD 2016 Average: 35%) 
Table 2. Percentage of African American Students (ICCSD 2016 Average: 19.8%) 
     Obviously these data do not reflect the socioeconomic and racial diversity that the 
Redistricting Policy claims to do. According to the former Vice President of ICCSD School 
board, Marla Swesey (resigned), “When we’re talking about students’ education, it should not be 
political. It should be what is right for student’s achievement and what’s not” (http://
www.thegazette.com/). Given the observed inconsistency between data and the promised racial 
and socioeconomic diversity, I look further into student proficiency (scores on Iowa Test) to see 
if the redistricting efforts have had any effect on the student’s proficiency score at each school 
(See Table 3). 
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2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Weber 10.4% 15.5% 33.7% 40.9% 42%
Borlaug 23.5% 24.3% 26.3%
Wickham 5.7% 5.5% 6.3% 0.8% 4%
Lincoln 5.5% 5% 3.8% 4.1% 6.1%
Kirkwood 61.7% 67.7% 71.6% 68.7% 68.6%
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Weber 11.4% 10.4% 22.2% 26.1% 26.8%
Borlaug 12.5% 13.7% 16.1%
Wickham 2.5% 2.3% 3.5% 2.7% 3.6%
Lincoln 5.5% 2.1% 2.1% 3.4% 4.1%
Kirkwood 36.8% 35.% 36.4% 41.9% 42.8%
Table 3. Proficiency: African American Students vs. white Students 
   
Through the years of 2014-2016, the proficiency score for African American students in 
Kirkwood remains at an average of 35%. In schools with less than 4% African American 
students, no proficiency for this group is available, since subgroups with less than 10 students are 
intentionally redacted. Given the limited data, it is hard to compare the proficiency of African 
American students between these two significantly different types of schools. So instead, I 
examined proficiency scores historically within Kirkwood itself. But no proficiency change in 
African American students was found. This is not surprising, since neither the percentage of 
African American students population nor the percentage of FRL was affected by the 
redistricting act.  
     Some schools, however, were affected by the policy. Weber Elementary experienced the most 
significant increase in African American students, from a historic average of 10% to 26%. The 
proficiency in African American students in 2014 was 50%; in 2015, it dropped to 40%; and in 
2016, it bounced back to 50%. Again, since no proficiency before the year of redistricting act is 
available (subgroups with less than 10 students are intentionally redacted), it is hard to see how 
the increase in African American students at this particular school affected the proficiency of this 
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group. Based on the limited data through the year of 2014-2016, the proficiency for African 
American students in Weber maintains at about 50% with a population of 25% African American 
students. This proficiency is higher than Kirkwood but lower than Borlaug, which is another 
elementary school that was affected by the redistricting policy. As a new school opened in 2014, 
Borlaug has approximately 15% African American students and the proficiency for this group is 
60%.  
     In summary, the proficiency of African American students is relatively stable (about 50%) at 
Weber when its African American population remains at 25%; the proficiency at Borlaug is 10% 
higher than Weber when African American population is kept at 15%; and there are no 
proficiency changes (35%) at Kirkwood when African American population stays at  43% high. 
Together, these data lead to the following hypothesis: with an average of about 20% African 
American students in the district, if all schools share some responsibility in providing 
educational opportunity for African American students by maintaining a 15-25% African 
American population, like Weber and Borlaug do, the overall proficiency for this group can be 
increased to 50-60%, somewhere between that of Weber and Borlaug. This level is significantly 
higher than that of Kirkwood (35%).  
     According to Ravitch (2013), education reformers often say that African American students 
have made no progress for decade. This is simply not true based on the data mentioned above. In 
the case of Iowa Redistricting, there is significant improvement in the proficiency of African 
American students who are given the opportunity to learn in a school environment where 
classrooms are not about constant settlement of behavioral challenges. Public schools, like 
Weber, can in fact significantly improve the proficiency in students who are previously 
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disadvantaged. If all schools in the district can keep a 15-25% of African American students 
population, more African American students would have the educational opportunity to increase 
their proficiency by a 15-25%. Another fact is worth noticing: the proficiencies for white 
students and other ethnicities in all schools are not affected (an average of 90%) with or without 
the inclusion of African American students. 
     So why are some public schools willing to share the responsibility in providing educational 
opportunity for African American students while others are not? Why are some predominantly 
white schools not willing to include African American students in an educational space that is 
public? Why are these schools not sharing the responsibility in providing educational 
opportunity, especially when the inclusion of a higher percentage of African American students, 
as data have shown, does not necessarily affect the proficiency of their existing student body? If 
not proficiency, what are the other implications?  
     I group my discussion as follows: first, I discuss how feelings of empathy toward 
marginalized others, as well as people’s good intention for public schools, is not enough in 
working toward the equality of educational opportunity. The exclusion of African American 
students in the predominantly white schools will continue to persist if a moral responsibility is 
absent in carrying out the good intentions for public schools; second, the root cause of low-
achievement needs to be addressed, including the question of how to provide an environment 
that meets the educational needs of African American students in a public, however, racialized 
space. Thirdly, I argue that without offering extra-curricular support, such as social service and 
after-school programs, the policy addressing the “achievement gap” will only serve as a tool to 
identify and perpetuate, rather than to close the achievement gap.      
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     Boler (1999) raises the question of how to develop modes of moral understanding in order to 
build democracy in education. The author describes “the experience of reading a newspaper in a 
state of numbness, that all too familiar strategy for absorbing information without feeling it” (p. 
156). On the one hand, this “habit of mind…has its immediate value… as a form of self-
protection” (p. 156). However, in the case of Iowa Redistricting, in which some predominantly 
white schools are not sharing the responsibility of providing educational opportunity for African 
American students, the habit of exclusion does not necessarily demonstrate any immediate value 
as a form of self-protection. As mentioned above, the proficiency for white students in these 
schools does not get better as they exclude African American students. In fact, the proficiency for 
white students in Borlaug and Weber is as good as Wickham. On the other hand, according to 
Boler, “because of the reluctance of the average mind to make this translation [from the habit of 
mind to moral responsibility] into human terms, the teacher must take the responsibility for 
stimulating it” (p. 156, added brackets). Educators know well that it is not just the teacher’s, but 
the whole society’s responsibility to work against a habit of mind that dwells in the comfort of 
feeling empathy toward others. Boler questions the way policy makers politically manipulate 
people’s empathy in the name of diversity. 
  Across the political and disciplinary spectrum, conservative and liberals alike advocate  
 variations of empathy as a solution to society’s ills… Empathy is promoted as a bridge  
 between differences, the affective reason for engaging in democratic dialogue with the  
 other. But who and what… benefits from the production of empathy? In what ways does  
 empathy risk decontextualizing particular moral problems? In short, what is gained by the 
 social imagination and empathy, and is this model possibly doing our social vision more  
 harm than good? (p. 156) 
     Empathy alone does not deliver the good intention, nor does being sensitive to others’ cultural 
differences. Only when the empathy and good intention are carried out can they disturb the 
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existing power relations and lead to the equality of educational opportunity. Boler (1999) asserts 
that education should be seen “as a means to challenge the rigid patterns of thinking that 
perpetuate injustice” (p. 157). It should encourage a critical, self-reflective evaluation of the 
complex relations of power and emotions through which a consciousness of exclusion can be 
transformed. The Iowa redistricting Policy fails to carry out the good intention people have for 
public schools because the consciousness of exclusion persists. This case provides an example of 
the political manipulation of people’s empathy toward the marginalized in relation to public 
schools. While more and more money is spent transporting students from their homes to more 
distant neighborhoods, expanding school facilities, and providing computer access, little support 
is given to teachers and students in an effort to address the root cause of achievement gap. This 
leads to the second point of discussion mentioned above: addressing the cause of low-
achievement.  
     In particular, Weber had 10% of African American students before the percentage is increased 
to the current 25%. Due to multiple reasons, some teachers in Weber left their jobs. For the year 
of 2016, the staff retention in Weber has dropped a 15% (http://directory.iowa.gov/organization/
index), whereas staff retention at other schools was stable. The reasons are the following: first, 
most existing teachers are not experienced in working with the different behaviors that this body 
of students brings to classrooms. Second, based on information learned at PTO meetings (Parent 
Teacher Organization), school orientation, and public hearings on school’s reform, teachers are 
not provided with professional training in support of their inexperience in this regard. Thirdly, 
due to these two reasons, teachers often feel that they are challenged in working with this group 
of students. Teachers have no other option or resource of support but to send the students to the 
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principal’s office. Ironically, in the past two years, Weber has changed its principal three times. 
How can the principals become community and visionary leaders? How do they develop and 
share close relations with students, parents, and teachers when the position holder is frequently 
changing (Jones and Kennedy, 2008)?  
     As a result, teachers reinforce discipline and punishment without providing the learning 
environment appropriate and adequate for marginalized students. Mitchell (2010) raises the 
question of “how to meet the educational needs for students of color once they arrive on 
predominantly white” schools (pp. 294-295). The author asserts, “This arrival of groups who 
have been historically excluded has created a unique dilemma” for both the teachers and students 
themselves as well (p. 295). As the inclusion of marginalized groups “signals an increase in 
diversity” in schools, however, it assumes that the pubic school space is “race-neutral” (p. 296). 
According to Mitchell, marginalized students are in fact entrapped in a racialized space, which is 
not equipped to provide the unique support these students need. 
     In addition to the lack of support for teachers, students are not provided with extra-curricular 
support, such as after-school programs. At the time of school dismissal, the same group of 
students, who got off the bus in the morning, got on the bus again and were sent home. Simply 
increasing the number of marginalized students in public school does not bring the equality of 
educational opportunity, nor does it close the achievement gap. The social, cultural, racial, and 
economic challenges that marginalized students face outside of the school context must be 
addressed. Mitchell (2010) asserts, “Educators must possess critical understanding of race and 
space” embedded in the history of schooling (p. 305). 
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     Not only for African American students, learning in general in Weber is impeded. Who has 
time for playing, exploring, and learning when the teachers are constantly trying to maintain a 
class order? Instead, teachers teach to the tests and students learn to master the testing points. 
The mandate to prepare students exclusively for standardized tests is carried out to the extreme. 
Children are not learning “how to socialize with others, how to listen… how to communicate 
well…while engaging in the joyful pursuit of play and learning that is appropriate to their age 
and development” (Ravitch, 2013, p. 7). Learning is reduced to a process of fact-recalling that 
lacks intellectual challenge. This intellectual dullness sets a limitation in the curious mind and 
often turns students off. As a consequence, the manufactured diversity impedes learning for all 
students. Superficial diversity at schools does little for racial and socioeconomic equality, but 
instead impedes upon the development of learning conditions that meet the educational needs for 
all children. Under the cover of diversity, the privilege of the predominantly white schools 
persist. Their exclusion of African American students—the unwillingness to share the 
responsibility in providing educational opportunity—casts another challenge to the already 
problematic implementation of standards and assessments in schools like Weber. 
     Thirdly, in relation to standards and testing, many researchers also question the use of 
achievement gap as a tool to identify and punish the low-achieving students. According to Hatch 
(2002), achievement gaps serve to identify the low-achieving students as failures. They punish 
and delimit students from future educational opportunity. The author asserts, “Using the threat of 
failure as a tool to motivate young children…is an absurd notion that characterizes a system 
designed to punish rather than improve” (p. 459). Instead of punish, education should discover 
where students are, what their strengths are, and what additional guidance is needed. It needs to 
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builds upon each student’s uniqueness, rather than to strip away their characteristics through 
disciplines and punishment. The standardized test score is but not the only variance to understand 
the achievement gaps. Grodsky (2008) et al. point out, “Our society is stratified along the lines of 
race and SES [socioeconomic status]; standardized test scores reflect that fact” (p. 399). The real 
issue is how policymakers, educators, and gatekeepers should respond to the differences.   
     Without addressing the differences of students’ living environment, discussions of the 
achievement gap operate under an ideology of segregation. Public education in the United States 
has come a long from explicit segregation. Educational rights have been made legally equal after 
the Civil Rights Acts of 1964. However, the legal protection of educational rights alone is not 
enough in carrying out the equality, as well as the quality, of educational opportunity for all, 
especially for marginalized groups. Ravitch (2013) points out that public schools are in trouble 
because of racial segregation. The author recalls, 
  The period in which achievement gap was narrowed the most was the 1970s and 1980s,  
 in response to some factors, one of which is desegregation… The source of the gap is not  
 secret. African Americans have been subject to a long history of social and economic  
 oppression and disadvantage; higher level of poverty, low level of education… Policies  
 are insufficient to overcome generations of racism. (p. 58) 
     Educators know well that achievement gaps begin long before children start school. They are 
rooted in social, political, and economic structures that cannot be seen as an isolated 
phenomenon for which schools and teachers alone are held accountable. Schools cannot close the 
achievement gaps independent of wider social change. Policymakers talk a lot about closing the 
achievement gap, but not about closing the socioeconomic gap. Ravitch (2013) asserts, “What 
we call achievement gaps are in fact opportunity gaps” (p. 62). It will take a whole society’s 
responsibility to address the opportunity gaps. 
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     To summarize, under the cover of diversity, the Iowa Redistricting Policy conforms to an 
ideology of segregation that excludes African American students in some predominantly white 
schools, while other schools—schools that share the responsibility in providing educational 
opportunity for African American students—are set up with an additional challenge, adding to 
the already problematic implementation of standards. The absence of moral responsibility in the 
policymakers indirectly pushes the practice of teaching and learning “to the tests” to its extreme, 
which is not oriented toward the goal of benefitting children as lifetime achievers. Without 
addressing the social, racial, economic background that exists outside of the school context, and 
without providing the curriculum support that serves the educational need of marginalized 
groups, the achievement gap will continue to exist. Rather than setting up a model of Ren that 
leads people to recognize and learn moral responsibility, as discussed in the section about ancient 
rulers in China, the Iowa redistricting Policy sets a negative model through which children are 
accustomed to a habituated numbness and unwillingness in carrying out good intentions for the 
benefit of others. It deviates from an ideal of public school that bonds people together and brings 
equal opportunity and quality education to all. Yet, not all efforts to improve education in the 
United States lack the moral responsibility. In the following section on law cases, people’s moral 
responsibility is not missing but plays a critical role in the protection of academic autonomy. 
Moral Responsibility in Higher Education: The Protection of Academic Autonomy             
     The power of people’s collective moral responsibility is not only demonstrated in the ancient 
rulers of Ren, but is also found in United States higher education. In this section, I fast forward 
from ancient China to the modern United States. I include this application for two reasons: first, 
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as discussed in Chapter 4, the Confucian self is foremost an autonomous self whose rights are 
assured through its Ren, although the Confucian self is often critiqued and misunderstood as 
incapable of claiming individual rights. Second, the law cases indicate that people’s moral 
responsibility does exist and play a critical role in the protection of academic autonomy in 
addition to the legal enforcement. However, if education continues to reinforce the individual, 
results-, rights-driven subjectivity at the expense of moral responsibility, the power of people’s 
moral responsibility may not rise above the surface during critical, social circumstances. I begin 
with a little background on human rights.  
     At the International Institute of Human Rights, Vasak  (1979) for the first time talks about 43
three generations of human rights: first generation civil/political rights, second generation 
economic/social/cultural rights, and third generation solidarity rights. Racial discrimination is 
considered a violation of civil/political rights. Both civil/political rights and economic/social/
cultural rights are protected by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as the 
human rights. The UDHR recognizes, “Without civil and political rights, the public cannot assert 
their economic, social, and cultural rights; similarly, without livelihood of a working society, the 
public cannot assert or make use of civil or political rights” (http://www.un.org/en/universal-
declaration-human-rights/). The question is: what makes of the livelihood of a working society? 
Is legal enforcement alone enough to establish the livelihood of a working society?  
     In 1993, the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action confirms that all “human rights are 
universal, indivisible and interdependent and related. The international community must treat 
 Karal Vask: Czech jurist, became the first Secretary-General of the International Institute of 43
Human Rights in 1969, a position he held until 1980.  
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human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same 
emphasis” (http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Vienna.aspx). In practice, 
however, two of the three protected human rights are not given equal consideration. Civil rights 
have historically been given priority at the expense of economic, social, cultural rights such as 
academic autonomy and freedom, especially at times of national emergency. On the one hand, 
the law claims that academic autonomy and freedom is an essential aspect of American education 
on the grounds of four essential freedoms–who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be 
taught, and who may be admitted to study. Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New Hampshire 
(1957) delivers the following often-cited statement: 
 It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is the most conducive  
 to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevails “the  
 four essential freedoms” of a university–to determine for itself on academic grounds  
 who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to  
 study. (http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/354/234.html)  
  
     There are, however, complications. On the other hand, the alleged “modern terror-suspects 
right” is one example of how national security can be used to justify violations of academic 
autonomy and freedoms. Prioritizing national security over academic freedom of speech 
becomes a practical decision in which yielding academic freedom of speech is a prerequisite and 
proof of one’s loyalty to the nation. In Schenk v. United States (1919), Holmes delivers the 
opinion of the Supreme Court explicitly pointing out that in circumstances of war where certain 
acts create “a clear and present danger,” the academic freedom of speech is no longer protected 
by the First Amendment. Thus it is within the power of Congress to punish such acts at the 
expense of academic freedom. Holmes delivered the following opinion of the court: 
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We admit that, in many places and in ordinary times, the defendants, in saying all that 
was said in the circular, would have been within their constitutional rights. But the 
character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done…. When a 
nation is at war, many things that might be said in times of peace are such a hindrance to 
its efforts that their utterance will not be protected by any constitutional right. (http://
www.firstamendmentcenter.org/faclibrary/Library.aspx) 
     How then should academic autonomy and freedom be practiced when it conflicts with legal 
enforcements on national security? According to Egéa-Kuhne (2001), academic freedom bears 
the responsibility in working through tensions, double injunctions, and contradictions. In 
denouncing the censorship of institutional power and its effect under any guise, this 
responsibility brings the justice of rights. The Burt v. Rumsfeld (2005) in the United States 
District Court for the District of Connecticut is a case in which the military and its recruitment 
processes compromised academic freedom of speech. However, the Yale Law School (YLS) 
faculty’s and student’s collective effort to resolve this conflict eventually earned the court’s 
support for academic freedom of speech.  
     More specifically, Yale Law School (YLS) in 1972, and then again in 1978, enacted a non-
discrimination policy (NDP). The NDP barred against discrimination on the basis of religion, 
race, and national origin, as well as sexual orientation. This NDP also applied to the recruitment 
of military service on campus. After having been accused of violating the Solomon Amendment  44
in 2003, YLS faculties voted to approve a temporary suspension of the NDP to declare their 
compliance with the Solomon Amendment and also to avoid a $300 million funding loss to Yale 
University (www.lexisnexis.com.libezp.lib.lsu.edu). Later in 2003, a letter was issued by the 
 The 1996 Solomon Amendment is a United States federal law that allows the Secretary of 44
Defense to deny federal grants (including research grants) to institutions of higher education if 
they prohibit or prevent military recruitment on campus.
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Department of Defense informing Yale that the temporary suspension of NDP “remains an 
obstacle to military recruiters” and that the “Yale University be determined ineligible for the 
Department of Defense funding” unless “a change of policy sufficient to overcome the 
deficiencies” would be issued.      
     During the primary years of conflict, 2003-2004, a total of only five Law School students 
agreed to interview with the military recruiters and none had accepted employment. This may 
have been the key point that won the court’s support because the court observed the fact that, for 
two years, coercive enforcement of Solomon Amendment and subsequent suspensions of NDP 
had not advanced any effective military recruitment. The enforcement of Solomon Amendment 
without respecting YLS’s existing non-discrimination policy practically failed. Legal 
enforcement of national security could demand a violation of academic freedom, however, it 
could not punish the collective, moral responsibility that emerged from people and the social 
context as a whole. To some extent, legal forces can practice power when people accept it as 
good and necessary for the working of society. In the case of Burt v. Rumsfeld (2005), it was a 
practical decision for the court to put a stop to the coercive and unsuccessful enforcement of 
Solomon Amendment as an effort to best retain the government’s intention for bettering the 
livelihood of a working society. It is rather ironic that violations of academic freedom over 
national security can both start and fail for the same practical reason.  
     What makes the winning of Burt v. Rumsfeld (2005) and the losing of Schenk v. the United 
States (1919) possible, since both cases concern academic freedom? One could argue that the 
failure of Schenk and the success of Burt involve the question of whether or not the nation is at 
war. However, this argument makes little sense given the fact that the conflict between YLS and 
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Department of Defense occurred during 2001-2005, a period characterized by heightened 
national security after the “9/11” attack in 2001. Rather, YLS’s success lies in the faculty’s and 
student’s collective responsibility at a time when they felt that academic autonomy and freedom 
were compromised. The essence of academic rights is not to create supremacy for limited groups 
of people, nor to sever faculty’s and student’s beliefs from political consideration. Moral 
responsibility can exercise its power rather than comply unquestionably to political and legal 
forces. In short, The legal enforcement of academic autonomy and freedom alone cannot better 
the livelihood of a working society without the consideration of people’s collective 
responsibility. 
     To summarize, Confucianism was one of the generations of philosophy  to which ancient 45
practice of Ren was passed on. The practice of Ren modeled by rulers is the original seed for 
Confucian Ren. To Confucians, Ren can only become part of the self and become powerful when 
it emerges from within the self voluntarily, rather than when it is externally imposed politically. 
As the symbolic models of Ren demonstrate, the ancient practice of Ren do not rely on political, 
legal enforcements, but instead carry out Ren in the actions of the rulers themselves. The 
legendary Great Yu governed water for the benefit of the people without seeking the reward of 
his own. His Ren touched people’s hearts and thus won him the political power. In the case of 
Burt v. Rumsfeld (2005), YLS faculty’s and students’ collective responsibility sustained the effort 
to protect academic freedom. Together their moral responsibility denounced the censorship of 
institutional power, in this case, that of the military. However, when the moral responsibility is 
absent, as in the case of the Iowa Redistricting Policy, education conforms to an ideology of 
 The other two generations of philosophy are Taoism and Buddhism.45
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segregation that excludes African American students, and goes against the ideal of public 
education for which Americans have fought. Confucian Ren is not passive empathy; it carries out 
good intentions for the benefit of others. Together the moral responsibility in leadership and 
people’s recognition of Ren can transform political power. Only in taking on the moral 
responsibility can educational change become possible. 
!133
CONCLUSION: ENVISION AN EDUCATION AS A MORAL RESPONSIBILITY      
     
     In 1916, Lewis Terman revised French physiologist/psychologist Binet’s Test of Intelligence 
and renamed it the Stanford-Binet Test of Intelligence. Terman used the Stanford-Binet Test to 
sort schoolchildren according to their cognitive ability. Following the years of the World War I, 
Terman transformed the Army Alpha Test  into the National Intelligence Tests for 46
schoolchildren as a way to capitalize on the “efficient military grouping procedures” (Gallagher, 
2003, p. 88). As Terman’s ability test gained popularity, educators are led into the idea that 
performance evidence, such as test scores, can measure student’s knowledge and learning, as 
well as to predict, diagnose, and explain individual differences. Terman’s pursuit of efficiency in 
ranking and sorting students, along with other social factors, such as the booming urban 
enrollment and the need for industrial competition, propelled the institutionalization of 
standardized testing in public schools.  
     However, questions remain: how can the comprehensive learning and human behavior be 
measured scientifically? How should policymakers and educators respond to students’ 
achievement differences reflected through test scores? In 2001, the NCLB added a federal 
mandate that all states implement accountability systems. Public schools that fail to make 
adequate yearly progress are subject to restructure and fund change. The enforced accountability 
further complicates the already controversial practice of standardized testing. 
 The Army Alpha Test was used to identify officer candidates from a large pool of recruits and 46
then place the rest of recruits in positions where they could function most productively.
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     In practice, standardized testing has shown tremendous effects and limitations on curricular 
content at the expense of the quality of learning. Standardization sets boundaries for what 
teachers should teach, what student should learn, and how well students should learn. This is not 
to say that there should not be expectation in learning, nor to question the value of scientific 
method used in testing per se. The problem lies in the fact that standardization associated with 
accountability pressures teachers and schools to describe students’ achievements in terms of test 
scores. Consequently, teachers develop rigid curricular instructions in order to follow precisely 
the predetermined standards aligned with the tests.  
     In addition, discipline is carried out to the extreme that carves out individual difference, 
which is “fundamentally important to the future of the human species” (Gallagher, 2003, p. 85). 
Foucault’s discourse of discipline and power provides a powerful lens to understand 
standardization as a process to make children docile subjects. Not only to produce docile bodies 
in students, the absolute discipline leaves no place for the development of qualities such as 
“cognitive flexibility, self-direction, cooperation resourceful, perspective-taking, the ability to 
communicate clearly, and use of strategies such as planning and goal-setting” (Gallagher, pp. 
96-97), which are fundamental for lifetime achievements. As children are shaped as results-
driven individuals and trained to conform to a political utility of control, they are not cared as 
lifetime achievers.  
     Although the historical rationale for standardized testing was to ensure that all children have 
the opportunity for educational advancement and that the “increasingly sophisticated 
measurement tools would result in a more objective and equitable system of 
assessment” (Gallagher, 2003, p. 84), in practice, the use of test scores does not deliver its 
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alleged democratic ideal. Winfield (2007) points out that standardized testing uses test scores as 
a tool to justify for racism and classism in which “boundaries remain intact” and “compromise 
and consideration are not built in to the system” (p. 152). The author asserts, 
 One did not enter into the public discourse in order to discover…[but rather] to convince  
 and compel others to believe what was presented. The influence of this early parameter  
 ensured that from the very beginning, education was a conduit for training and advocacy  
 rather than an environment of discovery and learning. (p. 152, original italics) 
     Grodsky (2008) et al. also point out, “The real issue is [not the test scores, but] the stratified 
distribution of knowledge and skills reflected in the scores” (p. 400). Standardized testing 
functions as a means of “social reproduction” rather than “social redistribution” (p. 389). The 
authors write,  
 Our society is stratified along the line of race and SES [socioeconomic status];   
 standardized test scores reflect that fact. To try to hide this truth by designing a test that  
 shows no difference in the achievement of those historically advantages and those  
 consistently denied OTL [opportunity to learn] would be both disingenuous and   
 regressive. (p. 399)  
     Winfield (2007) further points out, “Education as a social institution was conceived and 
developed during the height of the eugenics movement and in many ways is the product of 
eugenic ideological thinking” (p. 99). The author explains, “Eugenic ideology, replete with 
imperatives and proscriptions” (p. 151) is “more closely aligned with a capitalist paradigm and 
the desire to accumulate wealth rather than a democratic one” (p. 155). For the purpose of 
creating a superior Nordic race, standardized testing derives from a eugenic ideology that 
perpetuates a hierarchical conception of human race.      
     In summary, education’s current reliance on standardization represents a persistence of 
eugenic ideology that dismisses a historical introspection of domination associated with power. 
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As test scores are considered the only reliable and valid evidence of students’ ability, education is 
reduced to a procedural model that eliminates the political and cultural conflicts from the center 
of curricula debate. The high-stake testing diverts attention away from the difficulty issues of 
institutionalized racism and classism.  
     Most importantly, standardization impacts “not only non-Nordic and poor people, but 
everyone” (Winfield, 2007, p. 149). It creates in the minds of all children a causal link between 
individual economic advancement and test scores. The result is an individualistic, ontological, 
docile, rational, and rewards-, rights-driven subjectivity that lacks the consideration for others. 
Foucault’s subjectivity is reduced to “strategies of knowledge and power” (Wang, 2004, p. 137) 
and thus incapable of caring for itself or feeling achieved. With this subjectivity, children would 
grow up to pursue “good” lives without having the opportunity to realize the value of a moral 
responsibility toward others. In short, standardization perpetuates racism and rejects human 
nature’s moral imperatives toward others.  
     The Confucian Ren offers helpful insights to see education as a way of living to one’s 
potential, rather than a way of training agents that thrive in competition. It understands that life is 
more than just economic advancement and that feelings of lifetime achievements dwell not in the 
material abundance of one’s own, but in the delivery of others’ benevolence. Believing that all 
children are born with a moral goodness that can be cultivated toward a moral responsibility, the 
Confucian Ren provides a moral grounding for the development of children’s subjectivity. As a 
result, subjectivity of Confucian Ren is relational, reflective, and moral.  
     To build something stronger and higher, Confucius focuses to work on the foundation. Just 
like the Chinese bamboo, it develops strong root before showing visible signs of growth. The 
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Confucian Ren allows children to grow the same way Chinese bamboo grows. Confucius 
remarks in the Analects, “Establish [or work on] the root, then the Dao (道, the way) is born” (1: 
2). What is the root? What is the Dao? This message captures the very essence of Confucian 
thought: Ren (仁, benevolence) is the root and Ren is the Dao (道, the way). Confucius believes 
in the moral goodness of human nature, which is the seed of Ren. He also believes that this moral 
goodness needs to cultivated toward the Ren Dao, which is the carrying out of good intention or 
the practice of Ren, especially in rulers.  
     Confucius stresses the importance of the practice of Ren for rulers as much as it is for people. 
If the leaders govern in the Dao of Ren, people would respond in the Dao of Ren; if the leaders 
rely too much on legal forces, people would strive to avoid the punishment. In the case of Iowa 
Redistricting, the absence of a moral responsibility in those leading and establishing policy for 
diversity allows remnants of segregation to persist. Achievement gaps continue to be opportunity 
gaps and thus perpetuated. The diversity practiced in Iowa Redistricting is against the Confucian 
way of Ren Dao: when the leadership of education claims one thing but does another, people lose 
their sense of respect toward the leadership and the cohesion of public education suffers. 
     If the Dao of Ren is present in the leadership, people by nature would recognize it, the same 
way children by nature recognize the love of their parents when they are indeed loved. Together 
the practice of Ren in the leadership and people’s response to Ren can transform the existing 
political power, not the other way around. The legendary Great Yu governs the water for the 
benefit of the people without seeking the instant reward of his own. Yu’s Ren is not passive 
empathy that denies the existing power relations; rather it thrives through the working of 
conflicting power relations. In this sense, subjectivity of Confucian Ren is also transformative. 
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The more responsible the one is, the more one’s rights are assured. So Yu’s Ren wins him the 
political status and changes the existing power. In the case of Burt v. Rumsfeld (2005), the YLS 
faculty’s and student’s collective effort changed the Court’s decision and complemented the legal 
protection of academic autonomy.  
     The Confucian choice of Ren Dao over legality as a way of governance can be applied to the 
current state of education focusing on discipline and standardization. To Confucius, learning is 
meaningful only when it is emerged from within the self voluntarily rather than externally 
imposed. It involves not externally imposed disciplines, but an intimate communication with the 
nature and people around. Only when the learning is disconnected from external rewards can it 
become part of the self and become powerful. Moreover, the accumulation of knowledge is 
secondary to the establishment of root (i.e., Ren). Confucius remarks, “Those who learn but do 
not think are lost. Those who think but do not learn are in great danger” (2: 15).  
     In Confucian thought, to think is to think Ren, to learn is to learn through relations and 
conflicts, not simply knowledge, nor discipline. The same way children feel the love of their 
parents, children by nature can recognize the ways they are disciplined and trained at school for a 
purpose other than caring. My daughter often comments, “They don’t care!” She knows that 
teachers only “care” about the test scores, but she does not know that teachers do so because 
education has been reduced to standardization and discipline. But educators know the fact that 
children are trained to be docile for the purpose of a political utility. If educators cannot help but 
to care a little for the welfare of the future generation, they should recognize the limitation of 
standardization as it exists in education. 
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     The Confucian Ren embraces the innate, moral, caring feelings humans have toward the 
others. Confucius admires the wandering into nature as a way to nurture the body, because in the 
body dwells the heart, and in the heart dwells the moral responsibility. Just like the water 
simultaneously takes the shape of environments and moves with transformative power, the 
Confucian Ren transforms the existing power for the benefit of other people. Just like the water 
never loses but gains momentum in shaping around its environment, the Confucian Ren does not 
lose but gain power and autonomy in taking on the moral responsibility. Without the practice of 
Ren in leaderships, public education would not deliver the equality of educational opportunity for 
all children. Without incorporating the element of moral responsibility in everyday classroom, 
children would continue to be trained and limited as results-, rights-driven agents, rather than 
cared as autonomous, responsible individuals who are capable of leading worthwhile lives.  
     It takes a courageous, conscious, and moral choice to recognize the racism as it exists in 
education and within the memory of people itself. As a member of the dominant culture, 
Winfield (2007) had initiated a moral introspection as an effort make changes. 
 I am a white American, I am privileged, and my ancestors were no doubt active   
 participatory agents in the above tracing [of the collective memory of eugenics]… I  
 cannot begin to imagine the stories of those who exist, and have existed outside this  
 dominance…Like an alcoholic, dominance requires frequent refreshment, is a master of  
 manipulation, can be charming and seductive, and is dying internally. (p. 164) 
     To end, education as a social institution, should not be reduced to a technological model that 
eliminates the political and cultural conflicts from the center of curricula debate. Test scores 
should not be used as a tool to justify for racism and classism in order to keep the boundaries of 
control intact. In addition to the learning of knowledge, considerations for others should also be 
built in to the system. Education should encourage the uniqueness of human nature as morally 
!140
responsible and work toward the benefiting of children as lifetime achievers, rather than as 
rewards-driven subjects. In children’s eyes, there is no dichotomy of rights and responsibility. 
     The Confucian Ren understands people’s collective memory, not simply as a way of social 
reproduction or continuity that is passed generations after generations, but as a way of social 
transformation—it believes that people’s innate moral awareness can be encouraged and 
cultivated into a moral responsibility for others, especially if the practice of Ren is present in 
leaderships. As a member outside of the dominance, I believe the choice of reading the Analects 
with my daughter could be a starting point and seed for a moral responsibility that would bring 
care for more children. 
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